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ABSTRACT 
 
GLOBAL CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION  
FOR EXPORT ORIENTED FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
By 
JOSE RENE RENDON-GARZA 
August, 2006  
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics  
 Economic integration and mobility of capital have set the ground for a significant 
competition over resources. Tax competition for internationally mobile tax bases such as 
foreign direct investments has become an important matter of study. Nevertheless, 
literature has focused on a regional or geographical neighboring condition competition 
through taxes. This dissertation aims to test whether tax competition for foreign direct 
investment has changed its regional characteristic towards a global or world-wide 
competition. Global or world-wide tax competition can be thought as uncooperative tax 
policy reactions between governments of different countries of the world not necessarily 
near each other geographically, but in similar economic conditions and with the purpose 
to influence the allocation of mobile tax bases world-wide. For the purpose of this study, 
export oriented foreign capital investment was referred to as the internationally mobile 
tax base. 
A theoretical model was constructed allowing for three countries, geographical 
distance, transportation costs, labor and technology skills, as well as four types of 
individuals: workers, capitalists, and two types of entrepreneurs. Optimal corporate 
  
 xiii 
statutory and average effective tax rates were obtained in order to serve as reaction 
functions between governments and evaluate the presence of tax competition.  
A spatial econometric model was used to estimate the empirical approximation of 
the theoretical model. Four types of weight matrixes were computed: homogeneous 
weights, similar economic conditions, similar transportation costs from the FDI host 
country to the FDI home country, and neighboring conditions of FDI host countries. The 
sample covered 53 countries from different areas of the world from 1984 to 2002. 
Regarding the data, several variables were constructed, among those: the 
corporate average effective tax rate. The statutory corporate tax rate was discarded since 
it misses important factors for capital investment such as tax holidays and depreciation 
schedules.  
The principal result suggests that countries from the sample appear to behave in a 
tax competitive way not only in geographical neighboring terms but also in a global or 
world-wide approach. In fact, countries appear to compete in a stronger way in global or 
world-wide terms than when assuming a regional or neighboring condition.  
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobility of capital and economic integration have had an enormous impact in 
improving living standards around the world by providing firms and consumers with new 
options of prices, products and forms of financing. Nonetheless, they have also brought 
new ways to increase competition and relocate resources worldwide. In fact, mobility of 
capital has set the ground for a significant competition over resources. Of particular 
concern is tax competition over internationally mobile tax bases, such as foreign direct 
investments (FDI).  
In this sense, recently, the Mexican Ministry of Economy (MME) has noticed that 
many foreign firms (export maquila) from the electronic, textile, plastic, and furniture 
sectors, among others, previously functioning on Mexican territory, have decided to fly 
away to countries in completely different regions of the world, such as China, 
Philippines, Czech Republic, Thailand, and Malaysia. Additionally, Palencia and Angeles 
(2003a) from the Mexican National Board of the Export Maquila Industry (CNIME) have 
pointed towards the loss of competitiveness of Mexico against China, Malaysia, Korea 
and Thailand in the electric and electronic sectors, among others.1 Both, MME and 
Palencia and Angeles (2003a), have concluded that among several factors affecting 
Mexico’s FDI inflows, corporate tax rates appear to be not as competitive as those of the 
other countries to where many foreign firms are moving (see Palencia & Angeles, 2003a, 
2003b; Secretaría de Economía [MME], 2002).   
                                                 
1
 Additionally, empirical work by García-Herrero and Santabárbara (2004) show that from 1995 to 2001 
China’s inward foreign direct investment appears to have reduced that of Mexico and Colombia.  
  
 
2 
Analyzing those conclusions, it is clear that the countries above could be more 
competitive or less competitive than Mexico, in terms of wages, infrastructure, or 
transportation costs, but the fact that the Czech Republic, Philippines and Singapore, 
have reduced their corporate tax rates since 1997,2 while China, Malaysia, and Thailand 
have given highly preferential treatments to foreign firms such as tax reductions and 
exemptions, accelerated depreciation, investment credits, and special deductions, 
represent an additional factor towards increasing competitiveness and attracting foreign 
capital.3 Comparatively, Mexico has the highest statutory corporate tax rate among these 
countries of about 35 percent until 2002, 34 percent in 2003 and 33 percent in 2004.4 On 
the other hand, Mexican policymakers have also encouraged attractive corporate tax 
policies in the form of special deductions, tax exemptions, and investment credits, but 
none of them at a similar level than in the countries mentioned previously (Ley del 
Impuesto Sobre la Renta, 2002). Thus, neither Mexico’s corporate tax rates, nor its tax 
policies, seem as competitive as those of the previous countries and the conclusions 
provided by MME and Palencia and Angeles (2003a) from CNIME could not be that far 
from reality.   
                                                 
2
 The Czech Republic, Philippines and Singapore reduced their statutory corporate tax rate set in 1997 at 39 
percent, 35 percent, and 26 percent, respectively, to 28 percent, 32 percent, and 22 percent in 2004. On the 
other hand, China, and Thailand maintained their corporate tax rate at 33 percent and 30 percent, 
respectively since 1997, while Malaysia fixed its tax rate at 28 percent since 1998. See KPMG (1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). 
3
 For example, the 33 percent corporate tax rate of China is composed of a 30 percent state tax and a 3 
percent local tax. Nonetheless, the state tax may be reduced to a 15 percent or 24 percent if the foreign 
investment firms are located in a specially designated zone or associated in special operations or projects. 
Additionally, a foreign investment firm can be entitled to a tax exemption or reduction during a tax holiday 
period. Furthermore, the 3 percent local tax can be waived by the local government. In Thailand, the 
corporate tax rate is set at 30 percent; however, for small and medium enterprises or companies with less 
than Baht 5 million paid up capital, the corporate tax rate is 20 percent on the first Baht 1 million of net 
taxable profits and 25 percent on the next Baht 2 million. The corporate tax rate is also reduced to 20-25 
percent for companies registered with the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
4
 See KPMG (2002, 2003, 2004). 
  
 
3 
Acknowledging the above fact, could it be possible that countries’ policymakers 
in China, Philippines, Czech Republic, Thailand, or Malaysia have internalized that 
corporate taxes represent a factor towards increasing competitiveness, and given the high 
mobility of capital of these days, they have embarked on a reduction in corporate tax 
rates or in the provision of other corporate tax incentives in order to attract internationally 
mobile firms. Is it possible that Mexico, China, Philippines, Czech Republic, and 
Malaysia, could be presenting a degree of corporate tax competition to attract FDI? Note 
that these countries differ in competitiveness, but principally in the geographical region 
(i.e., continent) in which they are located.5 Hence, restructuring the question above, does 
corporate tax competition among countries from far away geographical regions of the 
world occur?  
In this context, what does the literature on tax competition states regarding a 
corporate tax competition scheme among countries at different regions of the world not 
located as geographical neighbors?  
First we need to define the term “tax competition.” According to Wilson and 
Wildasin (2004), tax competition can be defined as “non-cooperative tax setting by 
interdependent governments, under which each government’s policy choices influence 
the allocation of a mobile tax base among regions represented by these governments.” 
Alternatively, Alfano (2001) defines tax competition as “the possibility of countries to 
modify their tax base against the reduction of other countries’ tax base.” Thus, tax 
competition can be viewed as a reduction in domestic tax rates, or the implementation of 
partial exemption schemes, in order to enlarge the domestic tax base, or at least to attract 
economic activity.  
                                                 
5
 These countries are located far away in geographical distance terms. 
  
 
4 
Tax competition to attract foreign direct investment has been brought to debate 
from different lines of thought. One of such lines represented by authors as Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Keen and Marchand (1997), Janeba and Wilson 
(1999), and Wellisch (2000) highlights its potential negative effects as tax competition 
may reduce welfare by leading to inefficient low levels of public expenditure and tax 
rates, limiting the scope of taxation, the ability to relocate income among citizens, and the 
provision of public goods. 
Another line of thought comes from the public choice literature, which represents 
the strongest challenge to the notion that tax competition reduces welfare. Work by 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Rauscher (1997, 1998), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and 
Parry (2001) indicate that tax competition benefits countries by improving welfare 
through a reduction in wasteful government spending. The reasoning behind their 
proposal is that politicians and government officials act to maximize their own objectives 
or are at least greatly influenced by rent-seeking special interest groups. Government 
provides the infrastructure and institutional framework in which economic activity takes 
place. If it is inefficient, mobile factors are driven out of the country leading to a decline 
in income and employment of the immobile factors. As a consequence, the voters would 
be worse off and would punish the government by electing other parties or candidates 
counteracting the politicians own objectives of reelection. The government, then, is 
forced to act and increase the jurisdiction’s attractiveness to mobile factors of production 
requiring lower taxes and better public services. For that reason, the part of the budget 
spent by public officials for their own interests must shrink, allowing government’s 
officials to reduce waste in government spending. Furthermore, tax competition 
  
 
5 
potentially serves an important beneficial role in that it may limit the tendency of local 
governments to overexpansion.    
Considering the above arguments it is clear that there is no common consensus on 
the basic literature of tax competition. However, there is a mutually used common 
characteristic in these approaches, and that is that both lines of thought build their studies 
on a regional tax competition basis, which implies competition through tax rates along a 
given neighboring geographical area or region.  
Hence, a corporate tax competition scheme among countries at different regions 
of the world has not been brought into debate in the current literature of tax competition.  
In this sense, it results important to research if policymakers of countries such as 
China or Czech Republic are taking into account other countries’ corporate tax policies 
from far away geographical regions of the world when setting their own. Furthermore, 
mobility of capital and economic integration could be setting the ground for a world-wide 
corporate tax competition for internationally mobile firms that could not be just limited to 
a regional competition through corporate taxes.  
Thus, this dissertation differs from the contributions of previous literature in the 
sense that it considers competition through corporate taxes globally or world-wide. 
Global or world-wide tax competition can be thought as uncooperative tax policy 
reactions between governments of different countries of the world not necessarily near 
each other geographically, but in similar economic conditions and with the purpose to 
influence the allocation of mobile tax bases world-wide. For the purpose of this study, 
export oriented foreign capital investment was referred to as the internationally mobile 
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tax base. For countries in similar economic conditions we assume economies that fall in a 
given interval of gross national product per capita.6 
The idea behind this argument is that export oriented firms search for the most 
profitable after tax location for their investments taking into account the whole package 
of costs, such as labor costs, capital costs, and transportation costs, but also the optimal 
level of labor and capital, as well as taxes, among other deterministic factors. The most 
profitable location does not need to be in the neighboring country of where the firm is 
already located, and in fact it could be in a completely different continent if costs of 
production determine so. Countries, on the other hand, seek to attract FDI by increasing 
their relative competitiveness; this is determined by the countries’ level of infrastructure, 
wages, transportation costs, openness to trade, taxes, skills, technology, and availability 
of labor, among other factors. For example, a country in the American continent can offer 
higher after tax profits to an export oriented firm located in Asia and encourage that firm 
to relocate. The country in America would certainly have to be more attractive than that 
in Asia for the relocation to occur. Hence, countries in different geographical areas can 
compete to attract FDI by being more competitive, offering lower wages, greater 
infrastructure, more skills and technology, higher rates of allowance, and lower corporate 
taxes. There are factors such as wages and labor availability that depend on labor market 
conditions rather than on governments’ decisions, at least directly; others such as 
infrastructure, labor skills and technology can not be changed in a short period of time or 
they are fixed at the short run. This may leave as the only viable options in the short run 
to decrease the country’s corporate tax rate or to offer a more generous allowance under 
                                                 
6
 One of such classification of the world economies is provided in World Bank (2003, 2004).  
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the corporate income tax.  Thus, it is in this form that a global or world-wide tax 
competition may take place.  
The main objective of this dissertation is to research if there is corporate tax 
competition, not only from a regional point of view, but from a global perspective also. In 
other words, the purpose of this work is to evaluate the possibility of corporate tax 
competition among countries that are located far away from each other in different 
geographical areas or regions; that is, without a geographical neighboring condition. 
Additional questions are established in the dissertation in order to examine the effects on 
the corporate tax rates of the difference in wages, in openness to trade, in FDI attraction, 
and in technological skills among countries.   
Several critical assumptions are needed in order to conduct this study. One 
assumption is related to the type of firms interested in relocating without regard to the 
country or continent. These firms are likely to be of an export oriented type; seeking for 
the most profitable (after tax) locations, see for example Reuber (1973), Guisinger 
(1985), and Coyne (1994). A second central assumption is the presence of a proactive 
government, one that reacts to deficiencies or improvements in its economy by 
proposing, in a reasonable period of time, diverse policies in order to stabilize, correct, or 
improve the economic situation of its country. Without this assumption, we would have 
non-proactive governments which would not provide the required framework for tax 
competition, neither regional, nor global.  
The theoretical model in this dissertation follows the approach developed by 
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) but their framework is expanded to allow for 
a third country, workers, two types of entrepreneurs and capital, geographical distance 
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between countries, transportation costs, labor skills, and technology skills. The model 
starts with the discussion of the two tax instruments the government uses to finance the 
provision of a public good. After that, we describe the income and preferences of four 
types of individuals: capitalists, workers, home producing entrepreneurs, and export 
oriented entrepreneurs. The model recognizes the four of them by maximizing a social 
welfare function, which is simply the sum of the utilities of the different types of 
individuals, subject to the firms’ location decision constraint. The model is divided into 
different stages each corresponding to an event. First, governments in both countries 
choose their optimal corporate tax instruments; second, entrepreneurs make relocations 
decisions; third, entrepreneurs purchase capital inputs and hire workers; and four, 
production, consumption and exports take place. Although the four stages are important, 
our interest relies on the first three, with primary concern of what happens at stage one. 
The objective of the model is to search for the optimal corporate tax rate that would serve 
as reaction functions between governments. The existence of these reaction functions will 
allow us to evaluate the presence of tax competition. As we will see in the theoretical 
model, the corporate tax rate reaction of a country does not depend only on its own 
country’s factors such as wages, transportation costs, skills, and technology, but also on 
the competing countries’ factors such as corporate tax rates, wages, transportation costs, 
skills, and technology.  
A spatial econometric model is used to estimate the empirical approximation of 
the model presented in the theoretical section. Four types of weight matrixes are 
computed in order to provide the basis for an evaluation of the presence of a global 
(corporate) tax competition: (1) homogeneous weights; (2) similar economic conditions 
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(global tax competition); (3) similar transportation costs (approximated by the 
geographical distance between home and host FDI countries); and (4) neighboring 
condition of FDI host countries.  
Several variables such as average effective tax rates, wage differences, and 
differences in foreign direct investment inflows, among others, are specified and 
calculated in order to develop the empirical model properly.   
The empirical approach follows a similar methodology to that used in Cavlovic 
and Jackson (2003), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), 
Brueckner (2003), Revelli (2000), and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). The approach 
represents a derivation from the spatial econometric model described in Anselin (1999), 
and Lopez and Chasco (2004) as a “pure space-recursive model” or a “non-contemporary 
or lagged spatial dependence model,” respectively.   
The empirical evaluation comprises four estimation methods, for each of the four 
weight matrixes: fixed individual and time effects jointly, fixed individual effects only, 
fixed time effects only, and no fixed effects (simple panel data).  
Among the most important findings, one of them considers that the countries from 
the sample behave in a tax competitive way, not only in geographical neighboring terms 
as the current corporate tax competition literature suggest, but also in a global or world-
wide approach assuming similar economic conditions, and when internalizing the fact 
that their competitors have similar transportation costs. 
Another conclusion implies that the level of competition appears to be greater for 
the global tax competition framework than that regarding regional tax competition, and 
when assuming similarity in transportation costs. Nonetheless, the greatest influence on 
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the optimal corporate tax rate comes from the same weights approach. In this sense, 
countries could be synthesizing several distinctive factors from each of the three other 
weighting schemes that could explain the highest value of the estimated effect under the 
homogeneous weights matrix.  
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief 
overview of the background stylized facts that lead us to consider the idea of the presence 
of global tax competition. Chapter 3 offers a review of the literature on regional tax 
competition starting with the earliest theoretical works and ending with recent empirical 
researches. Chapter 4 presents the theoretical model of corporate tax competition 
identifying corporate tax reaction functions that take into account deterministic variables 
for each country. Chapter 5 presents the empirical specification as well as the 
econometric approach. It describes the computation of the weight matrixes, the 
measurement of the most appropriate effective tax rates, and wage differences, among 
other estimations. Chapter 6 presents regressions’ results with a focus on identifying the 
most appropriate estimation method. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the 
conclusions of this dissertation, some policy implications, as well as suggestions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL TRENDS IN FDI 
 
Economic integration and factor mobility have facilitated the creation of a single 
world economy; greater capital mobility, rapid transfers of technology and increasing 
flows of trade and investment have helped increase this level of integration. At the same 
time, many governments have taken key measures to encourage this integration, of which 
reductions in trade and investment barriers and the deregulation of financial markets are 
among the most important. 
The world has witnessed an increased movement of capital investments flows in 
the last few decades. Physical distance, previously a great obstacle for mobility, 
eventually has become an irrelevant determinant of businesses location today. As a 
consequence of globalization, firms and consumers have benefited from new options for 
prices, products, and forms of financing. It is clear that new ways of doing business have 
emerged with this new economic environment, but it is also evident that new forms of 
competition are now present in the world economy. Global competition through taxes, the 
topic of this dissertation, is one of them.  
The objective of this chapter is to present an overview of international trends in 
foreign direct investment (main investors and recipients) and governments’ corporate tax 
policies as a background for the theoretical model and empirical work of the latter 
chapters in the dissertation.     
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Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
World economies have become more tightly integrated in recent decades. Rapid 
growth in cross border investment encouraged by technological advances and 
government deregulation has been a key determinant of integration. Since the 1970s, 
most countries have reduced or eliminated controls on foreign currency exchange, the 
purchase of foreign securities, and the ability of foreigners to buy domestic securities and 
companies.7 Hundreds of bilateral investment treaties have been signed to lower 
investment barriers, in addition financial markets have been deregulated in dozens of 
countries, making them more attractive to foreign investors.  
Throughout the world, direct investment flows have boomed from $55 billion in 
1980 to $208 billion in 1990 and $1.397 trillion in 2000 (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2005b).8 These boosts represent an increase of 
$153 billion from 1980 to 1990, a $1.06 trillion from 1990 to 2000, and a $1.34 trillion 
from 1980 to 2000. Nonetheless, between 2000 and 2001, foreign direct investment flows 
into and out of countries recorded their largest drop in recent decades. In this period, 
world’s total inflows fell from $1.397 trillion to $826 billion, or a decline of around 41 
percent, of which developed countries accounted for 39 percentage points and developing 
economies for 2 percentage points. Alternatively, the European Union countries FDI 
inflows declined significantly in 2001 on the order of $311.4 billion, that is, a 46 percent 
plunge. (UNCTAD, 2005b) 
                                                 
7
 See International Monetary Fund (2001, October).  
8
 Foreign direct investment can be defined as the direct investment of a firm made outside of its home 
country. More specific definitions are given in UNCTAD (2001, September), and Drabek and Payne 
(2001). 
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When assessing the causes of the drop in international investment in 2001 it is 
essential to keep in mind the previous year’s levels of FDI ($1.397 trillion). The total 
amount of FDI in 2000 stood at an all-time historical high, at almost five times the levels 
recorded in 1994 ($260 billion). The decline between 2000 and 2001 essentially 
eliminated two thirds of the increase by reducing FDI inflows to more than twice the 
level they had reached in the mid-1990s ($341 billion in 1995). In other words, the 
developments in 2001, rather than an influential decline in international investment 
flows, appear to have marked a correction toward more sustainable levels, following what 
could arguably have been an investment bubble in 1999 and 2000 (UNCTAD, 2005b). 
Regarding 2004, world FDI inflows reached $648 billion registering a slightly 
increase of 15.5 billion since 2003; however, in comparison to 2001, they showed a 
decline of $177.8 billion, that is a 22 percent decrease.9 The reduction in the FDI inflows 
in developed countries was 36 percent, while developing economies presented an 
increase of 17 percent. Within the developed economies, the European Union showed a 
decrease of 46 percent. Adding up the decline in the FDI inflows of Canada, United 
States, France, Netherlands and Germany, the total amount reached $232.6 billion, a 
greater sum than the total world FDI inflows fall from 2001 to 2004 (UNCTAD, 2005b).  
Additionally, from 2001 to 2004 developing economies from America recorded a 
decline of $21.6 billion, or 24 percent. At the same time, African countries FDI inflows 
decreased $1.9 billion. 
In contrast, Asia and Oceania developing economies showed an increase in their 
FDI inflows in the order of $38.9 billion, or 36 percent. It must be noted that, taking into 
                                                 
9
 The comparison is made against 2001, since 2000 appears to be an investment boom year, and 2001 
appears to have marked a correction toward more sustainable levels of FDI inflows.  
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account the whole period from 2000 to 2004, the countries that received the most in 
foreign direct investment inflows were China accumulating $20 billion, and Australia 
with $28 billion in that period (UNCTAD, 2005b).   
The reasons for the 2002 and 2003’s significant downturn appeared to have been 
weak economic growth, tumbling stock markets (which contributed to a plunge in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions) and institutional factors such as privatizations in several 
countries. However, in 2004 global inflows of FDI rose for the first time in four years. 
The recovery appeared to have responded to a favorable recuperation in the macro, micro 
and institutional factors. For example, the process of privatization came to an end in 
several countries, and the strong economic growth and the large scale restructuring and 
consolidation of businesses brought many companies back to profit making in 2004 
(UNCTAD, 2005a).  
In recent years, direct investment has primarily flowed out of United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Hong Kong, Canada, 
United States, and Japan. In 2004 the United States was the highest foreign investor with 
$229.3 billion, followed by the United Kingdom with $65.4 billion. It must be noted that 
the United States and the United Kingdom amounted for the 31 percent and 9 percent, 
respectively, of the FDI outflows from that year, which reached $730.3 billion. On the 
other hand, the developed economies that attracted the most direct investment inflows in 
2004 are: United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland, France, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, Spain, and Italy (UNCTAD, 2005b). Among these, the highest recipient in 
2004 was the United States with $96 billion, closely followed by the United Kingdom 
with $78.4 billion. With regard to the developing economies, China was the highest 
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recipient with $60.6 billion, followed by Hong Kong with $34 billion, Brazil with $18.2 
billion, Mexico with $16.6 billion and Singapore with $16.1 billion. The global FDI 
inflows in 2004 amounted $648 billion. 
As illustrated previously, countries have continuously sought to attract direct 
investment inflows due to their notable advantages; besides providing with more choice 
variety of products, services and prices, FDI can provide more jobs, higher wages, greater 
consumption, tax revenues and investments from outsiders and insiders. 
For these reasons, countries often have modified their economic fundamentals in 
order to attract foreign investment. These changes have included a stable currency, 
trustworthy legal rules, and liquid and transparent financial markets. Dozens of formerly 
socialist countries have begun to get the fundamentals right in the past decade and most 
industrial countries have made substantial market reforms. As a consequence of these 
processes, tax policy has risen in importance as a factor influencing global investment 
flows. The fundamental reason is that, as other factors become more equalized among 
countries, investors have become increasingly more sensitive to differences in tax 
treatment.  
 
Taxes as a Determinant of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
There is increasing evidence that decisions about the location of businesses have 
become more sensitive to tax factors. Traditionally, an important reason to invest abroad 
was to gain access to fixed resources, such as oil deposits or land. Today, more industries 
are highly mobile and can be located just about anywhere. For example, according to the 
United States Department of Commerce, finance and services are the two fastest growing 
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areas of American direct investment abroad.10 Also, an increasing share of product value  
is  in  the  form  of  intangibles  such  as  knowledge,  trademarks,  and  patents, since the 
profits from intangibles may be easily moved to low-tax countries. Because of laxer 
controls and more pro-business legal environment, corporations, today, have greater 
ability to move profits to low-tax locations than previously was the case. 
Academic empirical research has confirmed that foreign direct investment is 
becoming more sensitive to taxes. In a compilation of studies on the issue, Grubert and 
Mutti (2000) suggest that the location of U.S. multinational firms may have become more 
sensitive to differences in after tax returns between 1982 and 1992. Also, work by 
Bénassy-Quéré,  Fontagné,  and Lahrèche-Révil (2001) using OECD’s data from 1985 to 
1995 shows that firms react to tax discrepancies when deciding their location, that is, a 
tax cut in one country encourages an increase of FDI to that country, at the expense of 
other countries.  
Alternatively, Hines (1999) concludes that besides corporate borrowing, transfer 
pricing, dividend and royalty payments, and research and development performance,  
taxes affect in a significant form the location of foreign direct investment. In addition, 
work by Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2001) finds that American multinationals 
became more sensitive to taxes on FDI between 1984 and 1992. The results of the study 
indicate that countries with an increase of 10 percent in their tax rates received 30 percent 
less American direct investment in 1992.  
Similarly, Gropp and Kostial (2000) found strong evidence that FDI is affected by 
tax factors.  This study found  that, of  the countries examined, those with lower taxes  
had  larger  inflows  of  FDI  than those  with  higher  taxes.  Sullivan’s (2002) analysis 
                                                 
10
 See Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA] (2000, July). 
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indicated that Ireland,  Netherlands,  Luxembourg, and Switzerland, four European 
countries with favorable  tax  regimes, have accounted for 9 percent of European GDP 
but attracted  38 percent  of  American  FDI  in  Europe  between 1996 and 2000 
(Sullivan, 2002). 
In conclusion, given the high mobility of capital of these days, taxes have become 
a factor of observance by mobile firms since it represents an important part of their 
profits (after tax). In other words, recent literature has suggested that FDI has become 
more sensitive to corporate tax policies than before. 
The following section provides an insight into how countries’ policymakers 
acknowledging the above fact have made corporate taxes a factor of action towards 
maintaining or increasing the economies’ competitiveness.  
 
Global Reduction in Tax Rates 
 
 
The great majority of industrial nations have reduced their corporate income tax 
rates in the last decades to ensure that their economies remain attractive for foreign 
investment. In this context, a significant part of the recent tax reforms in the European 
Union (EU) has been devoted to reductions in corporate taxation. These measures aim, in 
the first place, to raise investment and production incentives and, in some cases, to 
remove existing tax distortions. Countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Luxemburg, Germany, Ireland, and Netherlands, among others, have reduced its 
corporate tax rate in recent years. Portugal approved a decrease in its corporate tax rate 
from 32 percent in 2000 to a 30 percent in 2002, and it is proposing an even steeper 
decline in the rate to a 25 percent by 2006. Furthermore, other countries such as Austria 
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have reduced their corporate tax base in 2000 through increased research and 
development allowance, and deemed interest deduction on equity investment (Bénassy-
Quéré, Fontagné & Lahrèche-Révil, 2001). 
On the other hand, some Nordic countries have adopted dual income tax systems 
in response to rising tax competition. These systems feature a low flat rate on capital 
income (interest, dividends, and capital gains) while retaining progressive rates on labor 
income. Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden implemented such reforms a decade 
ago and Netherlands and Austria have recently enacted similar reforms. Joumard (2001) 
notes that such moves toward a lower and flat tax on capital income has often reflected 
the need to remain competitive on international capital markets.  
Figures from the OECD confirm countries’ desire to remain attractive for FDI 
with the average top corporate tax rate for national governments in the OECD falling 
from 41 percent in 1986 to 32 percent by 2000 (Edwards & de Rugy, 2002; Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2001).  
Alternatively, KPMG surveys which take into account both national and sub-
national taxes, show that the average corporate tax rate fell from 36.8 percent in 1997 to 
30.0 percent by 2004, a drop of 6.8 percentage points in seven years (see KPMG, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). The highest decline on corporate tax rates belongs 
to Ireland with a 23.5 percentage points decrease from 1997 to 2004. Other countries that 
followed this trend are Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and 
Turkey, all of these with decreases greater than 10 percentage points in seven years.  In 
contrast, the average corporate tax rate for selected Non-OECD countries decreased 2.6 
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percentage points, from 31.2 percent in 1997 to 28.6 percent in 2004.11 The largest 
2004’s negative deviation from average belongs to Cyprus with a difference of 14 
percentage points, followed by Chile and Hong Kong, with 12 and 11.5 percentage 
points, respectively. On the other hand, the lowest corporate tax rate of both groups, 
OECD and Non-OECD, is Ireland’s 12.5 percent; that is a 17.5 percentage point 
deviation from OECD’s average.  
The statutory corporate tax rate is just one factor determining the attractiveness of 
a business tax climate, an additional indicator is the corporate effective marginal tax rate, 
which must take into account depreciation deductions, investment credits, and other 
provisions.12 Effective corporate tax rates have fallen in the OECD countries in recent 
years, although not by as much as statutory rates (Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné & Lahrèche-
Révil, 2001).  For many corporate decisions, statutory rates are nonetheless the relevant 
tax factor to consider. As Mintz and Smart (2004) noted, reported income of corporations 
can be highly elastic with respect to the statutory tax rate since income can be easily 
shifted from one tax jurisdiction to another without moving real assets. 
Asian countries, such as China, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, among 
others, have also reacted to the world’s trend by providing tax incentives towards 
attracting FDI. China, for example, regardless of instituting a uniform corporate tax rate 
of 33 percent for foreign investment enterprises and domestic companies since 1991, has 
                                                 
11
 The selected Non-OECD countries are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam. These countries 
were selected since data for them continuously appeared in the KPMG surveys of 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, and 2004. 
12
 The statutory tax rate is the tax rate established by the government. The marginal effective tax rate is 
measured by the difference between the pre-tax and after tax rates of return on the investment. On the other 
hand, the average effective tax rate is measured by dividing actual taxes paid by an independent measure of 
income. See Chapter 5 for a further explanation. 
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set highly preferential treatments of foreign investment enterprises through various tax 
incentive practices such as tax reductions and exemptions, investment credits, rate 
reductions, accelerated depreciation, and special deductions (KPMG, 2004).  
Singapore has also tasted the improvements brought by FDI in such a form that 
they have acted towards providing tax incentives by reducing its corporate tax rates from 
26 percent in 2000 to 22 percent in 2004. Furthermore, Singapore does not tax capital 
gains, and operating expenses are generally deductible except for a small number that are 
statutorily disallowed. 
The strongest pressure towards tax competition appears to occur between 
countries that have deep trade, investment, and cultural ties. For example, after the 
United States cut tax rates in 1986, Canadian policy makers were very concerned that 
American companies would shift profits from their more highly taxed Canadian 
subsidiaries to their American operations (Whalley, 1990). They could do this relatively 
easily by increasing debt financing in their Canadian subsidiaries to shift taxable income 
out of Canada. As a consequence, Canada moved quickly to cut its corporate tax rate to 
avoid losing its tax base. Canada’s corporate tax rate dropped 8.5 percentage points from 
44.6 percent in 1997 to 36.1 in 2004 (KPMG, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004).  
Mexico, on the other hand, has reacted to the global trends and has approved a 
gradual reduction of its corporate tax rate of 35 percent in 2002 to a 30 percent by 2005. 
The reduction would be of the order of one percentage point since 2005 until it reaches 
28 percent by 2007. Furthermore, this new law eliminates the option to defer a portion of 
the corporate tax when dividends are not distributed. Additionally, this new law also 
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eliminates the 5 percent withholding tax on dividend distributions (see Servicio de 
Administración Tributaria, 2005; KPMG, 2002, 2003, 2004).  
A different tax factor, the corporate capital gains tax, has been cut in numerous 
countries. For example, Germany’s recent tax reforms abolished its 50 percent capital 
gains tax on sales of stakes in other companies because of competitiveness concerns. In 
fact, the German reforms prompted the European Union to express concern that this may 
constitute unfair tax competition because it will attract foreign holding companies to 
Germany (Lomas, 2001). Holding  companies and  corporate  head-quarters have long 
been attracted to Netherlands because  it  does  not  tax  corporate  capital  gains, and has 
a  territorial  tax  system  for  businesses (Lodin, 2001). 
Another policy response to tax competition has been the reduction and elimination 
of special taxes on wealth, which have been undermined by capital mobility. In the 
1990s, Norway and Sweden reduced their wealth taxes and Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Austria, and Germany abolished them (Messere, 2000). Huizinga and Nicodeme (2004) 
surveyed 19 countries and found that the average wealth tax has fallen 40 percent since 
the mid-1980s. Tax competition has also driven down with-holding taxes, these are taxes 
placed on payments to foreigners of interest, dividends, and other investment returns. 
Withholding taxes create an investment disincentive by placing an exit fee on repatriated 
income. The survey of 19 major economies found that the withholding tax on bank 
interest has been more than cut in half in the past decade.  
In  summary,  tax  competition  has  caused  substantial  cuts  in  corporate  
statutory income tax rates. Other reforms have included reductions in wealth taxes, 
withholding taxes, and capital gains taxes.  
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Global Tax Competition 
 
 
Mobility of capital and economic integration have expanded the wave of 
possibilities and competition around the world. Distance has been changing its nature 
from deterministic to non-deterministic among the firms’ decisions. Export oriented firms 
with the aim to invest abroad have demonstrated predilection for countries which provide 
them with higher profits, among other reasons because of taxes. And lastly, given the 
obvious advantages of direct investment inflows into a country, economies have 
embarked on the reduction of their statutory corporate tax rates or in the provision of 
other corporate tax incentives, showing a degree of competition through taxes.  
Examples of world-wide tax competition are becoming more common. For 
example, in 2002 the Mexican Ministry of Economy (MME) noticed that foreign firms 
from the export maquila of important sectors of the economy, previously functioning on 
Mexican territory, decided to leave the country in order to locate in a complete different 
region of the world, such as China, Philippines, Czech Republic, Thailand, and Malaysia, 
among others. Alternatively, in 2003 researchers and analysts from the Mexican National 
Board of the Export Maquila Industry (CNIME), Palencia and Angeles (2003a), 
signalized and highlighted the lost of competitiveness of Mexico against China, 
Malaysia, Korea and Thailand, again in important sectors of the economy. 
An interesting conclusion of MME and CNIME researchers was that, among 
several factors influencing Mexico’s FDI inflows, corporate tax rates seem not as 
competitive as those of the countries above, and that issue appeared to be a determinant 
factor in the firms’ location decision.  
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On the evaluation of their arguments, the countries mentioned previously could 
have similar of completely different levels of infrastructure, wages or transportation costs 
than Mexico, making them more competitive or less competitive in those terms, but there 
are interesting facts when observing the corporate tax policies evolution of these 
countries. First, the Czech Republic, Philippines, and Singapore, have reduced their 
corporate tax rates since 1997 (KPMG, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004).  In 
1997 the statutory corporate tax rate of the Czech Republic was set at 39 percent, while in 
1998 it was 35 percent, 31 percent in 2000, and finally 28 percent in 2004. That is an 11 
percentage points decrease in 8 years. Regarding Philippines and Singapore, they reduced 
their statutory corporate tax rate from 35 percent and 26 percent, respectively, in 1997, to 
32 percent, and 22 percent in 2004. On the other hand, since 1997 China and Thailand 
maintained their corporate tax rate at 33 percent and 30 percent, while Malaysia fixed its 
tax rate at 28 percent since 1998. 
 Additionally, China, Malaysia, and Thailand have given highly preferential 
treatments to foreign firms such as tax reductions and exemptions, accelerated 
depreciation, investment credits, and special deductions. China, for example, has a 33 
percent corporate tax rate, which is composed of a 30 percent state tax and a 3 percent 
local tax. Nevertheless, the state tax can be reduced to a 15 percent or 24 percent if the 
foreign investment firms are located in a specially designated zone or are related to 
associated operations or projects. Additionally, a foreign investment firm can be entitled 
to a tax exemption o reduction during a tax holiday period. On the other hand, the 3 
percent local tax can be waived by the local government. 
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In Thailand, the corporate tax rate is set at 30 percent; however, for small and 
medium enterprises or companies with less than $122,000 (Baht 5 million) paid up 
capital, the corporate tax rate is 20 percent on the first $24,360 (Baht 1 million) of net 
taxable profits and 25 percent on the next $48,700 (Baht 2 million). The corporate tax 
rate is also reduced to 20-25 percent for companies registered with the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand. 
On the other hand, Mexico has the highest statutory corporate tax rate among 
these countries of about 35 percent until 2002, 34 percent in 2003 and 33 percent in 2004 
(see KPMG, 2002, 2003, 2004). Furthermore, Mexican policymakers have also 
encouraged attractive corporate tax policies in the form of special deductions, tax 
exemptions, and investment credits, especially in sectors such as agriculture, fishing, and 
transport (Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, 2002). However, none of them at a similar 
level than in the countries above. In addition, since the last President’s administration 
(1994-2000) and until the current administration (2000-2006), Mexico has been waiting 
for a complete Tax Policy Reform that could make the country competitive in tax terms.  
Hence, neither Mexico’s corporate tax rates, nor its tax policies, have been 
considered as competitive as those of the countries previously mentioned, and MME and 
Palencia and Angeles (2003a) from CNIME could be right in their conclusions.  
The Mexican government’s lack of providing opportune efficient tax policy 
reforms to combat neighboring and non-neighboring countries’ tax policies and economic 
advantages could bear a part of the responsibility of the Mexican capital flight. Firms, as 
rent seekers, have been attracted by lower corporate tax rates and efficient tax policy 
reforms in different regions of the world. Their decision was to leave Mexico in order to 
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reach higher profits (after tax) taking into account within their analysis factors such as 
distance, transportation costs, wages, and of course, corporate tax rates.  
Extracted from the above there are different indicators that point towards the 
possibility of a tax competition framework among Mexico, China, Philippines, Czech 
Republic, and Malaysia, among many countries. A possibility that could indicate some 
signs that countries’ policymakers in China, Philippines, Czech Republic, Thailand, or 
Malaysia have internalized corporate taxes as a factor towards increasing 
competitiveness, and given the recent high mobility of capital, they have embarked on a 
reduction in corporate tax rates or in the provision of other corporate tax incentives in 
order to attract internationally mobile firms. China, Philippines, Czech Republic, and 
Malaysia, among other countries, could be presenting a degree of corporate tax 
competition to attract FDI; these countries could have different levels of competitiveness, 
but most importantly, they are located far away from each other. 
Hence, an important question arises when observing the previous arguments. Does 
corporate tax competition occur among countries from far away geographical regions of 
the world?  
The next chapter provides an insight into the literature on corporate tax 
competition to attract FDI.  
 
Summary 
 
 
The new current global economic environment makes it more difficult to sustain 
high corporate and personal tax rates. The sensitivity of decisions about investments and 
location to taxation has increased since it is clear that individuals and businesses have 
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gained greater freedom to take advantage of foreign economic opportunities. Pressure to 
reduce tax rates could stem from the direct  loss  of  capital and perhaps skilled  labor  by 
countries that  do  not  reform  their  tax  systems  and  from  the  example of countries 
that are prospering under low tax regimes. Comparatively, high tax rates can cause large 
economic losses giving countries strong incentives to reduce rates. Consequently, tax 
competition appears to have increased as capital mobility has risen. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Tax Competition: Definitions 
 
 
In order to investigate the empirical evidence on tax competition, we need to 
define it. Wilson and Wildasin (2004) defined tax competition as “non-cooperative tax 
setting by interdependent governments, under which each government’s policy choices 
influence the allocation of a mobile tax base among regions represented by these 
governments.” On the other hand, tax competition was defined by Alfano (2001) as “the 
possibility of countries to modify their tax base against the reduction of other countries’ 
tax base.” Summarizing, tax competition can be thought as reductions in domestic tax 
rates or the implementation of partial exemption schemes, in order to broaden the tax 
base or to attract economic activity. Regardless the simplicity of the latter, the definition 
given by Wilson and Wildasin (2004) will be the one used in this study.  
We must also establish a clear distinction between regional and global tax 
competition, given the importance of the latter for this study.  Regional tax competition 
can be defined as the tax competition between countries located near each other in a well 
defined geographical area. Recent empirical work on this topic can be found on 
Brueckner (2003), Besley and Rosen (1998), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002), 
Goodspeed (2000, 2002), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), and Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé 
(2001), among others. On the other hand, global or world-wide tax competition can be 
defined as the tax competition along an economical area without any particular bearing 
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on the geographical location of the countries.13 To my knowledge, there is no empirical 
work on this topic. 
The aim of this chapter is to review the existing literature on regional tax 
competition starting with the earliest theoretical works and ending in the empirical 
models used in the latest research. Hence, most of the chapter is dedicated to summarize 
the relevant literature on regional tax competition.   
 
Tax Competition Theory: Tiebout, Oates and the Standard Z-M Model 
 
 
The general theory of regional tax competition goes back to Tiebout (1956), and 
Oates (1972), and it is formally modeled by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), and 
Wilson (1986). This theory is commonly related to the view that competition for capital 
leads to inefficiently low levels of public expenditure and tax rates. Numerous writers 
have extended and refined this approach arguing that tax competition lowers welfare 
(Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991; Haufler & Wooton, 1997, 1999). Nonetheless, 
alternative theories have been stating the possibility that tax competition may have 
desirable effects, among those are Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Oates (1985, 1989), 
Andersson and Forslid (2003), and Wilson and Wildasin (2004).  
The starting point in tax competition theory comes from Tiebout’s (1956) theory 
of local public goods provision. Tiebout (1956) states that competition among 
jurisdictions for households leads to an efficient provision of local public goods. In 
particular, households vote with their feet by efficiently sorting themselves across 
jurisdictions, and local governments respond by tailoring their taxes and expenditures to 
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 A wider definition of global tax competition is offered in the next chapter.  
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the preferences of their residents. Although this theory was originally applied to 
household mobility, it can also be applied, almost unaltered, to competition among 
jurisdictions for mobile firms as suggested by White (1975), and Fischel (1975) 
originally, and Wellisch (2000) more recently. As in the Tiebout model, the result of tax 
competition leads to an efficient outcome in the sense that the marginal benefit of 
providing public inputs are equalized to the marginal cost. 
The Tiebout hypothesis has been widely questioned mostly because it relies on 
several restrictive assumptions. Among these is the assumption that the government can 
collect a non-distortionary head tax from each resident equal to the cost of providing him 
with his preferred level of public goods. Other underlying assumptions are the absence of 
scale economies in public goods provision, and a large number of jurisdictions in order to 
obtain efficient sorting of individuals. The inclusion of firms in the Tiebout model does 
not rely on milder assumptions since it requires the use of non-distortionary taxes in the 
sense that lump sum taxes are necessary to ensure an efficient location of firms. In 
reality, the taxation of capital is inefficient and the sorting mechanisms required by the 
Tiebout model are not in place. The departure from the idealized settings of the Tiebout 
model implies that competition to attract mobile capital leads to fiscal externalities 
among jurisdictions, which is at the heart of the analysis in modern models of tax 
competition. 
Contrary to the conclusions from the Tiebout model, Oates (1972) retakes the 
competition discussion but argues that tax competition among jurisdictions can result in 
inefficient levels of public services. Local officials may hold public spending below the 
efficient allocation keeping taxes low in order to attract investment, particularly for those 
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programs that do not offer direct benefits to local business. According to Oates (1972), 
the additional costs of an exhaustive tax competition might include lower wages and 
employment levels, capital losses on homes or other assets, and reduced tax bases. Their 
presence will reduce public spending and taxes to levels where the marginal benefits 
exceed the marginal costs. Oates’s conclusion is that this behavior is inefficient and it 
rests on the idea that when all governments behave this way, none gain a competitive 
advantage, and consequently communities are all worse off than they would have been if 
local officials had simply used the conventional measures of marginal costs in their 
decision rules.  
Thus, the main theme of tax competition literature has been that it lowers 
government spending and taxes below their efficient levels. This is the “race to the 
bottom” argument. This view emerges empirically from the framework developed by 
Wilson (1986), and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) who began building formal models 
based on Oates’s (1972) discussion of tax competition.  
The Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model, or the standard Z-M model of tax 
competition, assumes a world consisting of a fixed number of identical (homogeneous) 
regions, each containing an immobile factor, labor, and a perfectly mobile factor, capital. 
The immobile factor is inelastically supplied by the region’s residents. These residents 
also own fixed endowments of capital, and the assumption of perfect capital mobility 
means that they are free to invest their capital anywhere. Within each region, perfectly 
competitive firms use a constant-returns technology to produce output from this labor and 
interregionally-mobile capital. In addition, adding the capital endowments across the 
residents in all regions gives the fixed supply of capital in the world economy.  
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Alternatively, income distribution issues are ignored in the model by assuming, 
either, that each region’s residents are identical, or that their aggregate welfare can be 
depicted by the preferences of a representative consumer. In particular, these preferences 
are represented by a utility function, ( )gcU , , where c is private consumption and g is 
consumption of the public good.  Consumers use their income from capital and labor 
endowments to purchase one final consumption good, c. The government also purchases 
output to use as the sole input into the production of a public good, g. A tax on the capital 
located within the region’s borders is used to help finance g.  There are two local tax 
instruments, a tax that applies to capital income and a head tax. A Nash’s equilibrium is 
assumed in which each region takes the after-tax return to capital and the tax rates set by 
other regions as fixed. The public services only benefits residents, and there are no 
spillover effects to other regions.       
The Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model assumes that local governments set the 
public good and tax rate in order to maximize a representative resident’s utility: 
 
                                                    Maximize   U(c, g)                                                 (1) 
                                                    Subject to: ( )trtKg +=  
 
where r is the after-tax return on capital; t is the unit tax rate which is equated across 
regions by capital mobility but treated as fixed by any small region; and K(r+t) is the 
region’s demand for capital as a function of the before-tax return. Otherwise, the regions 
play a Nash game in tax rates, recognizing that the vector of all tax rates determines the 
equilibrium r. In either case, the critical condition for the optimal public good supply is:    
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where εK denotes the elasticity of demand for capital with respect to the before before-tax 
return (measured positively); τ is the ad valorem tax rate (i.e., τ = t/(r+t)); and dr/dt gives 
the marginal impact of the region’s tax on the equilibrium r, which is negative or zero 
depending on whether the large or small region case is considered.14  
The right hand side of Equation 2 represents the marginal cost, while the left hand 
side represents the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and private 
income. It should be observed that the marginal cost exceeds one because the 
denominator contains a term reflecting the cost of the capital outflow that occurs when a 
single region raises its tax rate. With the world economy’s capital stock treated as fixed, a 
rise in the capital tax rate of one region causes a capital outflow in this region and a 
capital inflow in other regions. The inflow benefits these other regions because the 
marginal value of capital exceeds the opportunity cost from their point of view by an 
amount equal to the unit tax rate. Thus, there is a positive fiscal externality for other 
regions in this model. The size of this externality clearly depends on the number of 
competing regions. If this number is large, then the elasticity of a single region’s capital 
supply with respect to its tax is small, since a rise in the tax rate depresses the return on 
capital, r, thereby dampening the impact of this tax change on the cost of capital.  
                                                 
14
 Lockwood (2004) notes that Nash equilibrium in capital taxes on the Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model 
depends on whether these taxes are unit or ad valorem. His work indicates that the public good provision is 
lower with an ad valorem tax than with a unit tax; residents are better off when countries compete in unit 
taxes. 
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Nonetheless, governments in each region neglect the externalities since they are 
only concerned with the welfare of their own residents. The end result is that taxes are set 
too low resulting in underprovision of public goods levels, and thus, on a reduction of 
welfare. However, since all jurisdictions are identical and the national capital stock is 
fixed, the allocation of capital across regions is unaffected.  
 
Extensions of the Standard Tax Competition Z-M Model 
 
 
Most of the contributions on tax competition literature have been derived from the 
basic Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) model, all of which alter one or more of their 
assumptions. The following section provides a brief summary of some of these 
extensions. 
 
Size of the Jurisdictions 
The basic tax competition model is characterized by homogeneous jurisdictions, 
either small or large. A particular division in the literature has focused on tax competition 
between countries of different size. Bucovetsky (1991), and Wilson (1991) models 
include asymmetric tax competition between large and small jurisdictions. They have 
shown that when two countries, different in size and with equal per capita endowments, 
compete for internationally mobile capital, then the small country chooses the lower tax 
rate and attracts a more than proportional share of mobile capital and achieves a higher 
per-capita utility level than the larger country.   
Different results are found Haufler and Wooton (1997, 1999). They extend the 
standard Z-M model analyzing tax competition between two countries of unequal size, 
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but add the existence of trade costs and multiple tax instruments. Their studies consider 
two different fiscal instruments, the profit tax (subsidy) and the consumption tax. The 
results suggest that when regional governments have only a lump-sum profit tax 
(subsidy) at their disposal, but face exogenous and identical transport costs for imports, 
then both countries will always offer to subsidize the firm, and the maximum subsidy 
would be greater in the larger region than in the smaller region. However, if countries are 
given an additional instrument, either a tariff or a consumption tax, then the larger 
country will no longer underbid its smaller rival and its best offer may involve a positive 
profit tax. In both cases the equilibrium outcome is that the firm locates in the larger 
market, paying a profit tax that is increasing in the relative size of this market and which 
is made greater when the tariff (consumption tax) instrument is permitted. 
About the regions’ size, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1983) show that as the 
number of jurisdictions gets large, interjurisdictional competition leads to abandonment 
of the property tax by all jurisdictions, coupled with sole reliance on head taxes.  If the 
number of jurisdictions is large, then each jurisdiction perceives that it is unable to affect 
the after-tax return to capital, as it effectively faces a perfectly elastic supply of capital.  
Thus, any tax on mobile capital will be shifted to immobile local factors of production, 
the labor in the Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model, as will the excess burden 
attributable to the tax-induced outflow of capital.  Hence, it is preferable for small local 
jurisdictions simply to tax their immobile factors directly and avoid at least the excess 
burden of the tax. 
In addition, Dehejia and Genschel (1999) use the standard prisoners’ dilemma to 
address the problem of why does collective action fails under asymmetric tax 
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competition. They could not find obvious why it should be more difficult to stabilize and 
maintain cooperation in taxation, than in money or trade. The argument is that the 
prisoners’ dilemma is a misleading metaphor for tax competition because it suggests that 
all competing states suffer from competition and therefore share mutual interest in tax 
cooperation. Prisoners’ dilemma is right when assumes a deserting problem, but it is 
erroneous in suggesting that states will always share a mutual interest on solving this 
problem cooperatively. Nevertheless, this is not completely valid. Small states can 
actually gain from tax competition and may be reluctant to support cooperation, only if 
states are of about equal initial size will they share a preference towards universal tax 
cooperation. Thus, the situation changes from a symmetric prisoners’ dilemma to a game 
where one actor with prisoners’ dilemma preferences (the initially large country) faces 
another actor with deadlock preferences (the initially small country). For the small state, 
cooperation is harmful, they are better off competing. Thus if competing countries differ 
in size, as they are likely to, the real issue for tax cooperation is not defection ex-post but 
disagreement ex-ante about the desirability cooperation.  
 
Tax Exporting and Imperfectly Mobile Capital 
According to Iregui (2001), tax exporting refers to the shifting of tax burdens 
from domestic residents to non-residents of the taxing jurisdiction.15 In the small 
jurisdiction version of the basic Z-M tax competition model with perfectly competitive 
markets, tax exporting is not an issue. However, with either large jurisdictions or 
                                                 
15
 Exporting can be achieved indirectly by taxing imports or through intergovernmental transfer 
mechanisms. In general, tax exporting can be achieved directly, as is often the case for travelers, by taxes 
that are paid explicitly or predominantly by non-residents. Hotel room taxes, car rental taxes and surcharges 
are appealing to policymakers because they are paid predominantly by non-residents. 
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imperfectly competitive markets, local governments may be able to export some of the 
burden of a tax on capital income to foreigners. For example, Mintz (1994) notes that one 
common argument for taxing capital income is to tax economic rents earned by 
foreigners, and Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) note that increasing globalization implies 
that foreign ownership of domestic companies, and thus the potential for tax exporting, 
are likely to increase over time. The potential for tax exporting creates a tendency for 
inefficient overprovision of public services, as consumers perceive a reduced price for 
public services. The empirical importance of these factors, however, is unclear. In 
addition, Sørensen (2004) argues that foreign ownership of domestic firms would have to 
be implausibly large for the tendency toward overprovision of public services due to the 
potential for tax exporting to outweigh the downward pressure on service levels from tax 
competition. Nevertheless, another potential efficiency-enhancing role for tax 
competition is to limit tendencies for overprovision of public services due to the potential 
for tax exporting an effect that would be negated with tax harmonization.  
Within this context, Eijffinger and Wagner (2001) studied whether financial 
integration can increase taxes, by analyzing the tax competition and tax exporting effects, 
and assuming imperfect capital mobility. On the one hand, financial integration increases 
capital mobility, and thus the incentive for countries to compete for capital, this is the tax 
competition effect. On the other hand, a tax exporting effect is present when financial 
integration increases foreign ownership of firms and capital, and allows for exportation of 
source taxes. Both effects have opposite implications for capital taxes. Their empirical 
results suggest the presence of an excessive taxation due to the assumption of imperfectly 
mobile capital. Thus, the tax exporting effect counteracts the tax competition effect. 
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Sørensen (2000) addresses the tax exporting issue and uses it as an explanation 
for why effective tax rates have not changed much in OECD countries as economic 
integration has increased. The potential for this type of tax exporting, however, depends 
on the extent of cross-ownership of assets, which may itself be influenced by tax policies.  
Zodrow’s and Mieszkowski’s (1983) work also show that if jurisdictions are large 
enough to possess some monopsony power in the union-wide capital market (each 
jurisdiction faces a less than perfectly elastic supply of capital), then the optimal tax on 
mobile capital is positive, as each jurisdiction is able to export some of its tax burden to 
non-resident capital owners.  Such tax exportability, which provides an incentive for 
inefficient overexpansion of the public sector, tends to offset the bias toward 
underprovision of local public services attributable to the taxation of mobile capital.   
 
Trade and Tax competition 
The standard Z-M tax competition model has only a single good and ignores 
inter-jurisdictional trade. Wilson (1987) incorporates interregional commodity trade into 
the tax competition analysis adding a second good and a system of numerous identical 
regions. The model of property taxation by regional governments causes regions to 
specialize in the production of a single traded good. In equilibrium, some regions choose 
a relatively low tax rate on capital and produce the capital-intensive good, whereas other 
regions choose a relatively high tax rate and produce the labor-intensive good. No region 
produces both goods, because then a tiny reduction in its tax rate would discontinuously 
eliminate all production of the labor-intensive good, creating only capital-intensive 
production in its place. Once again, the diversity in tax rates is really inefficient, since 
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there are no ex ante differences between regions to justify it. Thus, Wilson (1987) results 
demonstrate that regions containing identical individuals and production possibilities 
choose different tax rates and produce different traded goods, and that the inefficiencies 
resulting from taxing mobile capital cannot be adequately described as an underprovision 
of goods.  
Within this perspective, Janeba and Wilson (1999) allow for both commodity 
trade and capital mobility between competing regions and the rest of the world. They 
reconsider the question of whether tax competition for mobile capital leads to tax rates on 
capital that are too low or too high from the combined viewpoint of the competing 
regions. Their model assumes that the country’s central government sets the external 
trade policy by choosing tariffs on imports, that the tax on capital is chosen either by the 
central government of the home country or by the country’s regional governments, and 
that the economy’s import-competing industry imports capital. The key result of the 
analysis is that whether the capital taxes are too low or high depends on the degree of 
external trade protection. When the country’s central government is free to set the tariff, 
tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates. But in the absence of a tariff, tax rates 
can be too high. In particular, regions may choose to subsidize capital in equilibrium as a 
means of inducing favorable terms-of-trade effects, but the subsidy (i.e., a negative tax) 
will then be too low because an increase in a single region’s subsidy benefits other 
regions by reducing their relative quantities of subsidized capital. 
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Tax competition, Public Expenditure, and Economic Position 
Zodrow and Mieszkowski’s (1986) work pays careful attention to the public 
goods provision, but neglects the composition of it. Keen and Marchand (1997) base their 
study on Zodrow-Mieszkowski’s (1986) model and continue with the discussion that tax 
competition leads to inefficient levels of public goods and tax rates. Their premise is 
whether the composition of the public goods under tax competition is efficient or not. 
The model assumes identical and small countries, a fixed capital supply but mobility 
between jurisdictions, creating scope for tax competition among them. The model 
incorporates two stereotypical forms of public spending into a model of fiscal 
competition; one concerning broadly to consumption items as recreational facilities or 
social services; and the other refers broadly to items such as infrastructure or general 
training expenditures. The results propose that a lack of coordination within the model of 
interjurisdictional tax competition may lead not only to inefficient levels of aggregate 
public expenditure but also to systematic inefficiencies in the composition of that 
expenditure. Tax competition leads to overprovision of public inputs in infrastructure, 
such as business centers and airports, and to underprovision of items that directly affect 
consumer welfare such as social services (parks and libraries), and since it is not in the 
interest of any country to undertake such a rebalancing unilaterally it emerges a case for 
some coordination of spending policies even in the absence of tax rate coordination. 
Their policy arguments imply the existence of a case for international coordination not 
only of tax bearing on internationally mobile cases but also of domestic public 
expenditures.  
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Following Keen and Marchand (1997), Solanko’s (2001) model analyzes the 
regional tax competition for a mobile capital between identical regions in a transition 
economy. The study examined the effects of regional tax and commodities competition in 
a simplified transition economy with several regions and two distinct sectors, an old state 
sector and a new private sector, each receiving a different tax treatment. The model 
assumes that: (1) the old sector has a low productivity compared with the new sector; (2) 
the regional decision-makers are not entirely benevolent, but instead seek to maximize a 
weighted average of the utility of their citizens and their private benefit; (3) the decision 
makers are the owners of the old sector production; and (4) the regional governments use 
rent taxation and capital tax on new sector capital to finance the provision on pure public 
goods. Solanko’s arguments imply that tax competition may be at least partially 
beneficial in the case of a transition country starting from a centrally planned socialist 
economy. The results show that in the very early stage of transition when the share of the 
old sector is overwhelming, consumers in a transition economy may be better off in a 
competitive equilibrium. The decision maker, however, would prefer to coordinate their 
tax policies. Also in early transition, when regional competition would be socially 
beneficial, it is least likely to appear. As the total amount of rents from the old sector is 
positively correlated with total amount of production in the less efficient sector, it is 
precisely in early transition that the decision makers have least interest in engaging in a 
competition for mobile capital. The authors conclude that the transition feature 
incorporated in a classical tax competition model make regional tax competition less 
harmful, and consequently make coordination less beneficial.  
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In addition, Qian and Roland’s (1998) work also on transition economies and tax 
competition indicates that in a transition economy, decentralization combined with 
regional competition for mobile capital reduces subsidies to local state enterprises, and 
thus is potentially beneficial for the transition process. 
 
 Public Good Spillovers and Tax Competition 
The basic tax competition model assumes that the public services provided by the 
independent regions have no cross-boundary spillover effects.  Nonetheless, some public 
goods may have important positive or negative spillovers. The standard result in the case 
of positive spillovers is that these lead to underprovision of public services as the region 
providing the service ignores its external benefits. Within this line, Bjorvatn and 
Schjelderup (2002) show that if public services are financed with taxes on mobile capital, 
then positive spillovers dampen tax competition. The intuition is that when the 
government of an independent region is considering a tax reduction to attract mobile 
capital, it will also recognize that the capital outflow from other regions will be 
accompanied by a reduction in their public service levels, which will have a negative 
effect on the welfare of the citizens of the taxing state.  Indeed, in the case of a pure 
international public good, these two effects are perfectly offsetting, and the incentive for 
tax competition is eliminated.   
Alternatively, Rauscher (1995) considers a single plant which potentially invests 
in one of several potential locations which compete in terms of emission taxes.16 Here, 
investment causes negative spillovers between states as pollution spreads across borders. 
                                                 
16
 Emission taxes involve tax payments that are directly related to the measurement or estimation of the 
pollution caused.  
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Since states ignore the pollution costs to their neighbors, individually optimal state taxes 
will be less than nationally optimal taxes. While the host state can benefit from FDI due 
to the taxes it collects, it can also suffer greater environmental damage from local 
production. If the first effect dominates, emission taxes are too low in the tax competition 
equilibrium and there is excessive environmental damage. If the second effect dominates, 
taxes will be too high and may in fact be so high that the firm does not invest. In Davies’ 
(2005) setting, since the firm generates positive spillovers, state taxes will be too high 
relative to the nationally optimal tax. Also, since there is no cost to being the host (other 
than the taxes necessary to secure the firm), taxes will always be lower with competition 
than without it. Finally, without pollution costs, it will never be optimal to set taxes so 
high that the firm decides not to enter.  
 
State Tax Competition 
Contrary to the basic tax competition model, recent studies have discussed the 
welfare enhancing conditions of the state tax competition scheme. For instance, work by 
Wilson and Janeba (2005) studies tax competition between two countries that are divided 
into regions. The model considers a world economy in which the central governments of 
two countries provide public goods financed by taxes on mobile capital.17 Competition 
for this mobile capital leads to inefficiently low taxes and public good levels, as in the 
basic Z-M tax competition model. Unlike the basic model, however, there exists a variety 
of public goods and, therefore, the possibility for the central governments to decentralize 
the provision of some, but not all, public goods. From a single country’s viewpoint, both 
                                                 
17
 Their framework uses a two stage game. In the first stage, the strategy variable for each country is the 
division of the provision of a range of public goods between the central and regional governments. In the 
second stage, the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital. 
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horizontal and vertical externalities are involved in the provision of public goods by 
regional governments (i.e., state, local, or provincial governments). When a single 
regional government lowers its tax rate, it not only attracts capital away from other 
regions (the horizontal externality), but also expands the central government’s tax base 
by attracting additional capital into the country (the vertical externality). As a result, 
regional governments may under or over provide public goods, depending on the relative 
sizes of these two externalities. Wilson and Janeba (2005) demonstrate that the central 
government can control these relative sizes by manipulating the division of public good 
provision between the two levels of government. In so doing, it can influence the degree 
to which the country as a whole competes with the other country for scarce capital. In 
other words, decentralization emerges endogenously as a tool for gaining a strategic 
advantage over a rival country in a tax competition game. The authors also show that the 
uncoordinated decisions to decentralize by the two competing countries can be welfare-
improving for both of them. In contrast to standard tax competition models, the 
decentralized provision of public goods can therefore play a welfare-enhancing role. 
Work by Davies (2005) presents a general equilibrium model in which a single, 
monopolistic firm chooses a single host from multiple states whose costs differ due to 
differing factor endowments. The framework considers competition in taxes on the firm’s 
domestic factor. States set tax rates to maximize the welfare of their own constituents 
while the federal government sets a national labor tax rate to maximize national welfare. 
Due to the price externality, whichever state hosts the multinational enterprise without 
competition sets a high tax in the absence of federal intervention. While the federal 
government can make a correction for this, it involves federal subsidies for the host 
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state’s labor. Such subsidy may not be possible because it requires the politically difficult 
task of taxing non-host states to subsidize factor markets in the host state. Furthermore, 
without competition, the firm may locate in an inefficient location, reducing national 
welfare.  
Tax competition, thus, offers two potential improvements in national welfare. 
First, the state which generates the largest surplus as a host always wins the multinational 
enterprise under tax competition eliminating location inefficiencies. Second, incentives 
offered by other states constrain the winning state’s tax, reducing the need for federal 
subsidies. If federal subsidies are not politically viable, the nationally optimal tax burden 
can be reached only under tax competition. Thus, in contrast to the warnings put forth by 
the Z-M model, tax competition can improve national welfare. 18 
In addition, Black and Hoyt (1989) also model subsidy (negative tax) competition 
between states for a firm under perfect information. They find that, since subsidies can 
induce labor migration and lower the average cost of providing a public good, allowing 
states to compete results in an efficient firm location.  
Regarding local taxes, the work of Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) test whether 
there is a mimic of local tax rates among Belgian municipalities. Their hypothesis 
initiates from the question that a jurisdiction tax policy may be influenced by other 
jurisdictions’ tax policies. Their findings indicate that tax rates are indeed copied among 
neighboring municipalities, suggesting that the mimicking behavior is a characteristic of 
decision making within the context of a decentralized government.    
                                                 
18
 Davies’ results are comparable to Walz and Wellisch (1996) who consider competition for a mobile, 
oligopolistic firm when expenditures on a public input are the policy instrument. They too find that 
although competition may be inefficient, its problems can be corrected by allowing the federal government 
to intervene using the same tool available to the states. However, they do not endogenize tax rates nor do 
they compare this result to the solution without competition. 
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Leviathan Models and Political Economics 
 
 
All the literature summarized thus far assumes that independent governments act 
to maximize the welfare of their residents or landowners. The strongest challenge to the 
notion that tax competition reduces welfare comes from Leviathan models in the public 
choice literature. This literature argues that state politicians and government officials act 
to maximize their own objectives which are typically positively related to the size of the 
government budget or are at least heavily influenced by rent-seeking special interest 
groups. The basic idea, as developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), is that the total 
size of government would be excessive in the absence of fiscal competition. The basic 
argument is that the government is responsible for the provision of the infrastructural and 
institutional framework in which economic activities take place. If it is inefficient, for 
example, if it provides low-quality services but charges high taxes, mobile factors are 
driven out of the country. This leads to a decline in income and employment of the 
immobile factors. Thus, the voters will be worse off and they will punish the government 
by electing other parties or candidates. But since the government is interested in being re-
elected, it is forced to act and increase the jurisdiction’s attractiveness to mobile factors 
of production. This requires lower taxes and better public services. Thus, the part of the 
budget spent by the public sector for its own well-being must shrink. There are additional 
incentives for government officials to reduce waste in government, and hence, the 
Leviathan is controlled. Under such circumstances, tax competition potentially serves an 
important beneficial role in that it may limit the tendency of local governments to 
overexpansion. 
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Further investigation was carried out by Rauscher (1997, 1998), and Edwards and 
Keen (1996) who formally examine various Leviathan models where governments are 
partially concerned with maximizing the size of the public sector. For instance, Edwards 
and Keen (1996) construct a model similar to the basic Z-M tax competition model, but 
assume that state government officials act to maximize a function that includes both the 
welfare of their residents, and their own welfare, which is assumed to be directly related 
to revenues diverted to their own purposes, that is government waste. They argue that 
such a representation embodies a reasonable compromise between the more extreme 
views that governments act only to maximize the welfare of their citizens or only to 
maximize revenues.   
 Within this context, Besley and Smart (2002) relax the assumption of purely 
benevolent government that seek to maximize the public welfare. They argue that far 
from being benevolent, governments aim to maximize revenues which politicians use for 
their own ends. They take the public choice possibility that tax competition between 
governments may indeed raise welfare. Their main question is whether subjecting the 
government to greater competition will raise or lower the welfare of voters. The study 
comprehends two types of competition. The first is a standard notion of competition for 
mobile tax bases which raises the marginal cost of public funds and constrains the size of 
the government. The second is a competition where voters in one jurisdiction make use of 
comparative performance evaluation, conditioning their voting behavior on policy 
outcomes in other jurisdictions. Their results show that if competition is due to resource 
mobility across jurisdictions, without any shift in the political equilibrium, welfare must 
be lower. If the politicians take rents, then the voters would prefer that they did so using 
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efficient forms of taxation. Nonetheless, once endogeneity of the political equilibrium is 
taken into account, then tax competition may indeed be welfare improving. Overall, they 
find that competition is most likely to be welfare improving for voters when the prospect 
of selecting a good politician is high. This is because the screening benefits from 
competition are likely to dominate any adverse incentive effects.  
Parry (2001) examines the possible magnitude of the welfare effects of tax 
competition in a model that generalizes the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model by allowing for 
Leviathan behavior. In particular, he allows government officials to care not only about 
the welfare of residents, but also about tax revenue per se. Extending the analysis of 
Wildasin (1989), Parry identifies production and preference parameters including local 
demand and substitution elasticities for capital and for local public goods, numbers or 
size of jurisdictions, and the potential magnitude of Leviathan behavior. The findings 
suggest that although the introduction of Leviathan behavior produces a wide range of 
outcomes, with taxes and spending either too low or two high, the welfare losses from tax 
competition appear to be quite modest over a range of values of relevant parameters.  
Nonetheless the different welfare conclusions, Leviathan models and the Zodrow- 
Mieszkowski models both agree that tax competition lowers the size of government. 
A different welfare enhancing theory comes from Bond and Samuelson (1986). 
They suggest that tax competition can improve welfare when potential locations have 
private information about their costs. By offering tax holidays, locations provide signals 
to the firm about their costs. This allows the firm to choose the most efficient location for 
its investment, improving global efficiency. 
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Regarding the inclusion of political economy on tax competition, Biglaser and 
Mezzetti (1997) study how regions compete to attract large firms. Their starting point is 
the observation that some U.S. states seem to offer tax packages to firms that often 
exceed the economic value of firm’s instate investment project. They assume that when 
preparing a bid, legislators take into account both the public’s interest and the bid’s 
impact on their probability of re-election. Since politicians value their re-election, their 
bid for investments is distorted away from the value of the project to voters and may 
result in an inefficient location of firms in the sense that legislators give away too much 
of the taxpayers money in order to attract firms. 
Persson and Tabellini (1992) make use of political economy to study a two-
country model where each government levies a source tax on mobile capital to finance 
government transfers. This model generates the usual effect. A fall in the cost of 
investing abroad (i.e., increasing competition) puts downward pressure on tax rates. At 
the same time, however, there is a second, political effect in place since policy is chosen 
by a policymaker who represents the preferences of the median voter. Tax competition is 
shown to make the median voter select a more leftist government, whose distributional 
preferences call for higher taxes on capital, and this partly mitigates the tendency of tax 
competition to lower taxes on capital.  
 
Economic Geography 
 
 
A completely different strand of literature is the new economic geography 
literature, which analyzes the relationship between trade integration and industrial 
location. In a series of seminal papers by Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables 
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(1995), and Venables (1996), it is shown how economic integration may lead to increased 
concentration of industrial production. This literature is based on the Spence (1976), and 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework of increasing returns to scale and monopolistic 
competition, together with trade costs. A key feature is that these models display 
hysteresis in location, meaning that once production has agglomerated in a region it tends 
to get stuck there because of demand and supply linkages. These linkages are an 
important explanation for the industrial clusters that can be observed in many real world 
regions such as the manufacturing belt of the U.S. A consequence of this is that mobile 
factors may not respond to marginal changes in tax rates if they are locked in by the 
existence of an industrial cluster. This stands in stark contrast to a standard neo-classical 
framework, where a marginal tax change in a region leads to a marginal movement of 
factors. 
Few attempts have been made to date to address issues of tax competition in an 
economic geography framework, among those are papers by Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik, 
and Schjelderup (1998), Forslid and Ottaviano (1999), Baldwin and Krugman (2002), and 
Andersson and Forslid (2003). An important exemption is Ludema and Wooton (2000). 
In a framework with a homogeneous good, oligopoly and moving costs, the authors focus 
on the effects of integration on the intensity of tax competition. The conclusion indicate 
that integration interpreted as decreasing trade costs, contrary to popular notions, 
attenuates tax competition; and that integration interpreted as increased labor mobility 
has mixed effects. A key finding of Ludema and Wooton is that the inertia resulting from 
concentration of the mobile factor in one region gives, essentially, rise to a rent that is 
taxable. This latter conclusion is borne out also in Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik, and 
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Schjelderup (1998); more precisely they show that a country hosting an agglomeration 
may find it optimal to levy a source-based tax on capital income. 
 
Recent Empirical Work 
 
 
Most of the empirical work surveyed by Brueckner (2003) concentrates on tax 
competition between governmental units within a country. Several recent papers in this 
literature such as Besley and Rosen (1998), Goodspeed (2000, 2002), Hayashi and 
Boadway (2001), and Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001) investigate Stackelberg 
behavior of the central government vis-à vis a lower level governments within a country. 
A small empirical literature has recently begun to attempt estimating tax reaction 
functions of national governments which compete against other national governments.19 
For instance, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) and Besley, Griffith, and 
Klemm (2001) estimate Nash reaction functions for OECD countries. Both studies find a 
positively sloped Nash reaction function, but do not consider the possibility of 
Stackelberg behavior as suggested by Gordon (1992). 
Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) estimate the tax reaction functions of national 
governments competing with other national governments, both, for a pure Nash model 
and for a model in which the U.S. can act as a Stackelberg leader while the European 
countries compete with each other in a Nash way. They follow Gordon (1992) who sets a 
strategic model of tax competition that allows for one large country to act as a 
Stackelberg leader. They allow the followers to be Nash competitors with each other, and 
the Nash competitors to be followers in a Stackelberg game with a large country. The 
                                                 
19
 Tax reaction functions are equations which indicate whether any particular government will change a tax 
rate in response to changes in other countries’ tax rates. 
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European countries would act as Nash competitors with each other, while the United 
States would be the Stackelberg leader. 
The basic estimating equation for the Nash game between countries is: 
 
                                         ∑
≠
++++=
ij
itititjijti ddXw εϕφθτβτ ,,,                                 (3) 
 
where i indexes countries and t indexes time; τ is the tax rate measure; Xi is a vector of 
exogenous control variables such as GDP per capita, total government spending (as a 
percentage of GDP) and the lagged value of the personal and corporate tax measure; 
β, θ, φ and ϕ are estimated parameters (being θ  a vector of estimates); ε  is an error term; 
and w is a weighting matrix whose weights are assigned based (inversely) on the distance 
between the own country and all countries for which interactions are assumed. One such 
scheme assigns a weight of one to contiguous countries (states, counties, etc.) and zero to 
all others (Besley & Case, 1995). These weights are normalized to add to one. In this 
specification they estimate the model for both capital and personal tax competition.  
Alternatively, the authors explored the possibility that European tax havens view 
the United States differently than do other European countries. Following Hines and Rice 
(1994), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) classified Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland 
as tax havens. Thus, di represents a set of country fixed effects with a value of one for the 
countries above. Furthermore, it was possible that the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 
combined with the relaxation of capital controls in Europe and technological advances 
resulted in European nations treating the U.S. as a Stackelberg leader after 1986. To do 
this the authors included a dummy variable dt that equals one for observations prior to 
  
 
52 
and including 1986 and an interaction term between this variable and the U.S. tax rate. 
The estimated coefficient showed the difference (if any) between the responsiveness of 
corporate tax rates to U.S. tax changes before and after the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
The authors turned to a specification that incorporates a Stackelberg leader and in 
which they allow the followers to be Nash competitors with each other. The basic 
estimating equation for the followers in this game is: 
 
                                    ∑
≠
−
+++++=
ij
ititLtitjijti TdXw εψϕητθτβτ 1,,,,                          (4) 
 
where i indexes the follower countries; 1, −tLτ is the lagged tax rate of the leader; η and 
ψ  are estimated coefficients; and T is a time trend. The data was extracted from the 
OECD’s Revenue Statistics from 1968 to 1996, and sample of countries included are all 
the European OECD’s countries with the exception of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Iceland, and the Slovak Republic.   
The empirical results provided evidence that European countries interact 
strategically with their neighbors to set capital tax rates but not to set labor tax rates and 
follow the lead of the United States in setting capital tax rates after 1986, the year of the 
major U.S. tax reform. In fact, their results suggested that the tax rates of non-tax haven 
European countries are more responsive to changes in U.S. rates than to their own 
neighbor’s rates. However, they found no evidence that either the haven or non-haven 
countries reacted to the tax changes of the United States before 1986, the year of a major 
U.S. tax reform.  
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A paper by Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) researched property-tax competition 
among local governments. They estimated the reaction function of the representative 
community, which relates the community’s property-tax rate to its own characteristics 
and to the tax rates in competing communities. The estimation uses cross-section data on 
property taxes and other socio-economic variables for 70 cities in the Boston 
metropolitan area before (1980) and after (1990) Proposition 212 .20  
Their theoretical model is drawn from the literature on tax competition, in which 
local jurisdictions choose property-tax rates taking into account the migration of mobile 
capital in response to tax differentials. The reaction functions were estimated using the 
techniques of spatial econometrics, with a non-zero slope coefficient providing evidence 
of strategic interaction in the choice of tax rates. The econometric specification used a 
spatial lag model on which a weight matrix aggregates the property-tax rates in 
competing communities into a single variable.  
The authors estimate the reaction function: 
 
                                                      ∑
≠
++=
ij
iijiji Ztwt εθφ                                              (5) 
 
where ti represents the natural logarithm of the total property tax rate; Zi is a vector 
containing the socio-economic characteristics of community i, such as the natural 
logarithm of the per-capita income, of the per-capita state aid, of the population with 16 
years of education, of the population proportion of Afro-American, of the lagged per 
capita levy, and the annual rate of population growth; and w represents a weight matrix 
                                                 
20
 The Proposition 2
12  is a property-tax limitation measure that took effect in 1981. 
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that takes into account the geographical distances from a given community to its 
competitors, as well as the population sizes.  
The results of the study showed empirical evidence on property-tax competition 
among local governments. The 1980 results suggested that strategic tax competition 
occurred in the Boston metropolitan area in the pre-tax-limitation era. Interestingly, the 
evidence showed that tax competition persisted, although in a less pervasive manner, 
after Proposition 212  despite the restrictions imposed by this tax limitation measure. 
In this context Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) tested whether 
OECD’s countries compete with each other over corporate taxes and allowance rates in 
order to attract investment. The study examined whether there was any empirical 
evidence for such international competition in taxes on corporate income using data from 
21 countries between 1983 and 1999. 
The authors developed two models which helped clarify the nature of corporate 
tax competition. In the first model, firms are mobile, but countries are small relative to 
the world capital market. In this case, countries compete only in statutory corporate tax 
rates. In the second, firms are immobile, and countries are large relative to the world 
capital market. In this case, countries compete only in allowance rates.21 For each of the 
two models, they developed fiscal reaction functions. They also allowed for a wide 
variety of specifications in the empirical work, i.e., they allowed tax reaction functions to 
be non-linear, and that the adjustment to equilibrium to be instantaneous or dynamic. 
                                                 
21
 The statutory tax rate is the tax rate established by the government. The marginal effective tax rate is 
measured by the difference between the pre-tax and after tax rates of return on the investment. On the other 
hand, the average effective tax rate is measured by dividing actual taxes paid by an independent measure of 
income. 
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The theoretical analysis generated symmetric reaction functions of the form 
( )ji TRT =  where Ti denotes the tax rate (whether statutory, average effective, or 
marginal effective tax rate) in country i, and Tj is country j tax rate. The theoretical model 
assumed two symmetric countries. Allowing for n countries that may be different, and 
introducing time subscripts, the reaction functions were written more generally as:  
 
                                        
( )ittiiti XTRT ,,, −=                 i=1,2,…….n                              (6) 
 
where  ( )nSSiSiSSSi TTTTTT ,.....,,..., 1111, +−− =  denotes the vector of tax rates of all other 
countries at time s, and Xit is a vector of other control variables that may affect the setting 
of the tax in country i, such as the relative size of each economy, measured as 
GDPit/GDPjt where j is U.S., the total public consumption as a percentage of GDP, the 
lagged sum of inward and outward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, the 
proportion of population below 14 years old, the proportion of population over 65 years 
old, the proportion of population living in urban areas, the population density, and the 
highest marginal income tax rate. 
More explicitly, the system of equations estimated could be expressed as:  
 
                        ittiitisisisistit eXADDATT ++++++++= − ηηηγγγβα '32111             (7) 
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and where iη  is a country fixed effect, tη  is a period fixed effect, and ite  is an error term. 
Observe that tiA ,  is defined as jt
ij
ijti TwA ∑
≠
=
,
, where wij is a weights matrix. The 
weights should be large when tax competition between countries i and j is likely to be 
strong. In the case of local property taxes, the obvious choice (and one that works well in 
practice (see Brueckner, 2000) is to use geographical weights, where wij is inversely 
related to the distance between jurisdictions i and j. A local government is likely to 
respond more readily to changes in the tax rates of neighboring governments than it 
would to rates in a different part of the country. However, in this case, the degree of tax 
competition between two countries may depend not only (or at all) on geographic 
proximity of countries, but also their relative size and the degree to which they are open 
to international flows. 
On the other hand, isD  is a dummy indicating whether country i’s tax rate is 
above or below the weighted average in period s. Thus, they allow for two possibilities: 
simply being above the average may change the intercept of the reaction function; and 
being above the average may change the way itT  responds to changes in the weighted 
average of the other taxes.  
The authors found evidence that countries compete over all three measures of 
taxes, the effective marginal tax rate, the average effective tax rate, and the statutory tax 
rate, but particularly over the statutory and effective average tax rates. This is consistent 
with the belief that the typical location decision of a multinational is a mutually exclusive 
discrete choice between two locations.  
They also found evidence of non-linear reaction functions. Specifically, countries 
with relatively high tax rates tend to respond more strongly to changes in tax rates in 
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other countries. Alternatively, countries react more strongly to changes in other countries 
tax rates when their own tax is above the average. Finally, they found rather weaker 
evidence that countries compete over effective marginal tax rates. 
Chen, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1998) researched foreign direct 
investment outflows from five developed home countries to four host rival countries in 
Southeast Asia, as well as the responsiveness of FDI to tax policies of each pair of host 
and home countries and those of potentially competing host countries. Their work 
consists in an research of whether host countries are interdependent in the sense that 
production costs, including taxes in other host countries, affect the inward FDI to a 
particular host country. A particular point in this study that sets a difference from others’ 
works, is that the authors included the impact of the home country tax rate into the 
analysis. The estimation and analysis allowed not only for the roles of the tax systems of 
each pair of home and host countries on FDI, as conventionally done in the literature, but 
also for the potential role played by the tax systems of competing host countries. 
Their model for FDI from home country i into host country j ( ijF ) is represented 
by: 
 
                          ∆Fij=αij + βij1∆τi + βij2∆τj + βij3∆(ti-τj,) +βij4∆τjo+ βij5∆wj+                  (8) 
                                  βij6∆wjo +βij7∆ej +βij8∆ejo +βij9∆pj + βij10∆pjo +εij                       
 
where ∆Fij is the annual change of FDI from home country i (five countries) into host 
country j (four Southeast Asian countries); εij is the random disturbance term; τi is the 
effective tax rate in home country i; jτ  is the effective tax rate in host country j; it  is the 
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statutory tax rate in home country i; joτ  is the average effective tax rate in the other three 
host countries; jw  is the hourly compensation cost in host country j; jow  is the average 
hourly compensation in the other three host countries; je  is the number of months of 
imports covered by international reserves in host country j; joe is the average number of 
months of imports covered by international reserves in the other three host countries; jp  
the export price index in host country j; and jop  is the average export price index in the 
other three host countries. The model was estimated using cross section and annual time 
series data covering 20 pairs of countries over 18 years (1972-1989). 
The results showed that FDI flows tend to be negatively related to the rate of 
effective taxation in the host country and this effect appear to be more pronounced for 
FDI coming from home countries with territorial or exemption systems. Foreign direct 
investment into any host country is sensitive to the tax system of potentially competitive 
host countries. The results showed that the tax policies of developing countries can put 
them in competition with each other for FDI. 
Continuing with this review, Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, and Lahrèche-Révil 
(2001) work reject the recent literature on economic geography which has underscored 
the significance of tax differentials as determinants of foreign direct investment. As 
previously explained, economic geography theory affirms that size effects and 
agglomeration economies represents the most important determinant for the FDI location, 
and that corporate tax competition does not necessary lead to a race to the bottom. To 
challenge this argument, Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, and Lahrèche-Révil establish a 
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theoretical and empirical framework based on a panel data of bilateral FDI flows across 
11 OECD countries over the 1984-1996 period.  
Their empirical specification can be expressed as:  
 
                      FDIijt = β0ETAXijt + β1NTAXijt + β2FDIij,t-1 + β3SGDPij,t-1+                             (9) 
                                   β4SGDPij,t + β5SGDPij,t+1 β6GDPjt + β7Openijt +  
                                  β8DGDPijt  + β9Distijt + β10D6 + β11D11 +εijt                                                              
    
where FDIijt represents the bilateral foreign direct investment inflow from country j to 
country i ; ETAXijt is the difference between i and j effective taxes on corporate income 
standardized by the corresponding operating surplus in GDP percentage; NTAXijt is the 
difference between i and j statutory tax rates;  GDP is the Gross Domestic Product of 
country j (investor); Openijt is the sum of bilateral exports and imports over the GDP of 
the investing country defined as: 
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great arc cycle distances between i and j economic centers; and SGDPijt represents a 
measure of market potential which accounts for  both internal transportation costs in the 
host country and transportation costs between the host country and the regional market, 
including internal transportation costs in each foreign market. The variable SGDPijt is 
defined as: ∑+=
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Alternatively, D6 represents a dummy for the bilateral FDI flows from UK to 
USA in 1995; and D11 is a dummy for the bilateral FDI flows from USA to Japan in 
1990.  
The empirical results imply that, although market potentials such as 
agglomeration economies and size effects do matter, tax differentials also play a 
significant role. This provides empirical evidence that corporate tax differentials among 
countries are significant in determining the FDI flows of investors. Nonetheless, an 
implication of the results is that tax competition cannot be excluded, although it may not 
lead to a race to the bottom. 
Rizzo’s (2002) work investigates the concept of transfers using a tax competition 
framework. The study is based on the notion that transfers are normally needed to 
compensate or equalize for the loss of revenue or social welfare due to the mobility 
resources that happens from tax competition. The aim of the paper is to investigate if the 
states of a federation receiving a compensation transfer modify their tax rate choice with 
respect to states which are not given any transfer. Rizzo’s model was developed as a tax 
rate reaction function, described as:  
 
                               
ststststststtsst zxEXPEvht εθϑδδδβα +++++++= 321
                 (10) 
 
  
 
61 
where tst represents the cigarette tax rate for province s and year t; αs are the state fixed 
effects; and βt  is a vector of 2 dummy variables defined as: β11 equal to one when the tax 
rate is higher than the Canadian neighbors’ tax, and β12 a dummy equal to one when 
equalization holds. The xst is a vector of province specific time varying shocks such as 
population of province s in year t, density of population (calculated as the fraction of 
population over the area of the province), ratio of individuals who are between 5 and 17 
years of age, ratio of individuals over 65 years of age, unemployment rate, and real per 
capita income. Variable hst represents the tax rates average for province s in year t of the 
neighboring provinces of province s; vst is the tax rates average for province s in year t of 
the neighboring U.S. states of province s; and EXPEst represents the ratio of the total 
expenditure on GDP for province s in year t. On the other hand,  zst is a vector of 
neighboring variables such as U.S and Canadian province neighbors’ income, U.S. and 
Canadian province neighbors’ grant, U.S. and Canadian province neighbors’ income tax, 
U.S and Canadian province neighbors’ unemployment rate; and finally εst represents the 
error term. The model was estimated for Canada and United States using a panel data at a 
province level from 1984 to 1994. 
The results indicated that a decrease of Canadian neighbors’ average tax rate, hst, 
would produce a significant decrease in the tax rate of province s, and that the province 
with a higher tax rate than its neighbor reacts more heavily to a neighboring change in 
tax, than in the case that it would have had a lower tax rate than its neighbor.    
Other empirical studies that rely on the tax competition model to motivate the 
estimation of tax reaction functions include Brett and Pinkse (1997, 2000) who focus on 
local property taxes in Canada; Buettner (2001) who studies the local business tax in 
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Germany; and Hayashi and Boadway (2001) who focus on provincial corporate income 
taxes in Canada.  
 
Summary 
 
 
The literature on tax competition has continuously attempted to demonstrate the 
disadvantages and advantages of competing through taxes. Since its beginnings with the 
Tiebout (1956) hypothesis, to the recent theories of the Leviathan (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980), there is no common consensus regarding the favorable or damaging 
actions of tax competition. What is true is that foreign direct investment inflows represent 
a favorable environment for economies, and that one way to attract it is to provide fiscal 
incentives to firms; fiscal incentives in the form of tax holidays, reduced tax rates, or 
increased depreciation among other factors.     
Recent research has demonstrated the existence of tax competition along a 
geographical region or areas. Subdivisions of this topic are now in study by numerous 
authors. An example of these subdivisions is the study presented by Altshuler and 
Goodspeed (2002) on which they have established a form of behavior of countries’ tax 
policies, be it Stackelberg or Nash behavior. Nonetheless the extensive literature of tax 
competition, a global or world-wide tax competition framework, the topic of this 
dissertation, has not been analyzed so far in the literature.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
As shown in the last chapter, most of the literature concerning tax competition has 
commonly focused on a regional basis, that is, countries located near each other along a 
given geographical area or region compete on tax incentives in order to attract foreign 
direct investments.22 This study differs from the past literature in the sense that our focus 
is on global instead of regional corporate tax competition. More formally, global or 
world-wide tax competition can be defined as uncooperative tax policy reactions between 
governments of different countries of the world not necessarily near each other 
geographically, but in similar economic conditions and with the purpose to influence the 
allocation of a mobile tax base world-wide. In other words, global tax competition is 
thought as a tax competition among different countries of the world without providing a 
significant importance to the geographical location of them, but considering their 
economic position. For the purpose of this study, export oriented foreign capital 
investment was referred to as the internationally mobile tax base. For countries in similar 
economic conditions we assume economies that fall in a given interval of gross national 
product per capita. The reason to use gross national product per capita as a proxy for 
economic proximity regards the need for a reliable and given parameter that permits a 
standard classification of the economies. This classification has been already developed 
                                                 
22
 The incentives can take the form of preferential tax rates, tax holidays, tax discounts, or increased 
depreciation. 
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by the World Bank as low income, lower middle income, upper middle income, and high 
income economies.23 
The basic mechanics of tax competition and the firms’ decision can be described 
as follows. Firms undertake their decision of where to invest examining many possible 
locations in terms of costs, economic activity, infrastructure, etc., and narrowing their 
focus to a handful of potential sites. After that, these potential locations bid against one 
another by (if they decide to do so) offering firm specific tax reductions and other 
incentives to the firm to ensure that they become the host.  
Thus, world-wide tax competition is possible by internalizing transportation costs, 
distance, and skills, among other factors, within the firms’ decision of where to invest, 
and most important, on the governments’ decisions. 
World-wide tax competition is also possible by the inclusion of export oriented 
firms on which the purpose is to find and use particular and specific resources at a lower 
real cost in foreign countries, and then export the output produced to the home country or 
third countries.24 For this type of firms, resource endowments are commonly considered 
as one of the most important investment location factors. The amount and availability of 
these factors can make the country in question more, or less competitive in terms of other 
countries. For this reason, the literature has repeatedly attempted to evaluate if a tax 
policy could compensate, in terms of competitiveness, for obstacles in the business 
                                                 
23
 The classification of the world economies is provided in World Bank (2003, 2004).  This is fully 
explained in the next Chapter. 
24
 On the other hand, market oriented investments aim to set up enterprises in a particular country to supply 
goods and services to the local market. This kind of FDI may be undertaken to sustain or protect existing 
markets or to exploit or promote new markets. Market size, prospects for market growth, and the degree of 
development of host countries are very important location factors for market-oriented FDI. The general 
implication is that host countries with larger market size, faster economic growth and higher degree of 
economic development will provide more and better opportunities for these industries to exploit their 
ownership advantages and, therefore, will attract more market-oriented FDI. 
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environment and attract multinational companies.25 The result depends on whether the 
firms are market or export oriented. Work by Reuber (1973), Guisinger (1985), and 
Coyne (1994), indicate that the impact of tax rates on investment decisions is generally 
higher on export oriented companies than on those seeking the domestic market. Their 
reasoning showed that export oriented firms operate in highly competitive markets with 
very slim margins, and that these firms are often highly mobile, and more likely to 
compare taxes across alternative locations (Wells, 1986). From their work it can be 
concluded that taxes are an important part of export oriented firms’ cost structure, and 
that these companies can easily move to take advantage of more favorable tax regimes. 
Hence, in this case tax incentives compensate for resource obstacles making the country 
more attractive to investors, and consequently more competitive.  
Taking into account the above arguments, and acknowledging transportation 
costs, distance, and skills, among several factors within the firms’ decisions and 
governments’ reactions, a tax competition model can be constructed.  The model we 
build here is based on the Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) framework, but we 
expand their framework to allow for a third country, workers, two types of entrepreneurs 
and capital, geographical distance between countries, transportation costs, labor skills, 
and technology skills.26 The aim of the model then, is to understand the forces that 
generate competition between countries’ fiscal policies and after that generate some 
                                                 
25
 Reuber (1973) argued that all multinational corporations are not the same, and that they respond 
differently to special types of incentives, depending on their motivations. Reuber studied 80 investment 
projects; among export oriented projects, fiscal incentives (including accelerated depreciation, tax holidays, 
and duty remission) were said to have been important in 48% of the investment decisions, while among 
investments directed to the domestic market, 56% of responses named protection as the most important 
factor.   
26
 We take into account the geographical distance as well as the economic distance in the model.  The first 
is internalized in the theoretical model in the form of geographical distance between the FDI host country 
and the FDI home country. The second, economic distance, refers to the fact of considering the economic 
fundamentals of each country within the theoretical model.  
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testable predictions. The interest of the model is to find optimal tax rates that will serve 
as reaction functions of the governments’ fiscal policy instruments. The logical 
specification of the model follows a three stage framework.  
 
Theoretical Model 
 
 
Consider a model with three countries on different geographical areas, labeled 1, 
2, and 3, i =1, 2, 3. Countries 1 and 2 face similar economic conditions, and compete to 
attract capital from country 3.27 There are two unit measures of “export seeking” 
corporations in country 3 that would like to invest in 1 or 2 depending on their 
profitability.28 The output produced in each host country can be sold in the world market 
or returned to the investor’s home country. For this study the latter will be assumed. 
There is also a unit measure of immobile home producing corporations established in 
each country, 1 and 2, that produce a private good x . Note that this type of firms will 
attend the national market, that is, they will produce the “nationally consumed” products.  
In summary, there would be two types of corporations, the export oriented firms 
that will direct their output only to country 3 (returned to the investors’ home country), 
and the home producing firms that will only attend the local market. Additionally, we 
will assume that the goods produced by both firms are neither substitutes nor 
complements. 
                                                 
27
 Countries 1 and 2 will be the FDI hosts and can not become FDI home countries. On the other hand, 
country 3 will be the FDI home country and can not become a FDI host. 
28
 Throughout the model, the export seeking corporations coming from country 3 are denominated as 
“export oriented entrepreneurs.” Note that the goods produced by these types of firms are returned to the 
investors’ home country or directed to the international market if assuming no exports or imports between 
countries 1 and 2.  The goods produced will not be sold in the home producing country local market. 
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Both types of firms, home producing and export oriented, use two production 
factors to fabricate x : capital K, and labor L. Labor is the internationally immobile factor 
in both types of firms and capital is immobile for home producing firms and perfectly 
mobile for export oriented firms.29 The total export oriented capital supply of both 
countries is assumed to be fixed at 3K , while the total home producing capital supply of 
both countries is assumed to be fixed at 1K  and 2K , respectively. There is no 
unemployment and there are no moving or transaction costs for the export oriented firms.  
The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and is described by 
an homogeneous production function, F(γK,ϕL), where 0>γ  and 0>ϕ  represent the 
technological and labor skills, respectively. The intensive form of the production function 
F(γK,ϕL) is written ),,( iiikF ϕγ , where ik  is capital per worker. 30 Expressing the 
production function in the intensive form, we have F’(k) > 0 and F’’(k) < 0. Both 
countries, 1 and 2, are assumed to be small relative to the size of the capital market, so 
the cost of capital r is equal in both countries to the international capital cost.  
Governments finance the provision of a public good gi in each country through a 
corporate income tax rate, with a statutory rate of it , where 10 ≤≤ it . Governments also 
set a rate of allowance ia  in order to reduce the taxes paid and provide incentives to the 
firms, where 0≥ia . Higher values of ai are preferred by the firms since they indicate 
higher fiscal incentives, in other words, governments make use of higher rates of 
                                                 
29
 Labor is assumed to be “internationally” immobile, but mobile within a given country. 
30
 The production function  F(γK, ϕL) = Lf(υk) with υ = γϕ  and k = K / L. Similarly to the intensive form, 
F’(K) > 0 and F’’(K) < 0. 
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allowance in order to encourage firms to invest.31 There are no taxes on labor or the 
capital stock. Thus, there are two mechanisms by which the governments can affect the 
location decision of firms and their investment, the statutory corporate income tax rate 
and the rate of allowance, ( )ii at , .Thus, higher tax revenues are obtained by attracting 
foreign direct investment but lower tax revenues also result from lower it  and higher ia .  
It is crucial to assume there is a proactive government, meaning a government that 
reacts to deficiencies or improvements in its economy by proposing, in a reasonable 
period of time, diverse policies in order to stabilize, correct, or improve the economic 
situation of its country. Without this assumption, a non-proactive government would not 
provide the required framework for fiscal competition, neither regional, nor global. 
Additionally, another necessary assumption is that governments do not discriminate 
against domestic capital or home country investors, this implies that the same statutory 
corporate income tax rate, it , and rate of allowance, ia , are applied to the home 
producing firms and to the export oriented firms. It is also assumed that home countries 
use a territorial system of taxation and do not offer any credit for the taxes paid abroad.32 
There are four types of individuals in countries 1 and 2: workers, capitalists, home 
producing entrepreneurs, and export oriented entrepreneurs. We make a difference 
between capitalists and entrepreneurs (or firms) since we need to separate the latter into 
market oriented and export oriented. According to Reuber (1973), Guisinger (1985), and 
Coyne (1994), the second type of firms have shown to be more sensitive to changes in tax 
rates. Hence, the model seeks to internalize that behavior.    
                                                 
31
 For the case of equity finance, a represents the percentage of investment deductible from profit. On the 
other hand, a can also reflect the benefits of interest deductibility in the presence of debt financed 
investment.  
32
 This assumption is meant to simplify the theoretical model.  
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For simplicity in the model we seek that wages stay fixed, thus we assumed a 
labor supply with the characteristic of perfect elasticity (it has a zero slope).33 We 
previously suppose no unemployment, so at the entry of export oriented firms to home 
producing countries labor demand could increase; with a perfectly elastic labor supply, an 
increase at the labor demand would not provoke a change in wages.  
Export oriented entrepreneurs denoted as type b come from country 3, while home 
producing entrepreneurs are denoted as type c. The sum of the four types of individuals in 
each case yields the total country population. Capitalists and workers preferences are 
denoted by a quasi-linear utility function of the form )(),( gvxgxu +=  on which x is the 
private good bought with the agent’s total income (there are no savings),34 and g is the 
public good where the function )(gv  is increasing and strictly concave, 0)(' >gv , and 
0)('' ≤gv . On the other hand, entrepreneurs preferences (of both home producing and 
export oriented) are denoted by a similar utility function of the form )(),( gvygyu += , 
where the function )(gv has the same properties as before. The variable y denotes the 
entrepreneurs’ (home producing and export oriented) after tax income, but only in the 
case of the home producing entrepreneurs it will be entirely used to buy a private good.  
Additionally, since there are no savings, it is assumed that capitalists, as well as 
home producing entrepreneurs, obtained their capital and firms through inheritance, in 
                                                 
33
 If we assume a positive sloped labor supply, when increasing the labor demand due to the export oriented 
firms’ entry to the FDI host country, wages should increase since workers would not accept working for the 
export oriented firms for lower wages than those that they already have. In turn, this could be translated 
into an increase in the labor costs for the home producing firms, and therefore their utility would be 
affected negatively (holding other variables constant) by the entry of export oriented firms. For simplicity, 
this model tries to isolate that effect by assuming to work on the perfectly elastic part of a labor supply 
curve.   
34
 The statement that there are no savings can be questionable at first sight; however, this is assumed to 
develop the model in a simple form and to acknowledge that workers do not become capitalists, and that 
capitalists do not become home producing entrepreneurs. The model could be extended to include savings 
in a later work.   
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such a way that capitalists would not become entrepreneurs, nor entrepreneurs will 
become capitalists. The model is developed in a static form.  
Each government chooses the parameters of the corporate tax system that 
maximize social welfare, which is assumed to be the sum of utilities of the types of 
individuals, taking as given the tax systems outside the country. The variables are 
measured in real terms.  
The order of events is formulated in four stages which are described as follows: 
(1) Governments in both countries choose their corporate tax instruments;                      
(2) Entrepreneurs make relocations decisions; (3) Entrepreneurs purchase capital inputs 
and hire workers; and (4) Production, consumption and exports take place. Although the 
four stages are important, our interest relies on the first three, with primary concern of 
what happens at stage 1.  The model will be solved backwards since we are assuming that 
governments change their tax package decision after observing the levels of the current 
production, consumption, investment and location of firms (export oriented) under the 
present tax package.  
In what follows we offer a more detailed description of the income and utility of 
the four participants of the model, workers, the two kinds of entrepreneurs, and 
capitalists. 
 
Participants of the Model 
Type I. Capitalists 
For home producing entrepreneurs there is a unit measure of capitalists in each 
country, 1 and 2. They receive the return for their capital endowment equal to irκ , where 
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iκ is the individual endowment of capital in country i. iκ  is defined as the total capital 
stock of country i divided by the number of capitalists of country i.35 Variable r is defined 
as the price of capital. 
 
                                                                  
i
i
i
s
K
=κ                                                         (11) 
 
where iK  is the capital stock of country i, while is  represents the number of capitalists in 
country i. Notice that the individual endowment of capital is only used by the home 
producing companies, cik , since this type of capital is immobile. So, using both 
conditions:  
 
                                                              
i
i
i
c
i
s
Kk == κ                                                   (12) 
 
where the home producers use of capital per capita equals the capital stock divided by the 
number of capitalists in country i.36  Capitalists income can be denoted as cirk , while the 
consumption of the private good can be expressed as kix . Since we previously assumed 
that the private good was bought with the agent’s total income, then ci
k
i rkx = .  Hence, 
                                                 
35
 Note that iκ  can not be denoted as the per capita stock of capital since it only takes into account the 
owners of capital within the country and not the whole population. 
36
 Note that the superscript “c ” is used to denote the home producers, while “b ” is used to represent the 
export oriented entrepreneurs. 
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country’s i capitalists utility is given by the private good kix   and by the capitalists value 
of the public good )( igv . Hence:  
 
                                                      )(),( icikii gvrkgxu +=                                              (13) 
 
Alternatively, the total fixed stock of capital available for export oriented 
producers 3K  is defined as the sum of the capital stock for export oriented producers in 
countries 1 and 2.  
 
                                                            321 Kkk
bb
=+                                                      (14) 
 
where bk1  and bk2  represent the stock of capital for export oriented entrepreneurs in 
countries 1 and 2. The total stock of capital available for export oriented producers come 
exclusively from country 3, 3K  . The income from capital of country 3 is assumed to 
come entirely from the export oriented entrepreneurs.  We do not specify the utility for 
the capitalists in country 3 since they are not a part of the social welfare functions of the 
FDI host countries 1 and 2.    
 
Type II. Workers 
There is a unit measure of workers residents in country i that receive a return for 
their labor equal to iw . The wage is completely transformed into consumption of x, since 
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as previously stated, agents consume all their income and there are no taxes on labor 
income.37 Hence, i
w
i wx = .  
Following Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) wages for the home producing firm are 
determined by:38  
 
                                                   )('),,( ciciiicici kFkkFw −= ϕγ                                       (15) 
 
Wages in the home producing firm are defined as output per worker minus the 
payment to capital in terms of its marginal product and the amount of capital per worker.  
On the other hand, the export oriented firm wages are given by: 
 
                                             ( )( ))('),,(1 bibiiibiibi kFkkFw −−= ϕγθ                               (16) 
 
where iθ  represents the marginal cost of transportation, described in Equation 30 below. 
From the above and acknowledging that the fraction of the labor supply on which 
we are working on this model has the characteristic that it is perfectly elastic, thus the 
following condition is obtained in order to maintain a simple equilibrium:39 
                                                 
37
 Consumption assumptions are important since the model aims to maximize the social welfare function of 
the country on which the individuals are taken into account. The utility of each type of individual 
acknowledges the consumption of the private and the public good.   
38
 See Appendix B, Workers and Wages section.  
39
 For simplicity, we assume that the labor market has a negative sloped demand curve and a labor supply 
composed of a perfectly elastic initial part and a positive sloped consequent part. The model is developed in 
the perfectly elastic initial part of the curve. If assuming a positive sloped labor supply, when the labor 
demand increases due to the export oriented firms’ entry to the FDI host country, wages should increase in 
order to maintain equilibrium in the labor market. The latter could be transformed, first into an increase in 
the utility of workers; and second into an increase in the labor costs for the home producing firms affecting 
negatively their utility (holding other variables constant). So, in order to maintain simplicity and do not 
deal with workers and home producers utility shifts due to export oriented firms entrance to a country, this 
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b
i
c
ii www ==                                               (17) 
 
Note that if bi
c
i ww >  workers would not sell their labor for lower payments than 
those they are already receiving. In other words, workers would not accept working for 
the export oriented firm since the wages the latter is offering are lower than those of the 
home producing firm. The export oriented firms must offer “at least” cw  to the workers if 
they want to attract them.  Therefore, it is assumed that the wage paid is equal in both 
types of firms, home producer and export oriented in order to maintain equilibrium.40   
Assembling the above, workers utility is defined as the sum of their income plus 
their value of the public good, which is described as:  
 
                                                          )(),( iiwii gvwgxu +=                                         (18) 
 
Type III. Home Producing Entrepreneurs 
There are two types of entrepreneurs residing in countries 1 and 2. Type c are the 
home producing entrepreneurs, and type b are the export oriented entrepreneurs. Home 
producing entrepreneurs’ goal, each of whom owns a firm, is to reach the highest possible 
after tax profits since their income comes exclusively from the profit made by their 
                                                                                                                                                 
model tries to isolate such effect by assuming a perfectly elastic initial part and a positive sloped 
consequent part of the labor supply; and then, working on the first one. See Figure A.1 in Appendix A.  
40
 Note from Appendix B, Workers and Wages section, Equations B7, and B10 that if bi
c
i ww =  and since 
0≠θ , then )1( θ−= bici kk . 
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firms.41 They face wages equal to iw ; total cost of capital used equal to 
c
irk ; a statutory 
corporate tax rate equal to it , and an allowance rate equal to ia .
42
 Hence, the after tax 
profits of home producing firms located in country i can be expressed as:43 
 
                                                            ( ) iici t Γ−=Π 1                                            (19) 
 
where:  
 
                                                ( )ciiiiicii rkzwkF −−=Γ ),,( ϕγ                              (20) 
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where ( ) iit Γ−1  indicates the after tax profits of the home producing firm in country i; iγ  
represents the technology skills in country i; iϕ  are the labor skills; iw  is the wage; r is 
the cost of capital; iz is defined as one plus the effective marginal tax rate; and im  
                                                 
41
 Despite of the differences between the terms entrepreneurs and firms, these will be used indifferently 
along this dissertation.   
42
 See Appendix B, Home Producing Entrepreneurs section. 
43
 Also, note that the home producing entrepreneurs’ after tax profit with a tax system ( )ii at , can be written 
in a form such as: ( )( )ciiiicicici rkwkF −−−=Π ),,(1 ϕγλ  where ( )c
iiii
c
i
c
iiiii
c
iic
i
rkwkF
rkawkFt
−−
−−
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),,(
ϕγ
ϕγλ  and ciλ  
represents the average effective tax rate for the home producing firms.  
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represents the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on new investment in function of the 
statutory corporate tax rate and the rate of allowance.44 
Home producing entrepreneurs maximize the after tax profits in order to reach the 
“optimal” decision of how much to invest. Hence:  
 
                           ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )rzwtrkzwkFMaxt iiiiiciiiiici
k
i c
i
,,,,1),,(1 ϕγϕγ Γ−=−−−         (23) 
 
Now, using Equations 20 and 23 the first order condition can be extracted which 
is simply the net of tax return to capital for the home producing firm:45  
 
                                                                rzkF iii
c
i =),,(' ϕγ                                         (24) 
 
According to the above, and using Equation 21, mi indicates the aspect of the tax 
system that determines the scale of a firm’s operation, that is the choice of capital per 
worker, cik , in any country, other things equal.  
Solving for cik  in Equation 24, the “optimal” decision of how much to invest will 
depend on γ , ϕ , r, and m, for the case of the home producing firm:  
 
                                                           ),,,(
.
++−−
= iii
c
i rmkk ϕγ                                             (25) 
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 Note that ( )ii mz += 1 ; 0>
i
i
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; 0<
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aif
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dz
i
i ; see Appendix B, Home Producing 
Entrepreneurs section. 
45
 See Appendix B, Home Producing Entrepreneurs section. 
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Note that the signs below the variables represent the relation between capital per 
worker, cik , and the variable in question, that is, the first derivative of 
c
ik  with respect to 
the variables in question.  
Thus, the after tax income for the home producing entrepreneur can be expressed 
as: 
 
                                                   ( ) ( )rzwty iiiiiici ,,,,1 ϕγΓ−=                                     (26) 
 
While the home producer entrepreneur’s utility is composed by the sum of the 
home producer after tax income plus his value of the public good. 
 
                                                   ( ) )(1),( iiicii gvtgyu +Γ−=                                      (27) 
 
Type IV. Export Oriented Entrepreneurs 
Recall that export seeking corporations coming from country 3, or export oriented 
entrepreneur’s decision of where to invest would depend on which country would they 
expect to obtain the higher after tax profits for their investments. Again, it must be 
assumed that their income comes exclusively from the profit made by their firms.46 
                                                 
46
 Again, this could be a questionable assumption but it is a measure to simplify the analysis. In fact, in 
order to evaluate the profitability of an export oriented firm located in a given location of the world we 
should treat each firm separately from their parent (no cross subsidies), thus the profitability of each firm 
will depend only on the profits made by themselves in the country of residence and not on the whole 
multinational firm. In this sense, a corporation will be profitable depending on their own costs and benefits 
that would be in function of the world’s location of the firm. 
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The after tax profits of the export oriented firms located in country i can be 
expressed as:47  
 
                                                               ( ) iibi t Ψ−=Π 1                                                (28) 
 
 where  
 
                                                  ( )biiiiiibii rkzhwkF −−−=Ψ ),,( ϕγ                            (29) 
 
on which iΨ  takes into account the marginal effective tax rate, ii mz +=1 ; and hi 
represents the transportation costs depending on the output produced and on the distance 
between the producing country and the target country, iD . Note that ih  refers to the 
transportation costs from country i to country 3. 
 
                                                     ),,( iibiiiii kFDh ϕγθϑ +=                                         (30) 
 
on which iϑ  represents a fixed coefficient of the distance between countries i and 3, 
where 0>iϑ . Alternatively, iθ represents the marginal cost of transportation, where iθ  is 
defined to be variable between countries, and 10 << iθ .48 
                                                 
47
 See Appendix B, Export Oriented Entrepreneurs section. 
48
 Following Hummels (2001), ocean shipping services are generally charged as US dollars per ton and 
may also include some minimal loading or unloading expenses. Ocean freight rates also include a charge 
for a fixed trade route. On the other hand, air cargo rates are assumed to be a function of the volume traded 
and the distance between the port of shipping and the port of entry. The formula presented here is assumed 
to be a simplification of the transportation costs commonly observed in reality. Equation 30 includes a 
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Before the export oriented firms have decided where to invest, the decisions of 
how much to invest in either location would depend on the “optimal” capital per worker 
that will maximize the after tax profit. The “optimal” capital per worker decision in each 
location is needed since entrepreneurs must evaluate which location, given the tax 
package ( )ii at , , provides the highest after tax profits.  
Export oriented entrepreneurs maximize their after tax profits in order to reach the 
“optimal” decision of how much to invest. Hence:49  
 
          ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )rzDwtrkzhwkFMaxt iiiiiiiibiiiiiibiki bi ,,,,,,,1),,(1 ϑθϕγϕγ Ψ−=−−−−   (31) 
 
From Equation 31 the after tax return to capital for the exporting firm is 
represented by:50 
 
                                                      ( ) rzkF iiibii =− ),,('1 ϕγθ                                          (32) 
 
where the decision of how much to invest will depend on γ , ϕ , r, θ , and m, for the case 
of the export oriented firm. Thus:51  
 
                                                        ),,,,(
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= iiii
b
i rmkk ϕγθ                                            (33) 
                                                                                                                                                 
variable factor determining a cost per volume, and a fixed factor determining the cost per kilometer or mile 
transferred.  
49
 See Appendix B, Export Oriented Entrepreneurs section. 
50
 Note that one of the differences between the net return to capital for the home producing firm and the net 
return to capital for the exporting firm is provided by the marginal cost of transportation )1( iθ− . 
51
 See Appendix B, Export Oriented Entrepreneurs section. 
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where an increase of country’s i EMTR im , marginal cost of transportation iθ , and 
international cost of capital r, lead to a decrease in the export oriented capital invested in 
country i. To the contrary, an increase in the technological and labor skills in country i 
increases the level of export oriented capital in country i.  
Now, since capital is mobile in the case of export oriented firms, net returns must 
be equalized across countries 1 and 2. Therefore:  
 
                                 ( ) ( ) ),,('11),,('11 2222
2
1111
1
ϕγθϕγθ bb kF
z
rkF
z
−==−                    (34) 
 
An additional condition is that the export oriented total capital stock is fixed, 
hence, export oriented capital per capita of country 1 plus export oriented capital of 
country 2 must be equal to the total export oriented capital stock 3K . Thus:  
 
                                                                
bb kkK 213 +=                                                   (35) 
 
Now, the optimal value of bk1  in terms of the competing country’s variables and in 
function of the total export oriented capital of country 3 can be expressed as:52  
 
                                             ),,,,,,,,( 3212121211
+−+−++−+−
= Kzzkk b ϕϕγγθθ                              (36) 
 
                                                 
52
 The signs below the variables represent the relation between the capital per worker and the variable in 
question. See Appendix B, Export Oriented Entrepreneurs section. 
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where an increase of country’s 1 EMTR, 1m , and marginal cost of transportation 1θ , as 
well as in the labor and technological skills of country 2, 2ϕ  and 2γ , respectively, lead to 
a decrease in the export oriented capital invested in country 1. To the contrary, a raise of 
country’s 2 EMTR 2m , and marginal cost of transportation 2θ , as well as in the 
technological and labor skills of country 1 and in the total export oriented capital supply 
of country 3, lead to an increase in the level of export oriented capital in country 1.53  
Note from Equations 28 and 29 that the exporting firms’ after tax profit in a 
country with a tax system ( )ii at , can be written: 
 
                                          ( )( )biiiiibibibi rkhwkF −−−−=Π ),,(1 ϕγλ                         (37) 
 
where  
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where biλ  indicates the effective average tax rate (AETR) for an export oriented 
entrepreneur, which is represented by the taxes paid as a percentage of true economic 
profit. For that reason, ceteris paribus, biλ  could represent the element of the tax system 
that determines the location of the firm, as indicated by Devereux, Lockwood, and 
Redoano (2002). That is, if export oriented firms located in country 2 observe that they 
will pay a high AETR in country 1, they will not consider moving from country 2 to 
                                                 
53
 As previously stated, ( )ii mz += 1 , or 1 plus the EMTR of country i. 
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country 1, and vice versa. In this case it implies a comparison between b1λ  and b2λ  for 
export oriented firms, other things equal. However, assume a comparison of the form 
( )
bb
bb
b
rkhwkF
rkahwkFt
222222
22222222
2 ),,(
),,(
−−−
−−−
=
ϕγ
ϕγλ  against ( )bb
bb
b
rkhwkF
rkahwkFt
111111
11111111
1 ),,(
),,(
−−−
−−−
=
ϕγ
ϕγλ , in 
which bb 21 λλµ −= , then if 0<µ  country’s 2 export oriented entrepreneurs will move to 
country 1 since the AETR in country 1 is lower than the AETR in country 2. Nonetheless, 
consider a situation in which 121 == aa , and 21 tt = , but 2211 ,, ϕγϕγ ≠ , in this case the 
comparison will end with 0=µ  which indicates that no export oriented entrepreneur of 
country 2 will consider moving to country 1, since the AETR’s in both countries are the 
same. However, this comparison is incorrect since indeed the AETR’s are the same, but 
the technology and labor skills are not, leading to different after tax profits in each 
country since the level of investment per capita, k, would be different in each location. 
The latter will imply a different location decision for a firm. So, a simple comparison of 
AETR’s in isolation without controlling for other determinants of foreign direct 
investment can lead to the wrong conclusion concerning the final location choice of 
firms. 
After recognizing this problem, export oriented firms’ most preferable location to 
invest could be determined by the following conditions:  
Define: 
 
                                                  ( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]2211 11 Ψ−−Ψ−= ttq                                      (39) 
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Hence: 
a. If  q > 0  then ( )( ) ( )( )2211 11 Ψ−>Ψ− tt  and therefore firms located in country 2 
will find country 1 more profitable and will decide to move to country 1. 
b. If  q < 0  then ( )( ) ( )( )2211 11 Ψ−<Ψ− tt  and therefore firms located in country 1 
will find country 2 more profitable and will decide to move to country 2. 
  
 The above conditions imply that a positive value of q, (q > 0), leads to capital 
flight from firms in country 2 towards country 1; to the contrary, a negative value of q,  
(q < 0), indicates a capital flight from firms on country 1 towards country 2. Thus, in 
order to obtain the fraction of entrepreneurs that will leave country 2 towards country 1, 
and using Equation 39 it is necessary to define the following: 
 
                                               ( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) 11
1
1 22
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t
t
q
                                  (40) 
 
where Ω  is assumed restrained to [ ]1,1−=Ω  since a positive value of Ω  represents the 
fraction of export oriented entrepreneurs located in country 2 that will relocate and invest 
in country 1; to the contrary, a negative value of Ω  represents the fraction of export 
oriented entrepreneurs located in country 1 that will leave and invest in country 2.54 On 
the other hand, ( )Ω+1  represents the total export oriented entrepreneurs investing in 
country 1, including investors from country 1 and country 2.55 It results important to 
                                                 
54
 Units are considered perfectly divisible and can be expressed in fractions. 
55
 Note that (1-Ω) represents the number (fraction) of export oriented entrepreneurs investing in country 2. 
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recall that there are two unit measures of export oriented entrepreneurs in country 3 that 
would like to invest in countries 1 and/or 2.56 
 Thus, the number of export oriented entrepreneurs investing in country 1 is 
determined by:57 
 
                                                            ( ) ( )( )( )( )22
11
1
11
Ψ−
Ψ−
=Ω+
t
t
                                       (41) 
 
Given the restraining conditions assumed for Ω , then ( ) 210 ≤Ω+≤ , since there 
are two unit measures of export oriented entrepreneurs. The latter indicates that the 
export oriented entrepreneurs investing in country 1 could go from 0, to the total number 
of entrepreneurs including country 2 and country 1, that is 2. Since the conditions 
regarding the “optimal” capital per capita and the number of entrepreneurs investing in 
country 1 are already obtained, what follows is to assemble the export oriented 
entrepreneurs’ after tax income given a tax system ( )zt, . Thus, the total export oriented 
entrepreneurs’ after tax income for country i can be expressed as:  
 
                                                        ( )( ) iibi ty Ψ−Ω+= 11                                      (42) 
 
Note that country 1 total export oriented entrepreneurs’ include export oriented 
entrepreneurs’ from country 1 and those coming from country 2. 
                                                 
56
 For simplicity in the model we assumed two unit measures of export oriented entrepreneurs; however, 
these two unit measures could represent a given number of firms, i.e., 1,000 export oriented firms.  
57
 See Appendix B, Condition of Investment section. 
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  Finally, country i total export oriented entrepreneur’s utility is determined by their 
after tax income and their value for the public good. 
 
                                       ( )( ) ( ) )(111),( iiibii gvtgyu Ω++Ψ−Ω+=                           (43) 
 
After a description of the incomes and utilities of the types of individuals has been 
given, the next section establishes the three central stages of the model in a backward 
form. 
 
Stages of the Model 
Stage 3: Entrepreneurs Purchase Capital Inputs and Hire Workers 
The maximum profit of a home producing entrepreneur given a tax system ( )zt,  
is: 
 
                         ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )rzwtrkzwkFMaxt iiiiiciiiiiciki ci ,,,,1),,(1 ϕγϕγ Γ−=−−−            (44) 
 
Countries, 1 and 2, home producing entrepreneurs optimal investment is 
determined by:58 
 
                                                            ),,,( 11.11
++−−
= ϕγrmkk c                                           (45) 
 
                                                 
58
 See Appendix B, Home Producing Entrepreneurs section. 
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                                                        ),,,( 22.22
++−−
= ϕγrmkk c                                               (46) 
 
Alternatively, the maximum profit of an export oriented entrepreneur, given a tax 
system ( )zt,  is: 
 
         ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )rzDwtrkzhwkFMaxt iiiiiiiibiiiiiibiki bi ,,,,,,,1),,(1 ϑθϕγϕγ Ψ−=−−−−     (47) 
 
Where the optimal value of 1k  can be expressed as:
59
 
 
                                         ),,,,,,,,,,( 321212111211
+−+−++−−−+−
= KDzzkk b ϕϕγγθϑθ                        (48) 
 
and the optimal value of 2k  is given by: 
 
                                      ),,,,,,,,,,( 321212221212
++−+−−−−+−+
= KDzzkk b ϕϕγγϑθθ                          (49) 
 
Regarding the number of workers hired, firms will hire workers until the payment 
for their labor equals the value of the marginal productivity for labor. Hence, from 
Equations 15 and 16:60  
 
 
                                                 
59
 See Appendix B, Export Oriented Entrepreneurs section.   
60
 See Appendix B, Workers and Wages section. 
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                                       ( ) iciciiicicici wkFkkFwLF =−== )('),,()(' ϕγ                          (50) 
 
                                 ( )( ) ibibiiibiibibi wkFkkFwLF =−−== )('),,(1)(' ϕγθ                   (51) 
 
We assume that both, the wage that the home producing entrepreneur pays, ciw , 
and the export oriented entrepreneur wage, biw , are equal since there is perfect mobility 
of workers within a country.61 If an export oriented entrepreneur wishes to set up a plant 
in a given country he would “at least” pay the workers the same wage that they are 
earning in the home producing firm. Workers, generally, will not be tempted to leave 
their job for a lower wage.62 Hence, wages are assumed to be equal to iw .  
Following Equations 50 and 51, labor demand is determined by: 
 
                                       
( ) ( )[ ]{ }11 )('),,( −− −== ciciiiciici kFkkFLwLL ϕγ                        (52) 
 
                                   
( ) ( )( )[ ]{ }11 )('),,(1 −− −−== bibiiibiiibi kFkkFLwLL ϕγθ                   (53) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61
 See Type II. Workers, above. 
62
 Workers, generally, take into account several factors in their decision to leave their job.  A few of such 
factors are higher wages, better work conditions, and distance traveled from home to their job, among 
others. These factors can be exchanged by one another in the sense that a worker could accept a lower wage 
but with better work conditions. In this context, the model presented in this chapter assumes that workers 
take their decisions regarding the wage they earn, and not on other factors that depend considerably on the 
utility of each worker.   
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Stage 2: Entrepreneurs make Relocations Decisions 
Entrepreneurs take relocation decisions following the condition given by:  
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where  
 
                                 
( )
( )
( )
( ) 01
1
1
1
?
1
1
1
1
1
1
22
1
22
1
11
<
Ψ
Ψ−
−
+
Ψ−
Ψ−
=
Ω
=
Ω+
−++
dt
dz
dz
dk
dk
d
t
t
tdt
d
dt
d b
b           (55) 
 
assuming ( )
( )
( ) 1
1
1
1
1
1
22
1
22
1
1
1
1 dt
dz
dz
dk
dk
d
t
t
t
b
b
Ψ
Ψ−
−
>
Ψ−
Ψ
 in the case that 0
1
1 <
dt
dz
. 
Similarly,  
 
                                       
( ) ( )
( ) 01
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
22
1
11
>
Ψ
Ψ−
−
=
Ω
=
Ω+
−−++
da
dz
dz
dk
dk
d
t
t
da
d
da
d b
b                       (56) 
 
and  
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The above intuitively indicates that an increase in the corporate tax rate of country 
1 will decrease the number of entrepreneurs investing in country 1, other things equal. 
Likewise, an increase in the EMTR of country 1 will lead to a decrease in the total 
number of entrepreneurs investing in country 1. Alternatively, an increase on the fiscal 
incentives, that is an increase on the allowance rate, will provoke an increase on the 
number of entrepreneurs investing in country 1, other things equal. Hence, the relocation 
decision is provided by Equation 54. 
 
Stage 1: Governments in both Countries choose their Corporate Tax Systems 
Governments finance the provision of a public good gi in each country through a 
statutory corporate income tax rate, it , and the allowance rate ia .
63
 The government can 
tax the home producer entrepreneurs and the ( )Ω+1  export oriented entrepreneurs’ 
resident in the country, and can tax both their rents and their use of capital. So, the 
government budget constraint for country i can be expressed as:64  
 
                                  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]ciiiibiiiii rkztrkztg 111 −+Γ+−+ΨΩ+=                       (58) 
 
The objective of government of country i is to reach the optimal tax instruments 
that will maximize the social welfare, which is simply the sum of utilities of the four 
types of residents in the country, subject to the location decision condition.65  
                                                 
63
 Governments’ revenues are used completely to finance the provision of the public good g.   
64
 See Appendix B, Government Budget Constraint section.  
65
 The utilitarist type of Social Welfare Function used in this work is assumed given its simplicity to work 
with at an algebraic level, but also, since we want to provide the same weight to the preferences of each 
individual, that is, we do not want to discriminate against or in favor of any of the individuals of the model. 
It can be put into discussion that social planners could not assign a same weight to the nationals’ social 
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Taking into account country 1, its Social Welfare Function can be written as: 
 
                                                    
bckw uuuuSWF 11111 +++=                                           (59) 
 
or  
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) )(111)(1)()( 1111111111 gvtgvtgvrgvwSWF Ω++Ψ−Ω+++Γ−++++= κ  
                    (60) 
 
which by simplification:66  
 
                            ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1111111 111)(4 Ψ−Ω++Γ−+Ω+++= ttgvrwSWF κ              (61) 
 
Suppose that the utility of the public good )( igv  is linear in ig  in such a form that  
ii ggv φ=)( , where 0>φ .67 It is assumed that g is an impure public good which is rival 
and non-excludable since it leads to perfect crowding but on the other hand an exclusion 
payment mechanism is difficult to implement. 
Therefore, the government will maximize Equation 61 subject to Equation 54 
with the control variables being the statutory corporate tax rate, ti, and the EMTR 
simplified by using zi. In addition, assume that the social welfare function is strictly 
                                                                                                                                                 
welfare than to the no-nationals, or in fact that the differences in weight could also be applied within the 
nationals. This kind of observation could be represented in the model by assigning a different weight to 
each type of individual; however, we maintain a no discriminatory approach between the types of 
individuals in the model.   
66
 Note that the Social Welfare Function of country 1 internalized the number (fraction) of export oriented 
entrepreneurs investing in country 1, that is ( )Ω+1 . 
67
 For straightforwardness in the mathematical calculations we could assume that 
)sindividualofTypes/(1=φ . However, for the case of symbolic calculations the term φ  is left that 
way.  
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quasi-concave in 1t and 1z .
68
 The government SWF maximization internalizes both types 
of entrepreneurs after tax income since greater after tax income for the home producing 
entrepreneurs would imply greater consumption of the home produced good; while a 
greater after tax income for the export oriented entrepreneurs will increase the 
attractiveness of the country to additional export oriented investors which would come 
into the country and hire new workers.69 
For competition between the two recipient countries for FDI, we assume Nash-
Cournot behavior.70 Hence, government of country 1 chooses taxes 1t and 1z  to maximize 
1SWF  subject to the location condition of )1( Ω+  and assuming 2t and 2z  as fixed. Note 
that country 2 behaves in a similar form. Hence, the maximization problem is given by: 
 
                  
11 ,zt
Max ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 11111111 1114)( Ψ−Ω++Γ−+Ω+++= ttgvrkwSWF c           (62) 
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Consequently, the first order conditions can be expressed as:  
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68
 Note that by obtaining the optimal values of 1t and 1z  the optimal value of the allowance rate, 1a , could 
be additionally obtained using the definition of 1z . 
69
 In reality, foreign direct investments could cause positive externalities to the countries on which they 
decide to locate. Externalities such as technology and the know-how could be spread on the location and 
workers, respectively. 
70
 The approach used in this study assumes a Nash-Cournot behavior, in which each government considers 
the taxes of all other rival governments and sets its own tax system in a way that maximizes its social 
welfare function. All governments choose the tax systems simultaneously. In equilibrium, each government 
sets its tax system at its social welfare maximizing point, given the tax systems of all the other 
governments, thus they would not find it optimal to choose a different tax package. This is an approach we 
have applied in detail to the corporate tax competition for FDI framework. 
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Intuition indicates that by solving the previous conditions for 1t  and 1z  it is 
possible to obtain the optimal statutory tax rate *1t  for country 1, and the optimal EMTR 
for country 1, 1*1
*
1 −= zm . Furthermore, the optimal allowance rate 
*
1a  is obtained by 
substituting *1t  and *1z  into Equation 21.  
Nonetheless, as argued by Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002), 
governments will not find efficient and optimal to use the tax on capital, 1m , and the 
allowance rate, 1a . The intuition is that a capital tax, or the allowance rate, causes double 
distortion in that it causes outward migration of firms and an inefficient use of capital by 
the remaining firms, whereas a corporate income tax distorts only location decisions. So, 
it is not desirable to use a double distorting capital tax. Hence, 1*1 =z , and 0*1 =m . 
In order to show the above let’s assume that 10 << it  and that 1*1 =z . Hence, 
from Equation 63:71  
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71
 See Appendix B, Government Maximization Problem section.  
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and from Equation 64: 
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Note that 0
11
1
1
=
=z
dt
dSWF
 implies that 0
11
1
1
=
=z
dz
dSWF
, and hence the optimal 1z  is 
1, which indicates that the optimal allowance rate ( 1a ) is also 1, and the optimal EMTR 
( 1m ) is zero. Consequently, if the government of country 1 chooses a statutory corporate 
tax rate that is positive, then it will find optimal to choose 1*1 =z , and 1*1 =a , without 
regard to the tax policy of country 2.72 Additionally, since 1*1 =z  and substituting this 
value into Equations 20 and 29, 1Γ  is now considered the before tax profits for the home 
producing entrepreneurs, while 1Ψ  represents the before tax profits of the export oriented 
entrepreneurs.  
Since the optimal EMTR, 1m , is already solved, it is now the turn to obtain the 
optimal statutory corporate tax rate. By solving for t1 in Equation 66, the reaction 
function for country 1, or the optimal statutory corporate tax rate, *1t , can be expressed 
as:73  
 
                                                 
72
 See Appendix B, Government Maximization Problem section. 
73
 See Appendix B, Optimal Statutory Corporate Tax Rate section. Note that the signs below the variables 
in the optimal statutory tax rate represent the empirical relation between the statutory corporate tax rate of 
country 1 and the variables in question. 
  
 
94 
                                       





=
++−−−++−+−−−+
3212211.21112
*
1 ,,,,,,,,,,,, KwwrhDttt ϕγϕγϑθ                    (67) 
 
where the optimal rate of allowance, effective marginal tax rate, and average effective tax 
rates, for both home producing and export oriented firms, are represented by 1*1 =a ; 
1*1 =z ; and 
*
1
*
1
*
1 t
cb
== λλ . Nonetheless, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) have 
indicated that an optimal 1*1 =z  does not hold in their data. Generally, *1z  exceeds 1 for 
equity financed investment. Their reasons concern the treatment of losses; that by giving 
full relief for all expenditure (when it is incurred) implies that governments may end up 
subsidizing loss making investments. Nonetheless, naturally, they are unwilling to do 
this. An option may be to pick a lower value for 1a  and consequently a higher value of  z. 
In such circumstances, the government will impose a positive EMTR, and then tax capital 
as well as economic rent. Alternatively, governments can still compete for firm location 
by choosing an appropriate statutory tax rate.  
Note from the reaction function (Equation 67) the pattern of tax competition when 
a decrease in the statutory corporate tax rate of country 2 leads to a decline in the 
statutory corporate tax rate of country 1. This effect comes as a result of the relative loss 
of competitiveness of country 1 at the reduction of country’s 2 tax rate.  
Similarly, a decrease in country’s 2 wages and transportation cost as well as in 
country’s 1 technology and labor skills lead to a decrease in the statutory corporate tax 
rate of country 1. Intuitively, these actions will make country 1 relatively less attractive to 
investors than country 2, hence, country’s 1 authority will direct their efforts to reduce 
their statutory corporate tax rate. 
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Alternatively, an increase in country’s 1 wages and transportation costs, and 
country’s 2 technology, and labor skills, lead to a decrease in the statutory corporate tax 
rate of country 1. A raise in these variables will make country 1 less attractive to foreign 
investors, so in order to compensate for this loss of competitiveness, government 1 
decides to decrease its optimal statutory corporate tax rate, *1t . 
A positive change in the international cost of capital r leads to a decline in the 
optimal statutory corporate tax rate of country 1. An increase in r indicates a raise in the 
opportunity cost of capital making country’s 3 investors reevaluate their investment 
positions in country 1 and 2. Hence, to compensate for the change in r, fiscal incentives 
are needed in order to continue to attract foreign investors to countries 1 and 2, as a 
consequence a decrease in *1t  occurs.  
Finally, an increase in the export oriented fixed capital supply will induce to an 
increase in the *1t . Intuitively, the slight positive relationship obeys to a wider margin of 
movement of the statutory corporate tax rate. More supply of capital will be available and 
consequently it will be distributed between countries 1 and 2. It must be remarked that 
the magnitude of the change is relatively small, but of course it would depend on the size 
of the capital increase.  
The intention of the model is to obtain a reaction function so as to observe or 
measure the level of corporate tax competition between 2 countries; hence Equation 67 
provides that function. Nonetheless, it is also possible to solve the model simultaneously 
for country 1 and 2 in order to reach the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. For that, it is first 
necessary to obtain the optimal statutory corporate tax rate for country 2, *2t , this is done 
  
 
96 
by maximizing the Social Welfare Function of country 2 subject to the location condition 
)1( Ω− . Hence:74   
 
                    
22 ,zt
Max ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 22222222 1114)( Ψ−Ω−+Γ−+Ω−++= ttgvrkwSWF c           (68) 
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Thus, the optimal statutory corporate tax rate for country 2, or country’s 2 
reaction function, is given by:   
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where similarly to country’s 1 reaction function, it indicates that a decrease in country’s 1 
corporate tax rate will lead to a decline in corporate tax rate of country 2. Furthermore, 
country’s 2 optimal rate of allowance is 1*2 =a , the effective marginal tax rate is 1
*
2 =z , 
and the average effective tax rates, for both home producing and export oriented firms are 
given by *2
*
2
*
2 t
cb
== λλ . 
Now, substituting Equation 69 into Equation 67, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of 
the corporate tax rate for country 1 is given by: 
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74
 See Appendix B, Reaction Function of the AETR section. 
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and for country 2: 
 
                                  





=
+−+++−−−−−−+++
3212211.222111
*
2 ,,,,,,,,,,,,, KwwrDDtt ϕγϕγϑθϑθ               (71) 
 
Both reaction functions, Equations (67) and (69), can be represented in Figure 1. 
Note that both have a positive slope.  
 
Figure 1 
Reaction Functions for Countries’ 1 and 2 Corporate Tax Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that RFti* indicates the reaction function for country i, and t1* and t2*  
represent the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, when the countries’ fundamentals are the 
same, Table 1 scenario 1.   
 
As observed previously, the optimal statutory corporate tax rate for both, 
countries 1 and 2, depends on the countries’ fundamentals; that is on the labor and 
technological skills, wages, and transportation costs, among other factors. Assuming that 
 
t1 RF t2* 
RF t1* 
t2 t2* 
t1
* 
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these factors are considered within the before tax profits of the home producing 
entrepreneurs ( iΓ ) and export oriented entrepreneurs ( iΨ ), it is possible to note that given 
different countries fundamentals, the resulting optimal statutory corporate tax rates of 
each country will be different.75 Hence, Table 1 shows the different scenarios for the 
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium when taking into account different amounts for  iΓ  and iΨ .  
 
Table 1 
Policy Implications for Different Cournot-Nash 
Equilibriums for Optimal Statutory Corporate Tax Rates 
 
1) If 21
21
21 tt =⇒



Γ=Γ
Ψ=Ψ
 4) If 21
21
21 tt <⇒



Γ<Γ
Ψ=Ψ
 7) If 21
21
21 tt <⇒



Γ<Γ
Ψ<Ψ
 
2) If 21
21
21 tt >⇒



Γ=Γ
Ψ>Ψ
 5) If 21
21
21 tt >⇒



Γ>Γ
Ψ=Ψ
 8) If 21
21
21 ?tt⇒



Γ>Γ
Ψ<Ψ
 
3) If 21
21
21 tt <⇒



Γ=Γ
Ψ<Ψ
 6) If 21
21
21 tt >⇒



Γ>Γ
Ψ>Ψ
 9) If  21
21
21 ?tt⇒



Γ<Γ
Ψ>Ψ
 
Note: The sign “⇒ ” means leads to.  
 
For example, starting from a situation where 21 Ψ=Ψ  and 21 Γ=Γ , the statutory 
corporate tax rates of both countries, 1 and 2, tend to be equal. To the contrary, if 
21 Ψ<Ψ  and 21 Γ=Γ , the before tax profits of the export oriented entrepreneurs in 
country 1 would be smaller than those in country 2; hence, country 1 should offer a 
                                                 
75
 Recall that since 1*1 =z , 1Γ  from Equation 20 is now considered the before tax profits for the home 
producing entrepreneurs, and 1Ψ  from Equation 29 represents the before tax profits of the export oriented 
entrepreneurs. 
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smaller statutory corporate tax rate than country 2 in order to attract export oriented 
firms.76 
On the other hand, it is of course possible to solve the model in terms of the 
AETR, λ . So, regarding the corporate average effective tax rate reaction functions, 
several equations must be redefined, among those, the location decision constraint, 
Equation 54. Recall from previous assumptions that governments do not discriminate 
against domestic capital or home country investors, this implies that the same statutory 
corporate income tax rate, it , and rate of allowance, ia , are applied to the home 
producing firms and to the export oriented firms. Hence if governments compete through 
AETRs to attract export oriented entrepreneurs they would have to take into account the 
transportation costs since this type entrepreneur acknowledges the costs of transportation 
in the profit valuation. Thus, governments would compete through the export oriented 
AETRs, biλ . Furthermore, this framework serves in a better way for an empirical 
investigation since both, the statutory corporate income tax rate, it , and rate of 
allowance, ia , are internalized within  
b
iλ .77  
Export oriented entrepreneurs’ after tax income in terms of AETRs is represented 
by: 
 
                                                              ( )( ) ibibiy Λ−Ω+= λ11                                     (72) 
                                                 
76
 For the case of policy implication number 4 in Table 1, when home producing entrepreneurs in country 1 
have smaller before tax profits than in country 2, the statutory corporate tax rate in country 1 tends to be 
smaller than in country 2 in order to incentive national investment. A similar approach applies to policy 
implication number 5. The sign “?” in policy implications 8 and 9 implies that the setting of the optimal 
statutory corporate tax rate of each would depend on the magnitudes of the differences between 1Ψ  and 
2Ψ , and 1Γ and 2Γ . 
77
 See Appendix B, Reaction Function of the AETR section. 
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where iΛ  is defined as the export oriented before tax income as:    
 
                                                  ( )bibibibibibii hrkwkF −−−=Λ ),,( ϕγ                           (73) 
 
In addition, home producing entrepreneurs’ after tax income in terms of AETRs is 
redefined as: 
 
                                                                   ( ) iciciy Σ−= λ1                                            (74) 
 
where iΣ  is the home producing entrepreneurs’ before tax income given by: 
 
                                                 ( )cicicicicii rkwkF −−=Σ ),,( ϕγ                                     (75) 
 
 
The new location decision constraint depending on AETRs is represented by:  
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( ) 22
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=Ω+ b
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                                                 (76) 
 
where Ω  has the same qualities and conditions as before. 
Alternatively, the new government constraint in terms of AETRs is categorized 
by: 
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                                                        ( ) iciibiig Σ+ΛΩ+= λλ1                                          (77) 
 
Now, the government search for the optimal b1λ  that would maximize the social 
welfare function subject to the new form of the location decision constraint, Equation 76, 
and taking into account Equations 72, 74, and 77. Thus:  
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Hence, the first order condition is expressed as: 
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Solving for b1λ   the corporate AETR reaction function for country 1 is given by: 
 
                                         





=
++−−−++−+−−+
3212211.21121 ,,,,,,,,,,, Kwwrhh
cbb ϕγϕγλλλλ                   (80) 
 
where a decrease in the AETR of country 2, b2λ , will lead to a decrease in the AETR of 
country 1. In addition, a decrease in country’s 1 technology and labor skills as well as in 
country’s 2 wages and transportation cost lead to a decline in the average effective tax 
rate of country 1. Intuition indicates that a negative change in these variables lead to a 
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decrease in country’s 1 competitiveness relatively to country 2, hence, in order to 
compensate for this loss of competitiveness country’s 1 corporate AETR, b1λ , must be 
reduced.  
On the other hand, an increase in country’s 1 wages and transportation costs, and 
country’s 2 technology, and labor skills, lead to a decrease in the AETR for export 
oriented entrepreneurs of country 1. A positive alteration in these variables will make 
country 1 less attractive to foreign investors, so in order to compensate for this loss of 
competitiveness, government 1 decides to decrease its AETR, b1λ .  
Alternatively, there are two theories to evaluate a change in the international cost 
of capital. First, an increase in the international cost of capital r does not provoke any 
change on the AETRs, neither b1λ  nor b2λ , since every country will face the same change 
in r, and therefore the decisions of the AETR are left unaltered (assuming that the AETRs 
are computed as in Equation 38 and holding all other variables constant). Second, an 
increase in r indicates a raise in the opportunity cost of capital making country’s 3 
investors reevaluate their investment positions in country 1 and 2 and perhaps making 
them evaluate to take their capital and invest it in the financial sector. Hence, to 
compensate for the change in r, fiscal incentives are needed in order to continue to attract 
foreign investors to countries 1 and 2, as a consequence a decrease in AETR occurs. 
Given the second conjecture closer similarity to reality, it will be the one assumed along 
this dissertation. 
Aside from previous assumptions, an interesting observation from Equation 80 is 
that a high home producing AETR for country 1 leads to a low export oriented AETR for 
the same country. Intuitively, a high c1λ  will act as a type of cross subsidy to b1λ , in such a 
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way that a country, having a high c1λ , could find optimal to reduce its b1λ in order to 
attract more foreign direct investment. In this context, a country could charge a higher 
corporate tax rate to the immobile tax base, and a lower corporate tax rate to the mobile 
tax base.  
Finally, a decrease in the export oriented fixed capital supply will induce a decline 
in the AETR in order to attract the scarce export oriented FDI.  
As expressed in the optimal statutory corporate tax rate exercise, it is possible to 
solve the model simultaneously in terms AETR’s in order to reach the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. Then: 
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Hence, the optimal export oriented AETR for country 2 is given by: 
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Thus, by substituting Equation 82 into Equation 80 the Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
of the corporate tax rate for country 1 is given by: 
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while for country 2: 
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The optimal average effective corporate tax rate for both, countries 1 and 2, 
depends on the countries’ fundamentals, that is on the labor and technological skills, on 
the wages, and on the transportation costs of countries, 1 and 2. In this context, by 
assuming that these factors are internalized in the before tax profits of the home 
producing entrepreneurs, iΣ , and in the before tax profits of the export oriented 
entrepreneurs, iΛ , the results of the different scenarios for the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium 
will be given by: 
 
Table 2 
Policy Implications for Different Cournot-Nash 
Equilibriums for Optimal Corporate AETRs 
 
1) If bb 21
21
21 λλ =⇒



Σ=Σ
Λ=Λ
 4) If bb 21
21
21 λλ <⇒



Σ<Σ
Λ=Λ
 7) If bb 21
21
21 λλ <⇒



Σ<Σ
Λ<Λ
 
2) If bb 21
21
21 λλ >⇒



Σ=Σ
Λ>Λ
 5) If bb 21
21
21 λλ >⇒



Σ>Σ
Λ=Λ
 8) If bb 21
21
21 ? λλ⇒



Σ>Σ
Λ<Λ
 
3) If bb 21
21
21 λλ <⇒



Σ=Σ
Λ<Λ
 6) If bb 21
21
21 λλ >⇒



Σ>Σ
Λ>Λ
 9) If  bb 21
21
21 ?λλ⇒



Σ<Σ
Λ>Λ
 
 
From the above it is possible to observe that given different countries 
fundamentals that affect the before tax profits of the home producing entrepreneurs and 
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the before tax profits of the export oriented entrepreneurs, the resulting optimal statutory 
corporate tax rates of each country will be different.  
 
Theoretical Model’s Global Tax Competition Framework 
 
 
As defined previously, global or world-wide tax competition is thought simply as 
tax policy reactions between governments of different geographical areas of the world but 
in similar economic conditions. It is possible to extract this description and apply it to the 
theoretical model in such a form that the model itself can provide insights of a global tax 
competition framework. Hence, observe from Table 2 that if countries face the same 
economic conditions or economic fundamentals (that is similar wages, transportation 
costs, technology, or labor skills, or in fact that the mix of them provides comparable 
advantage before tax incomes) the average corporate effective tax rates of the competing 
countries are equal. On the other hand, if the economic fundamentals are worse off for 
country 1, its government must compensate to the export oriented entrepreneurs by 
offering them a lower AETR, and then make country 1 attractive and competitive. Also 
note the same analysis applies to Table 1.   
It can be noted from Equations 67 and 80 that the effect of a change in the 
statutory corporate tax rate or AETR of country 2, over the statutory corporate tax rate or 
AETR of country 1, respectively, will be greater the closer (in terms of income) that the 
economies of both countries are. To the contrary, the more distant in terms of income the 
countries are, the smaller the effect of a change in the statutory corporate tax rate or 
AETR of country 2 over country 1. This can be denoted by: 
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2121
2
*
1
2
*
1
Γ≈ΓΓ>Γ
<
dt
dt
dt
dt
                                             (85) 
 
and  
 
                                                        
2121
2
*
1
2
*
1
Λ≈ΛΛ>Λ
< b
b
b
b
d
d
d
d
λ
λ
λ
λ
                                        (86) 
 
where the sign “ > ” in 21 Λ>Λ  denotes “greater than.” This finding comes hand in hand 
with the definition of global corporate tax competition given at the start of the chapter.  
Additionally, from the theory we could think of global or world-wide tax 
competition if the geographical (from the FDI home country to the FDI host country) and 
economic distances (discussed above) for both, host country and competing country, are 
taken into account and affect the determination of the optimal statutory corporate tax rate.  
So, the model provides us with some predictions regarding the relationship 
between geographical distances and the optimal corporate tax rates, *1t . First, the 
theoretical conclusions of the model indicate that, among different variables, the 
geographical distance between the home country and the host country represents a 
significant factor taken into account by both the optimal statutory corporate tax rate and 
the optimal AETR. Governments’ policymakers consider the distance from country 1 to 
country 3 when deciding country’s 1 optimal statutory and average effective tax rates. 
Hence: 
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                                                                    0
1
*
1 <
dD
dt
                                                      (87) 
 
where a greater distance between a host country and the investors’ home country leads to 
a host country’s lower optimal statutory tax rate. The intuition behind this argument is 
that governments’ policymakers will tend to provide a form of compensation to the 
export oriented entrepreneurs’ profit since the costs of transportation will be high given 
the greater distance between countries.  
Second, the model indicates that country’s 2 parameters (the competitor) also 
affect country’s 1 fiscal policy mechanisms decisions. Hence, distance from country 2 to 
country 3, whether being greater or smaller, affects the optimal tax rate of country 1. A 
smaller distance from country 2 to country 3 will provide country’s 1 policymakers a 
lower margin to modify their optimal tax rates, that is, that a smaller 2D  will tend to 
decrease the optimal statutory and average effective tax rates for country 1.  Therefore: 
 
                                                                   0
2
*
1 >
dD
dt
                                                    (88) 
 
Third, the magnitude of the reaction of a country’s optimal tax rate to another 
country’s change in its tax rate takes in to account the distance between both countries to 
the investor’s home country. The theoretical model indicates that the slope of the reaction 
function is greater when 21 DD >  than when 21 DD < . Thus, the magnitude of the change 
in the optimal tax rate of a host country will be greater at the presence of a change in the 
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competing host country tax rate, when the host country is located further from the 
investors’ home country than the competing host country. This can be expressed as:  
 
                                                           
2121 2
*
1
2
*
1
DDDD dt
dt
dt
dt
><
<                                           (89) 
 
A similar condition can be extracted from the marginal cost of transportation, 1θ and 2θ : 
 
                                                             
2121 2
*
1
2
*
1
θθθθ ><
<
dt
dt
dt
dt
                                            (90) 
 
which implies that the slope of the reaction function of the statutory tax rate depends, 
among different factors, on the marginal cost of transportation of country’s 1 and 
country’s 2.   
Extracted from the above is the conclusion that the theoretical model indeed 
provides an indication that world-wide or global tax competition is possible. 
Governments, theoretically, take into account the geographical distance from its country 
to the investors’ home country but also consider the distance of the competing host 
countries to the investors’ country when deciding their optimal statutory corporate tax 
rates. Competing countries’ distance is considered when offering tax compensations or 
incentives to the export oriented entrepreneurs. Also, it is very important that countries 
with similar economic conditions and with the purpose of attracting FDI will affect each 
others policies, while countries’ policies in dissimilar income conditions would be 
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affected in a less significant form.  Hence, the model itself highlights the possible 
presence of global tax competition.   
 
Summary 
 
 
The theoretical model in this dissertation assumes a benevolent government who 
intents to provide a high quality public good to its community. The quality of the public 
good will improve as more tax revenues are obtained. Higher tax revenues are obtained 
by attracting foreign direct investment. The nature of the FDI is export oriented as 
exposed by Reuber (1973), Guisinger (1985), and Coyne (1994), in such a form that the 
output produced in each host country would be returned to the investor’s home country. 
The objective of the benevolent government is to find the optimal tax instruments that 
will maximize the social welfare of its country. Reaction functions for the corporate tax 
rate, the rate of allowance, the average effective tax rate and the marginal effective tax 
rate are sought in this maximization. Nonetheless, the model indicates that if 
governments decide a statutory corporate tax rate that does not causes a double distortion 
then the optimal allowance rate must be equal to one while the EMTR must be equal to 
zero in order to maintain optimality. Hence, the model is able to provide an optimal 
statutory corporate tax rate and an optimal average effective tax rate where both serve as 
reaction functions given their dependence on competing countries’ fundamentals. Given 
the difficulty to obtain reliable data on the statutory corporate tax rates, the marginal 
effective average tax rates, and the allowance rates, the empirical specification of the 
model will be based on the average effective tax rate reaction function, Equation 80. 
Country i’s export oriented optimal AETR, biλ , depends on the competing country export 
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oriented AETR, bjλ ; on the host country and competing host country transportation costs,  
ih , and jh , respectively; on the international capital cost r; on the host country and 
competing host country technology skills, iγ , and jγ , respectively;  on the host country 
and competing host country labor skills, iϕ , and jϕ , respectively; on the host country 
and competing host country wages, iw , and jw , respectively; on the host country home 
producing AETR, ciλ ; and on the total supply of foreign capital, 3K .  
Commonly, countries that are far way from each other are typically considered as 
non-reactionary since distance puts a barrier between their responses. Nonetheless, the 
theoretical model presented in this section provides an insight to the fact that 
governments, when competing for export oriented FDI, take into account the 
geographical distance of their competing countries to the investors’ home country, as 
well as the income distance between each other, at the time of deciding their optimal 
statutory corporate tax rate.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The previous chapter provides a theoretical model for the presence of a significant 
level of global or world-wide corporate tax competition among countries. Crucial 
assumptions had to be made in order to develop the model properly. Conspicuous among 
these is the one related to the kind of firms there are; in particular we assume these are 
export oriented type firms as suggested by Reuber (1973), Guisinger (1985), and Coyne 
(1994). It is clear that without this assumption the theoretical model could not have an 
appropriate logic. 
Several issues arise from the theoretical model in relation to testing the hypothesis 
of global (corporate tax) competition scheme among countries.  
1. Does the optimal corporate tax rate of a country depend significantly on the 
corporate tax rates of other countries? 
2. Does the significance of global corporate tax competition depend on the fact that 
the “economic” distance of a country with its competitors is similar?  
3. Does the level of corporate global or world-wide tax competition depends 
significantly on the transportation costs (proxied by the geographical distance) 
between the host country and the investors’ home countries?  
4. Does the significance of global corporate tax competition depend on the 
geographical distance among the host countries?  
Additionally, there are further questions that we may want to consider when analyzing 
the global corporate tax competition framework.  
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5. Can the similarity or disparity of trade policies between countries affect 
significantly the setting of a country’s optimal corporate tax rate?  
6. Do countries tend to reduce their corporate tax rate in order to increase the 
amount of foreign direct investment inflows depending on their position of 
foreign direct investment attraction relative to other countries?  
7. Do countries compensate by offering lower AETRs if their technological skills 
are lower than those of their competitors?  
8. Finally, do countries compensate by offering lower AETRs if their wages are 
higher than those of their competitors? 
Hence, to answer these questions this section will provide a brief description of 
the type and measures of corporate taxes we use, the empirical specification of the 
theoretical model, the data sources, the specification of the variables and their 
computation, and the econometric methodology used along this investigation.  
 
The Empirical Model 
 
 
The model to be estimated represents an approximation of Equation 80 in Chapter 
4. Nonetheless, in order to make Equation 80 estimable we would need to transform it in 
several ways. First, given the data availability restraint, it is not possible to estimate 
Equation 80 for the framework previously established. Furthermore, some merging of 
parameters is necessary given the large number of variables taken into account.  Thus, the 
real cost of capital, ir , is internalized within the average effective tax rate for the export 
  
 
113 
oriented entrepreneurs, biλ .78 The transportation costs, ih , are approximated by the 
average geographical distance between the host country and the foreign direct investment 
home country, iD , internalized in W3, fully explained below. The total fixed stock of 
capital available for export oriented producers 3K  is decomposed into FDI inflows to 
host countries and incorporated in a variable denoted as ifd . The labor skills iϕ  are 
internalized in the constructed variable iL  denoting wages. There is another variable that, 
according to the literature, is taken into account in the real world when the entrepreneurs 
decide the location of an export oriented firm, that is openness to trade which will be 
denoted as iop .
79
 The computation of four variables, iL , ifd , iop  and the technology 
skills iγ  will be explained in further below. Furthermore, in reality two additional 
variables could affect the AETR behavior: (1) the government expenditure denoted by 
iGE , which implies that higher government spending could require additional funding 
from taxes which could be translated into an increase in the AETR;80 and (2) the 
movements of the exchange rate (appreciation or depreciation), iER , i.e., an appreciation 
of the national currency against the U.S. dollar implies that U.S. dollars are worth less in 
a given country; hence the costs of maintaining an export oriented firm increases 
relatively, as a consequence, the country’s government could compensate by providing 
                                                 
78
 See Equation 38 for an algebraic interpretation, and Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2001) for a 
theoretical interpretation.    
79
 Given that the model relies on the export oriented FDI, a trade openness variable will be taken into 
account in the framework, this will measure how the FDI home countries will invest given the trade 
policies of the host countries. See Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, and Lahrèche-Révil (2001). 
80
 Note that an increase of government spending raises the need for higher tax revenues which could put 
some pressure for an increase at the corporate AETR. However, this does not necessarily occur since the 
tax system of a country could manage several cross subsidies between taxes or simply increase its 
indebtedness that could leave the corporate AETR unchanged. Nonetheless, government spending enters 
the equation in order to measure the significance of its possible effect on the corporate AETR.  
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tax incentives (observable through its AETR) to the export oriented firms if they want the 
firm to stay at their current location. Government expenditure will be measured in GDP 
terms. The exchange rate will be computed as percent changes at the exchange rate, 
which in turn it will be calculated as US dollars per one unit of the national currency. 
Consequently, an appreciation of the national currency will be defined as an increase in 
the iER ; by contrast a depreciation of the national currency will be seen as a decrease at 
the iER  . Recall that wages and labor depend on labor market conditions rather than on 
governments’ policymakers’ decisions, and others such as infrastructure, skills and 
technology can not be changed in the short run, so corporate taxes are the only control 
variable left that can be changed.  
In addition, for representing the model in the real world, we need to make 
Equation 80 estimable, and for that, it is necessary to assume that i
c
i
b
i τλλ ==  given the 
complexity and lack of data that would be needed for estimating two different AETRs for 
a single country (within a wide sample of countries). Hence, Equation 80 is redefined as: 
 
                                                 





=
−+++−++
iiiiiiji ERGEopfdL ,,,,γτττ                             (91) 
 
The theoretical model of the previous chapter generated symmetric corporate tax 
reaction functions of the form ( )ji ttt =  and ( )cibjbi λλλλ ,=  where it  represents the 
statutory corporate tax rate and iλ  the export oriented average effective tax rate of 
country i. Nonetheless, as described previously, the empirical form of the model will be 
based on Equation 91 with a symmetric corporate average tax rate of the form ( )ji τττ = . 
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The empirical approach approximates in a linear form the corporate AETR reaction 
function.  
Following Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002), Revelli (2000), Brueckner (2003), 
and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), the empirical version of Equation 91 may be written 
as: 
 
              tititititititi
ji
tiijti GEERopfdL ,,5,4,3,2,1,0,, εβββββγβτωατ +++++++= ∑
≠
   (92) 
 
where ti,τ   indicates the AETR of country i at time t, and ijω   represent a set of weights 
that aggregate the average effective tax rates in other countries into a single variable, 
which has a scalar coefficient α . The four constructed variables ti,γ , tiL , , tiop , , and tifd ,  
represent the technology skills, wages, openness to trade and foreign direct investment of 
country i, respectively.81  Variable tiER ,  indicates the exchange rate for country i at time 
t, while tiGE ,  denotes the government expenditure for country i at time t. Finally, ti,ε  
represents the error term. Hence, Equation 92 represents a linear approximation of the 
nonlinear reaction function presented in Chapter 4. 
Additionally, Equation 92 can be rewritten in matrix form as: 
 
                                                      tttt XW εβτατ ++=                                          (93) 
 
                                                 
81
 The four variables Li, γ i, fdi and opi, will be defined further in the chapter.  
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where tτ  is a vector of corporate average effective tax rates (i and j jointly) at time t; 
[ ]ttttttt GEERopfdLX γ='  is a vector containing the technological skills tγ , 
the wages tL , the openness to trade, and the foreign direct investment of both, the home 
country and the competing countries, and the exchange rates and the government 
expenditure for country i; tε  is the error vector; and W represents the weight matrix.
82
 In 
the present context, the slope of the reaction function is given by ijtjti dd αωττ =,, . Thus, 
a positive and statistically significant value of α  proves our hypothesis of the presence of 
world-wide or global corporate tax competition among countries. Similarly, a 
statistically different from zero (significant) value of the β parameters will imply that 
skills, whether technological or labor, wages, FDI and openness to trade will affect the 
governments’ decision of the tax package represented by the AETRs.  
Second, we explore extending the above static model into a dynamic one that can 
be estimated (one more attached to the governments’ tax setting current practices). Note 
that in the literature, Equation 93 is the representation of a spatial autoregressive, or 
spatial lag, econometrics model. However, we will follow the approach of Nicita and 
Olarreaga (2000), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Richard, Tulkens and Verdonck (2001), 
and Cavlovic and Jackson (2003) substituting the independent variables ti,τ and tiX , by 
their one period lagged values 1, −tiτ  and 1, −tiX .   
In this sense, an estimation problem arising from the theoretical model in Chapter 
4 concerns the condition that the optimal values of the corporate tax rates for each 
country are set in each period, that is, countries react to one another at the same time 
                                                 
82
 Note that the diagonal elements of the weight matrix W are zero and that a representative off-diagonal 
element is ijω . 
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regarding their optimal decision of their Nash equilibrium values (the continuously 
setting of corporate tax rates). Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002 p. 21) indicate 
that this simultaneity or endogeneity seems improbable even in game theory, since the 
Nash equilibrium might be interpreted as the result of several steps of adjustment. As a 
consequence, a straightforward adjustment that produces testable reaction functions is to 
assume that the government in each country establishes the corporate tax rate as the best 
response to the previous period’s corporate tax rates in other countries. Therefore, ti ,τ  
from the independent variables would replaced by 1, −tiτ .  
Intuitively, in the real world, governments do not behave automatically nor 
immediately; they have several restraints when accepting new fiscal policies. For 
example, in the case of democratic governments, as in the majority of the sample, a 
change in the statutory corporate tax rate or an increase of a tax incentive has to be 
prepared, analyzed, and evaluated by policy makers, but must importantly, the changes 
have to be accepted by the congress. In such a case, the proposals of decreasing the 
corporate tax rates or providing corporate tax incentives would have to pass several tests 
within the congress of the country limiting the time of action and delaying the process. 
Hayashi and Boadway (2001) refer to this aspect as reasonable since governments 
decisions must internalize the time between studying other governments’ tax rates and 
incentives, and revising and modifying their own. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium on 
which taxes are set continuously implicates an approach of perfect availability of 
information. It is improbable to believe that governments have perfect availability of 
information about each other tax decisions (for a theoretical explanation see Elhorst, 
2001). Rational expectations theory implies that expectations are formed by incorporating 
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all available information about the problem; in this case, much of the information 
available for a wide sample of countries such as the one used in this investigation comes 
from previous period data. Expectations about future data are not always available for 
every country, neither for policymakers nor for government officials in charge of 
formulating a tax incentive package.   
Taking into account the above argument and recognizing that governments take 
their tax packages decisions by observing the data available (that is, data that has already 
been generated), as a consequence, variable tX  must also be lagged one period, 
becoming 1−tX .
83
   
In order to make the theoretical model applicable and testable for real world 
behavior, we follow the approach presented in Hayashi and Boadway (2001) and 
Cavlovic and Jackson (2003).84 Thus, the empirical model can be described as:  
 
                                                  titititi XW ,1,1,, εβτατ ++= −−                                      (94) 
 
This model is basically described in Anselin (1999), and Lopez and Chasco 
(2004) as a “pure space-recursive model” and as a “non-contemporary or lagged spatial 
dependence model,” respectively.   
                                                 
83
 This approach assumes a one period lag for governments to internalize the information regarding 
variables that affect the setting of a corporate AETR. Nonetheless, in Appendix F we also performed 
different estimations using two and three time lags as an exercise, but those regressions are not the central 
part of the study.  
84
 Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) indicate that a disadvantage of the lagged specification is that 
it is not directly consistent with the theory. Governments are assumed myopic in the sense that they do not 
anticipate any change in other countries’ tax rates either due to changes in underlying economic conditions, 
or as a result of the other governments’ myopic reactions to current taxes. We do not agree with this point 
of view since, as explained previously, governments do not have perfect availability of information nor 
perfect sharing of it, and furthermore, their policymakers and law actors and mechanisms do not function 
immediately, that is, they have by default a lag integrated. 
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Regarding the econometric problems we face, characteristic of spatial 
econometric models as explained above, the endogeneity or simultaneity issue is avoided 
entirely by allowing for the interaction among countries to occur with one time lag.85 
Hence, the estimation of Equation 94 through the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method 
will yield consistent parameter estimates.86 
A second problem occurs if countries’ individual characteristics in Xi are 
correlated with the error term ε . In this case the estimation of the parameters through 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Instrumental Variables (IV) methods are inconsistent. 
This correlation could occur if some countries’ characteristics, conditions or situations 
affecting τ  are unobserved but they are correlated with observed characteristics. A 
simple procedure to solve this issue is to use panel data in such a way that all time-
invariant country conditions, observed or unobserved, can be symbolized by country 
specific intercepts. Hence, a fixed-effects estimation approach is needed to make α , 
from Equation 94, consistent (Revelli, 2000; Devereux, Lockwood & Redoano, 2002). 
                                                 
85
 In order to have a closer view of the endogeneity of the τ‘s problem it is necessary to transform Equation 
93 solving for τ, that is: ( ) ( ) ttt WXW εαβατ 11 11 −− −+−= . Note that the solution to this equation provides, 
through interaction among countries, the Nash equilibrium. An important inference from the equation 
above is that any τ  is a function of ( ) 11 −− Wα  and the error term ε , this correlation implies that 
parameters estimated through OLS are inconsistent. According to Brueckner (2003), there are two methods 
widely used in the literature to face this problem. In the first method, followed in  Buttner (2001), Revelli 
(2002a), and Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002), the estimation of the above equation is made 
through the Instrumental Variables (IV) approach, in which a frequently used procedure is to regress Wτ  
on X and WX  ( ( )WXXfW ,=τ ), and use the fitted values *τW as instruments for Wτ.  Consequently, the 
τj’s  are viewed as depending on its associated Xj vector and on Xi. The IV approach yields consistent 
estimates of the parameters of Equation 93. On the other hand, a second approach implies the estimation of 
Equation 93 through a Maximum Likelihood (ML), however this process has the peculiarity that it involves 
a non-linear optimization routine since α  enters the equation as a non-linear parameter. Similarly to the IV 
method, the ML approach also generates consistent estimators for the parameters. Authors that have 
applied this approach are Brueckner (1998), Saavedra (2000), and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), among 
others. There is a different approach from the IV and ML methods for avoiding the endogeneity issue 
completely. Cavlovic and Jackson (2003), and previously Hayashi and Boadway (2001), elude this 
problematic by assuming that interaction occurs with a time lag, so that the  values on the right hand side of 
Equation 93 are lagged one or more periods. This last approach is the one used at this study. 
86
 See Anselin (1999) and Lopez and Chasco (2004). 
  
 
120 
Thus, we follow this approach in our econometric estimation.87 Furthermore, several tests 
are carried out for validating the presence of fixed individual and time effects.88   
Finally, a third problem, characteristic of spatial econometric models, is the 
possible presence of spatial error dependence which can be represented by: 
 
                                                         vW e += εψε                                                      (95) 
 
where eW  is a weight matrix, which is often assumed to be equal to W  in Equation 94, v  
is well-behaved error vector, and ψ  is an unknown parameter. 
The problem of spatial error dependence takes place when ε  includes omitted 
variables that are themselves spatially dependent. If this problem is ignored, estimation of 
Equation 94 may indicate the presence of strategic interaction, when in reality we are 
facing a spatial error dependence problem. Thus, in order to address this issue, some 
authors such as Case et al. (1993), have used the ML estimation method taking into 
account the error structure in Equation 95. According to Brueckner (2003), this approach 
is difficult and computational challenging, but also it could lead to problems of 
magnitude measuring since α  and ψ  play comparable roles in the model. A second 
                                                 
87
 The econometric estimation is formulated to allow for fixed individual and time effects together and 
separately, and for panel data alone. According to Anselin (1999), fixed individual effects are non 
compatible with spatial econometric models, thus the coefficients of the spatial individual fixed effects can 
not be estimated consistently because the number of observations available for their estimation is limited to 
T observations. Nonetheless, Elhorst (2003) indicates that the inconsistency of the fixed individual effects 
is not transmitted to the estimator of the slope coefficients in the demeaned equation since this estimator is 
not a function of the demeaned fixed individual effects. The latter implies that the large sample properties 
of fixed effects model when T is fixed and N tends to infinity do apply for the demeaned equation. If the 
fixed effects model also contains fixed time effects, for short panels when T is fixed and N tends to infinity, 
the fixed effects for time periods can be estimated consistently.     
88
 See Appendixes C and E. 
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solution is to apply the IV approach discussed previously since even with spatial error 
dependence it provides a consistent estimate of α  (Kelejian & Prucha, 1998). 
A different technique to manage this problem is to rely on hypothesis tests to 
validate the presence of spatial error dependence. Anselin, Bera, Florax, and Yoon 
(1996), and later Baltagi, Song, Jung, and Koh (2003), developed several Lagrange 
robust tests for this topic. These tests have the characteristic of not being skewed or 
damaged if spatial error dependence is not corrected, but most importantly, they can 
simply be obtained from the estimation of Equation 94 through OLS.89 This approach 
described in Brueckner (2003) is used by Saavedra (2000), and Brueckner and Saavedra 
(2001).  
Thus, taking into account the above arguments into Equation 94, the empirical 
model can be represented as:  
 
                                                  titititi uXW ,1,1,, +++= −− βταφτ                                  (96) 
 
                                                           ittiitu εηµ ++=                                                 (97) 
 
where iµ  represent the individual fixed effects, tη  indicate the time period effects, and 
φ  is the intercept. Following Baltagi, Song, Jung, and Koh (2003) we will also be 
analyzing the possibility that the following would be present:90   
 
                                                 
89
 See Appendix C.  
90
 See Appendix C. 
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                                                          ititNTit vW += ελε                                                 (98) 
                                                             ititit evv +=
−1ρ                                                 (99) 
 
where NTW  is the weight matrix assumed equal to the previous defined weight matrixes, 
λ  represents the spatial correlation in the error terms, and ρ  is the serial correlation at 
the error terms. Note that ite ~IIN ),0( 2eσ  , itv ~N ))1/(,0( 22 ρσ −e . Baltagi, Song, Jung, 
and Koh (2003) Lagrange tests imply testing for 0:0 =ρeH  and 0:0 =λeH  , where if λ  is 
statistically different from zero then we are facing a spatial error dependence problem 
instead of strategic interaction, and if ρ is statistically different from zero then we are in 
front of serial correlation in the error terms.91 
Thus, by substituting Equation 97 into Equation 96, the empirical model that will 
be estimated at this study through the OLS method regards:  
 
                                         ittitititi XW εβταηµφτ +++++= −− 1,1,,                             (100) 
 
The description of the computation of the average effective tax rates, the weight 
matrixes, and other deterministic variables will be presented in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91
 For a further description see Appendix C. 
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Theoretical Specification of Computed Variables 
 
 
The Weight Matrix 
The weight matrix W comes within the linear representation of Equation 80, in 
which the average effective corporate tax rate of country i depends on a weighted average 
of the average effective corporate tax rate of the competing country plus additional 
deterministic factors. The weights reflect the influence of each competing country tax 
rate on the own country tax rate. Hence, in principle, we would expect the weights ijω  to 
be large when corporate tax competition between countries i and j is estimated to be high. 
Authors such as Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) set a weighting scheme according to 
geographical distance, where ijω is inversely related to the distance within jurisdictions i 
and j.92 Others such as Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) indicate that the 
degree of tax competition between two countries may not only depend on the geographic 
proximity of countries, but also in the relative size of the economy against the U.S. 
economy, and the degree to which they are open to international flows.  
This dissertation will use neither of these two approaches, but instead it will rely 
on four other methodologies. First, an analysis will be made by assuming the same 
weight for each competing country tax rate in matrix W1. Its computation is simple since 
it only represents an average of the number of countries taken into account. For example, 
if the sample includes 21 countries, the weights will be equal to 0.05 since only 20 
countries are taken into account to form the matrix weights.93 The reason for using this 
matrix is to evaluate the presence of global (corporate tax) competition in its simplest 
                                                 
92
 See Chapter 3 for a greater insight.  
93
 Note that the diagonal elements of the weight matrix are equal to zero.  
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form, that is, without assigning a given and different weight to each country AETR. This 
matrix also serves as a benchmark for the other three approaches. Furthermore, it is clear 
that, in a simple form, we could answer the first question established above regarding the 
significant dependence of the optimal tax rate of a country on the tax rates of other 
countries.94 
Second, as the definition of global corporate tax competition points out, a given 
country will tend to face greater tax competition against countries that have similar 
economic conditions. This implies that that the weights ijω  will be high when there is 
some level of proximity between the countries’ GNP per capita. This matrix will be 
represented by W2.  It will be computed using a similar approach to that in Brueckner and 
Saavedra (2001), and Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002).95 Their weighting scheme assigns 
a weight of one to contiguous countries (states, counties, etc.) and zero to all others. Note 
that one important difference between their approach and this dissertation is that instead 
of a geographical distance, this study uses the concept of an economic distance. The 
weight scheme is based on the proximity of GNP per capita among countries. To use a 
given, standard and reliable parameter for economic proximity, we use the Classification 
of Economies provided by the World Bank. There, countries are classified in a range of 
                                                 
94
 See Chapter 5. 
95
 The difference between the weighting scheme W2 and that applied in Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano 
(2002) work regards that the latter provides different weights to every country depending on the relative 
size of their economy against the U.S. economy; the weights are measured as the total GDP of country i 
divided by the total GDP of the U.S. This scheme does not represent a measure for similar economic 
conditions of countries since there could be a developed country with a similar GDP to a developing 
country, and this would give a similar ratio of GDPA/GDPUS; however, the developed country would have a 
low population and the developing country a extremely high population showing great differences in the 
GDP per capita of the developed and developing countries. Hence, if the condition above is present we 
would be setting poor, medium income or perhaps rich countries in the same economic condition interval; a 
situation that misses the principal point of this dissertation. On the other hand, the weights provided for W2 
regard economic proximity and gives equal weights to those countries that fall in a given interval of GNP 
per capita, without taking as a reference just one given economy, and taking into account the per capita 
term which reflects in a greater form the similar economic condition term. 
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low income ($735 or less); lower middle income ($736-$2,935); upper middle income 
($2,936-$9,075); and high income ($9,076 or more).96  The countries that fall in the same 
interval as the studied country will be given a value of one; the countries that fall one 
interval above or below the country in question are given a value of 0.75; the countries 
that fall two intervals above or below the given country are given a value of 0.5; and the 
ones falling three intervals above or below are given a value of 0.25. Consequently, the 
weight matrix W2 will be formed by normalizing the weights so every row will add to 
one.  
As mentioned above, the reason to use this matrix for our framework is to 
evaluate the presence of global corporate tax competition given its definition in Chapter 
4. Regarding the economical distances between the countries, a country could compete 
with another not depending if they are close to each other geographically, but rather if 
they are close to each other in terms of economical distance. In addition, by using this 
matrix it is possible to answer the second question at the start of the chapter. Does the 
significance of global corporate tax competition depend on the fact that the “economic” 
distance of a country with its competitors is similar?  
Third, in matrix W3 weights ijω will be calculated by using the geographical 
distance as an approximation for transportation costs. In this context, weights ijω will be 
greater when host countries have similar geographical distances to the FDI home country. 
                                                 
96
 See World Bank (2004). For operational and analytical purposes, the World Bank’s main criterion for 
classifying economies is gross national product (GNP) per capita. Every economy is classified as low 
income, middle income (subdivided into lower middle and upper middle), or high income.  Low-income 
and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing economies. The classification 
includes all World Bank member economies and all other economies with populations of more than 30,000. 
Economies are divided among income groups according to 2003 GNP per capita, calculated using the 
World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $735 or less; lower middle income, $736–$2,935; 
upper middle income, $2,936–$9,075; and high income, $9,076 or more. 
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The reason for using this computation is to evaluate if countries that face similar 
transportation costs (proxied by the geographical distances) to the FDI home country 
show a higher level of global corporate tax competition. Moreover, question three of the 
introduction section of this chapter can be solved by this framework. Does the level of 
corporate global or world-wide tax competition depends significantly on the 
transportation costs (proxied by the geographical distance) between the host country and 
the investors’ home countries? 
Hence, in order to accomplish the above, transportation costs depend on the 
output produced by the export oriented investing firm and on the geographical distance 
between the home country and the host country. That is: 
 
                                                     ( )),,(,, iibiiii kFDhh ϕγθ=                                     (101) 
 
Nonetheless, given the lack of data, the amount of parameters to be estimated and 
the wide sample of countries, it is not practical to calculate the previous equation. Thus, 
in order to simplify Equation 101 and make it available for empirical estimation is 
necessary to assume that the transportation costs will be approximated by the average 
geographical distance between the foreign direct investor home country and the host 
country. Consequently, Equation 101 can be re-expressed as: 
 
                                                             





=
+
ii Dhh                                                      (102) 
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The average geographical distance was measured using the distance in miles from 
the host country capital city to the capital cities of United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 
Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Hong Kong, Canada, United States, and Japan, the top ten 
FDI home countries.97  
Matrix W3 is computed in the following form. First, we obtain the average 
geographical distance from the top ten FDI home countries to the host countries, ix  (each 
country of the sample). The second step is to construct an initial matrix with the ix  
without making the diagonal elements of the matrix equal to zero. The third step is to 
calculate iy  defined as the absolute value of the difference of 1 less the ratio of a host 
country average geographical distance (to the FDI home country) to the country of 
reference from which we want to obtain the weights, this computation can be extracted 
from the matrix as jiiiiji xxy ≠−= 1 , where i and j are the elements of the matrix. This 
computation is similar to an scale where 0≥iy  with indicates that countries that have 
similar average geographical distances to FDI home countries will face ratios of iiij xx  
closer to one and small iy ’s , which with further calculations would provide higher 
weights to those countries that share similar distances, and to the contrary, host countries 
that face dissimilar average geographical distances will end up with ratios of 
iiij xx distant from 1  and high iy ’s, that will provide lower weights to those countries 
that share different distances.   
                                                 
97
 See Chapter 2. The distance calculation is done using the web page http://www.indo.com/cgi-bin/dist/, 
which uses the “geod” program, which is part of the “PROJ” system available from the U.S. Geological 
Survey at http://kai.er.usgs.gov/pub/. 
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The fourth step is to calculate the row sum of the iy , that is∑
=
N
i
iy
1
. Step five will 
be to construct a second matrix with the following row values 



∑
=
i
N
i
i yy
1
. Sixth, we 
obtain the sum of the row values of the second matrix, that will be  ∑
=
=
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, and 
step seven, we construct matrix W3 by calculating the weights given by 
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Note that FDI host countries in different geographical regions could face similar 
transportation costs, that is, they could share similar geographical distances between them 
and the FDI home countries.  
Finally, a different approach is used in matrix W4  where we use the geographical 
distances between the host countries. The reason for it is to evaluate if countries located 
in a neighboring condition face greater tax competition than those situated far way from 
each other. Matrix W4  computation is simple the weights of countries that reside in the 
same continent are granted a value of 1, and if they are not, a value of zero.99 
Subsequently, the weights ijω will be formed by the ratio of the value (i.e., 1 or 0) divided 
by the sum of the row. Furthermore, matrix W4 serves to resolve question number 4 of the 
introduction.  
                                                 
98
 These steps are included in order to normalize the rows of the weight matrix.  
99
 Perhaps in a further work it could result interesting to assign the weights of the countries based on a 
miles distance ratio instead of assigning them to the same continent basis, i.e., Mexico could be assigned a 
value of 1 in relation to Canada but a ratio of 0.5 in relation to Argentina or Brazil despite their location in 
the same continent. But again, the approach used in this work tries to maintain simple the complex task of 
modeling corporate tax competition.  
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In the four approaches used to calculate the weight matrixes, the weights are 
normalized to add to one.  
 
Additional Constructed Variables 
In order to be able to answer if the optimal tax rate of a country depends 
significantly on its position of foreign capital attraction relative to other countries, and if 
the similarity or disparity of trade policies between countries affects significantly the 
setting of a country’s optimal corporate tax rate, an additional identification of variables 
is needed. 
First, it is necessary to define the foreign direct investment inflows variable 
previously denoted as 1, −tifd , in the following form: 
 
                                                     





−=
−−−
___
1,1,1, tjtiti fffd                                          (103) 
 
where 1,
___
1, −− = tjstj fWf  represents the weighted FDI inflows to competing countries j, 
1, −tif  denotes country’s i FDI inflows at time t-1, and sW indicates the weight matrix, 
whether 1W , 2W , 3W , or 4W , used in the regression. Observe that if  01, <−tifd , country i 
FDI inflows will be smaller than the weighted FDI inflows of its competing countries j, 
and regarding its effects over the AETR it might oblige a decrease in the corporate AETR 
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of country i at time t since the policymakers and politicians will react with a one period 
lag.100   
Intuitively, a country’s corporate tax rate at time t can be determined in part by the 
country’s own ability to attract FDI in relation to its competing countries attraction of 
foreign capital. The variable is lagged one period since we are assuming that 
policymakers, politicians, and law mechanisms do not function immediately, that is, they 
have by default a lag integrated. In this context, a deviation of country i from its 
competitors weighted FDI attraction at time t-1 will affect the setting of i’s optimal 
corporate AETR at time t. The 1, −tifd  variable is measured in million of US dollars per 
year. 
A second variable, openness to trade denoted above as 1, −tiop  can be described as: 
 
                                                    





−=
−−−
___
1,1,1, tjtiti opoop                                            (104) 
 
where 1,
___
1, −− = tjstj oWop  represents the weighted trade openness of competing countries j, 
1, −tio  denotes country’s i trade openness at time t-1, and sW indicates the weight matrix, 
whether 1W , 2W , 3W , or 4W , used in the regression. Observe that if 01, <−tiop , country i 
trade openness will be lower than the weighted trade openness of its competing countries 
j, and regarding its effects over the AETR it might oblige a cut in the corporate AETR of 
country i at time t. It is clear that the use of this variable obeys to the fact that countries 
will face greater tax competition against each other if their trade policies are similar. The 
                                                 
100
 See a further explanation for lagging variables above in the chapter.  
  
 
131 
trade openness variable will be measured similarly to Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, and 
Lahrèche-Révil (2001) as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP. Thus, the 
variable used along this methodology summarizes the trade policies of each country. 
1, −tiop  will be measured in GDP terms.  
A third constructed variable which denotes a country’s wage deviation from its 
competitors’ wages can be described as: 
 
                                                      





−=
−−−
_____
1,1,1, tititi LSLL                                            (105) 
 
where 1,
_____
1, −− = tjstj SLWL  represents the weighted wages of competing countries j, 1, −tiSL  
denotes country’s i wages at time t-1, and sW indicates the weight matrix, whether 
1W , 2W , 3W , or 4W , used in the regression. It results clear that if 01, >−tiL , country’s i 
wages will be greater than the weighted wages of its competing countries j, resulting in a 
lost of competitiveness against its competitors, thus it might force a cut in the corporate 
AETR of country i at time t. Summing up, countries will face greater tax competition 
against each other if their wages are similar. The 1, −tiL  variable is measured in US dollars 
per year. 
Finally, a fourth constructed variable, technological skills 1, −tiγ  denotes the 
deviation of country’s i technology skills from its competitors skills. This variable is 
constructed similarly to the previous three, in such a way that: 
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                                                       




 Ω−Ω=
−−−
_____
1,1,1, tititiγ                                         (106) 
 
where 1,
_____
1, −− Ω=Ω tjstj W  represents the weighted wages of technological skills of 
competing countries j, 1, −Ω ti  denotes country’s i technology skills at time t-1, and 
sW indicates the weight matrix, whether 1W , 2W , 3W , or 4W , used in the regression. Note 
that similarly to the last constructed variable, a negative deviation of country’s i 
technology skills from its competitors, 01, <−tiγ , it would implicate a cut in the corporate 
AETR of country i at time t. This fact relates to the idea that countries will face greater 
tax competition against each other if their technological skills are similar and they would 
have to compensate for lower technological skills by reducing its AETR. In particular, 
1, −tiγ  will be measured as telephone mainlines per 1,000 people.  
In conclusion, to test the hypothesis of the presence of a significant level of global 
corporate tax competition among countries we would need to evaluate the significance of 
α  in Equation 100 using either 1W , 2W , 3W , or 4W . Table A1 from Appendix A provides 
us with the way of how this study intent to evaluate the hypothesis and answer the eight 
questions presented at the start of the chapter.  
 
The Tax Rates: Statutory, Average Effective or Marginal Effective? 
According to the literature on corporate tax rates, the measurement and capture of 
a country’s corporate tax system has been considered a complex task for macroeconomic 
empirical work. Three types and measures of corporate tax rates have been used in 
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macroeconomic empirical studies: the statutory corporate tax rate, the corporate marginal 
effective tax rate, and the corporate average effective tax rate. 
The statutory corporate tax rate represents the most visible attribute of a country’s 
corporate tax structure, nonetheless is just one factor among many tax determinants that 
leads to a significant economic impact in a country.101 The statutory tax rate plays an 
important role in the determination of fiscal incentives that promote shifting income 
between cities, states, and countries. However, regarding its impact on investment 
incentives, the statutory corporate rate is not a proper measure since it misses the 
existence of tax holidays, of depreciation schedules, of inflation adjustments, of inventory 
allowance systems, of availability of credits for investment, and of deductibility of 
categories of business expenses. Consequently, a large literature has searched for the 
most accurate methodology able to summarize and acknowledge the previous factors into 
a common measure that could be useful in macroeconomic studies. 
Different combinations of information on tax returns, statutory tax rates, 
deductions, depreciation rates, and tax codes with data on income distribution, household 
surveys, and projections of net present values for investment projects, have been 
proposed by researchers in this area.102 Nonetheless, again, the complexity of tax credits, 
exemptions, and deductions that exist in most countries complicate the construction of 
effective tax rates, marginal and average, useful in macroeconomic modeling. As 
numerous authors argue, there are considerable suspicions in that marginal and average 
tax rates, extracted from particular individuals in a household survey or a specific 
                                                 
101
 The statutory corporate tax rate is defined as the corporate tax rate legally established by the tax 
authority of a country. 
102
 See Deveroux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002) for further explanation on the use of Net Present Values 
to calculate the average and marginal effective tax rates.  
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aggregation of incomes based on tax bracket weights, can be equivalent to the aggregate 
tax rates that affect macroeconomic variables (Frenkel, Razin, & Sadka, 1991; Mendoza, 
Razin & Tesar, 1994). Furthermore, given the existing methodologies, data availability 
considerably restricts the computation of corporate average and marginal effective tax 
rates for time series and cross country data. 
Before continuing is necessary to define both of these measures. Marginal 
effective tax rates, or EMTR, are defined as the difference between the before tax and the 
after tax rate of return to capital on the last dollar invested. On the other hand, average 
effective tax rates, or AETR, are the ratio of total taxes paid by the firm to the before tax 
returns of the firm.  
Different currents of thought have highlighted the advantages and disadvantages 
to each measure. Authors such as Chen, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1998), and 
Slemrod (2004) have not used the EMTR given its need for specific tax and firm’s 
information difficult to find and compare, and have opted to use the concept of AETR 
due to its measure convenience at a macroeconomic level. In contrast, Bird and Chen 
(2002) have promoted the superiority of EMTR over AETR arguing that the EMTR 
serves in a much better way for a comparative purpose across different types of assets, 
business sectors, or countries’ tax regimes than the AETR.103  
There are several arguments identified against the EMTR. First, EMTRs are 
relatively easy to quantify at a microeconomic level. However computing it at a national 
or international level results difficult and impractical. Second, the density and diversity of 
tax deductions, credits, and exemptions make it problematical to infer the actual tax 
                                                 
103
 Whichever line of thought prevails, this study needs to identify the reasons by which one of the effective 
tax rates, marginal or average, might be chosen for the empirical work. 
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burden from information on given statutory tax rates. Third, the majority of available 
methods for computing marginal effective tax rates require data on the distribution of 
income that should be consistent with social security contributions and income tax 
schedules and returns. Fourth, tax revenue data and the tax system itself do not conform 
to the aggregate concepts of a macroeconomic model. Fifth, observable variables used to 
construct tax rate estimates can be affected similarly by different taxes (Frenkel, Razin, & 
Sadka, 1991). Sixth, tax systems, especially in decentralized systems, often include 
different forms of taxation affecting the same tax base. Seventh, the EMTR do not 
account for how vigorously a particular system of procedure is enforced. Finally, the 
measure of EMTR complicates further at the international level given the differences in 
the structure of tax systems and limitations of the information available on tax revenues 
and income distribution (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993).   
Despite the disadvantages of the EMTR approach, Bird and Chen (2002) still 
favor the use of EMTR instead of AETR.104 They indicate that the EMTR serve as a 
better comparative indicator that could provide evidence for a tax distortion within a tax 
regime and a tax advantage or disadvantage of one tax regime relative to another. EMTR 
is considered as an ex-ante indicator that reflects the designed, or planned, impact of a 
formal tax structure. EMTR emphasizes the need to take into account not only statutory 
tax rates but also other tax provisions (i.e., tax allowances) that may affect the real tax 
cost. It is an economic concept that measures the impact of formal tax structure on the 
cost of capital. It is sensitive to the formal tax structure and its interaction with economic 
indicators and hence an ideal tool for investment oriented policy simulations.  
                                                 
104
 EMTR measures the incremental amount of taxes payable on the return to the last unit of capital 
investment under the formal tax system. 
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In contrast, against AETR, Bird and Chen (2002) specify that it does not represent 
a relevant indicator when comparing the impacts of tax structures on capital investment 
since AETR depends on the business performance of the taxpayer and on the quality of 
the tax administration reflecting the outcome of the interaction between the economy, the 
formal tax structure, and actual tax administration. The AETR provides a measurement 
for overall tax burden or revenue changes but lacks a strong economic background.105 
In favor of AETR, Shah and Slemrod (1991) indicate that the average effective 
tax rates capture in a better form the aspects of the countries’ tax laws. Furthermore, 
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) indicate that the AETR approach is less stringent on 
data requirements than the EMTR, it takes into account the net effect of existing rules 
regarding credits, exemptions, and deductions, and moreover, it is consistent with the 
concept of aggregate tax rates at the national and international level. 
To sum up, both lines of thought seem reasonable in their opinions; however the 
intention of this section is to offer the reader the latest arguments in favor and against the 
measure of effective corporate tax rates. It is in our best interest to focus on the AETR 
since it is the most accurate approach for our work. Furthermore, it is impractical to use 
the EMTR because its measure requires detailed sectoral information on tax provisions, 
deductions, exemptions, special depreciation structures, and other variables of economic 
influence, which could have diverse definitions in each country. In addition, it is also not 
convincing to use the statutory tax rate as a proxy of a country’s corporate tax structure 
since it misses the collection of determinant factors in the corporate tax system of a 
country.  
                                                 
105
 EMTR and AETR thus need not coincide and do not play the same role in tax analysis. Nonetheless, if 
tax administration is efficient, it would seem reasonable to expect AETR in the long run and at the macro 
level to follow the pattern of EMTR. 
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Now the turn is to choose the most suitable measure of AETR. Authors such as 
Lucas (1990), Razin and Sadka (1993), Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), and Chen, 
Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1998) have suggested an alternative estimation method 
that produces average effective tax rates using data on actual tax payments and national 
accounts. Their method takes into account the effective overall burden resulting from 
major taxes and produces measures of tax rates that are consistent with the concept of 
aggregate tax rates at the national level. The empirical work they have conducted 
suggests that the resulting average tax rates are useful approximations to the taxes that 
distort economic decisions in dynamic macroeconomic models.  
Chen, Martinez-Vazquez, and Wallace (1998) framework uses Mendoza, Razin 
and Tesar (1994) proposal for computing average effective tax rates. Their scheme is an 
extension of the Lucas (1990), and Razin and Sadka (1993) method to compute time 
series of effective tax rates on consumption, capital income, and labor income using 
information publicly available from the OECD. The three taxes are measured as ad-
valorem estimates by classifying virtually all forms of tax revenue at the general 
government level into one of the three taxes. Each measure of tax revenue is then 
expressed as a fraction of a precise estimate of the corresponding tax base. As Razin and 
Sadka (1993) show, these ad-valorem tax rates reflect specific (or per unit) tax rates faced 
by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework.  
The main advantage of the Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) method is that is 
less stringent on data requirements than other methods because it exploits the consistency 
of available international sources on national accounts and revenue statistics, and hence is 
much easier to use it to produce time series and cross country samples of tax rates. In 
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addition to its simplicity, the method also takes into account the net effect of existing 
rules regarding credits, exemptions, and deductions. Nonetheless, the method has the 
disadvantage that it does not take into account information on statutory tax rates and 
income distribution per tax bracket, as well as that it does not account for the 
enforcement of the corporate tax system. Furthermore, a shortcoming from the careful 
measure of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) method is that it results unworkable to a 
wide sample of countries since their source is the OECD’s Revenue Statistics.  
A different approach is proposed by Deveroux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2002). 
Their methods to calculate effective corporate tax rates, both AETRs and EMTRs, are 
based on applying the rules of the tax system to a hypothetical investment project. The 
AETR is defined as to be in function of the fixed pre-tax rate of return, on the discount 
rate of the marginal share holder in the absence of personal taxes, on the statutory 
corporate tax rate, on the cost of capital, on the present value of allowances associated 
with the additional investment expenditure, and on the economic rate of depreciation. 
This method, as dense as it seems, provides us with an interesting framework to work 
with at microeconomic level. However, similarly to the Mendoza et al. (1994) 
methodology, in reality this careful measure is not available for a wide range of countries 
over many years.  
Summing up, both measures of AETRs have a complication in common: they do 
not support their use within a large sample of countries. It results impractical, complex, 
and unreliable to calculate these tax rates since every country has its own fundamentals, 
and besides, developing countries do not have data available to estimate the AETRs by 
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these methods. Thus, we end up analyzing three alternative estimation methods for 
AETRs.  
First, there is the approach in Slemrod (2004), and Altshuler and Goodspeed 
(2002) which propose an approximation measure for AETRs when facing a large sample 
of countries. Commonly, AETRs are calculated as the ratio of corporate tax revenues 
divided by some economic income of corporations. But as mentioned before, obtaining 
information for a large sample of countries on income from corporations is impractical 
and for some countries is unreliable. Hence, as Slemrod (2004), and Altshuler and 
Goodspeed (2002) indicate, the AETR of a country can be approximated by the ratio of 
Corporate Income Tax Revenues (CITR) to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in order to 
be comparable and useful with a large sample of countries. This can be denoted as: 
 
                                                             
GDP
CITR
i =τ                                                      (107) 
 
As it can be observed in other computations, every method has one or several 
difficulties or problems. The inconvenient with this approach is that the denominator of 
the average tax rate, the GDP, is not a measure of corporate profits; iτ  is a product of an 
effective rate of tax on corporate income and the base to which it is applied. The AETR 
approximated by this measure will be higher the more successful the country is at 
attracting and retaining profitable corporations. This measure as simple as it seems, 
collects important information regarding the corporate tax system of a country, and in 
addition it results widely comparable between countries.   
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Even though this measure has the good feature of being available for a large 
sample of countries and for many years, it is troublesome for a few reasons.106 On the one 
hand, the ratio of CITR to GDP may fluctuate due to economic factors that are unrelated 
to changes in the underlying corporate tax structure of a country. On the other hand, as 
with any average effective tax measure, it does not necessarily internalizes the corporate 
tax incentives to invest in a given country in given year since it is a function of both 
present and previous investment decisions of firms as well as economic fundamentals. As 
a result, we have to acknowledge that this method is an imperfect measure of corporate 
tax burdens. Furthermore, the framework developed by Slemrod (2004) will provide 
skewed results since countries with strong economies will have greater tax collection than 
weak economies, and at the limit, what could seem as tax competition would be a 
comparison of poor tax collector countries and good tax collector countries, and not a 
world-wide tax competition by itself. The last argument can be transformed into 
competition among good to good tax collectors and bad to bad tax collectors. This 
method, hence, throws more information regarding the tax collecting capacity of each 
country than as a way to measure the corporate average effective tax rates. 
Second, a different method for approximating AETRs is used by Grubert and 
Mutti (2000), and Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001). They calculate the average 
effective tax rate for manufacturing Controlled Foreign Corporations, or CFCs, 
incorporated in each country by dividing total income taxes paid by total earnings and 
profits, both variables extracted from the Statistics of Income bulletin from the Internal 
                                                 
106
 This computation can easily be obtained using the Corporate Income Tax Revenue (CITR) statistic from 
the International Monetary Fund’s “Government Financial Statistics” book. Nonetheless, the CITR statistic 
obtained from the IMF has the shortcoming that it only takes into account central government data and 
leaves aside states, counties and municipalities data.  
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Revenue Service, IRS.107 Parent corporations must report their CFCs earnings and profits 
using the definition provided by the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. This measure of 
earnings and profits is meant to reflect net income, not host country (or domestic U.S.) 
taxable income, which would be affected by investment incentives such as accelerated 
depreciation. The first criticism to this approach, and perhaps the most important given 
the need for a large sample in terms of years, is that the data are only available for an 
interval of 2 years apart starting in 1982. Furthermore, the latest data available comes 
from 1998, and as it could be seen in KPMG (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004), the most important changes in the corporate income tax rates start in the year 
2000. Hence, the method provided by Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) for 
computing the AETR leaves out much information needed for a good fit of the empirical 
model.  
A third method comes from Desai, Foley and Hines (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). 
They compute the AETR with data extracted from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment abroad which provides information on 
the financial and operating characteristics of U.S. firms operating abroad.108  Desai et al. 
                                                 
107
 A CFC is defined as a foreign company where more than 50 percent of which is owned by U.S. 
shareholders. A U.S. shareholder must own 10 percent or more of the foreign company. More than 75 
percent of the CFCs on the form 5471 of the IRS are 100 percent controlled.  
108
 The surveys require respondents to file detailed financial and operating items for each foreign affiliate 
and provide information on the value of transactions between U.S. parents and their foreign affiliates. The 
International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act govern the collection of the data and the Act 
ensures that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is 
prohibited.” Willful noncompliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a prison term of 
one year. As a result of these assurances and penalties, BEA believes that coverage is close to complete and 
levels of accuracy are high. BEA collects sufficient information to link affiliate level data through time to 
create a panel. U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a 
single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business 
enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise. A U.S. multinational 
entity (MNE) is the combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the 
U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign affiliate. In order to be 
considered as a legitimate foreign affiliate, the foreign business enterprise should be paying foreign income 
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(2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) calculate the corporate effective income tax rates by first 
identifying the affiliates that report positive net income and then taking the ratio of the 
sum of foreign income taxes to the sum of net income and foreign income taxes for all 
affiliates in each country and year. 
 
                                    
IncomeNetTaxesIncomeForeign
TaxesIncomeForeign
i +
=τ                       (108) 
 
It results interesting and useful for the purpose of this investigation, that the 
method developed by Desai et al. takes into account data provided by firms that are 
involved in the FDI host country, and not information coming from the governments’ 
revenue accounts. This method represents a closer approximation for the average 
effective corporate tax rate of the export oriented entrepreneurs’ theory presented in the 
last Chapter.   
Thus, observing and analyzing the above advantages and shortcomings, we would 
use the Desai, Foley and Hines (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) measure for computing the 
AETRs and then evaluate the hypothesis of the presence of a global corporate tax 
competition among countries. 
 
Data Sources 
 
 
Countries of different geographical areas are included in the dataset in order to 
evaluate the hypothesis of the presence of a global corporate tax competition scheme. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
taxes, have a substantial physical presence abroad, have separate financial records, and should take title to 
the goods it sells and receive revenue from sales. 
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empirical approach in this paper is set to estimate Equation 100. In order to achieve this, 
panel data are collected on the tax regimes and control variables for the largest number of 
countries for which data is available and that comply with the requirements of the Desai, 
Foley, and Hines methodology (further on referred as the DFH method). 
For computing the average effective corporate tax rate, data are obtained from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment abroad from the 
BEA webpage.109  
For the vector 1, −tiX  variables, the host country and competing countries’ wages 
at time t-1, 1, −tiL  and 1, −tjL , are approximated by the annual average compensation per 
employee in US dollars for the Majority Owned Foreign Affiliates obtained from the 
BEA annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment abroad. 
The technological skills, 1, −tiγ , is proxied by the telephone mainlines per 1,000 
people obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2004.  
The Foreign Direct Investment, FDI, needed to compute 1, −tifd  is obtained from 
the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development, UNCTAD, database and it is 
measured in million of US dollars per year.110 
Trade openness is approximated by the ratio of the sum of the exports and imports 
to the GDP and the data is obtained from the World Bank’s, World Development 
Indicators, 2004. 
Government expenditure is measured as percentage of GDP and the data is 
extracted from the World Bank’s, World Development Indicators, 2004. 
                                                 
109
 Data are available in the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) website.  
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/surveys/diasurv.htm. 
110
 Data are available in the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website. 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1584&lang=1 
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The exchange rate is obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s, 
International Financial Statistics, 2004. 
Regarding the geographical distance, it is obtained from the Geod Program which 
is part of the “PROJ” system available from the U.S. Geological Survey.111  
 
Summary 
 
 
This chapter offers a discussion of the type and measure of corporate tax rate to 
use, and specification of the variables, their computation and their sources, and serves to 
state both the empirical and econometrical methodologies used along in this research. 
Four weight matrixes were described: (1) homogeneous weights; (2) similar economic 
conditions’ weights; (3) similar transportation costs’ weights; and (4) geographically 
neighboring conditions’ weights. The average effective corporate tax rate was selected as 
the most appropriate measure given its properties and suitability to our work. The method 
selected to approximate the corporate average effective tax rate follows the DFH 
methodology, which takes the ratio of foreign income taxes to the sum of net income and 
foreign income taxes. The next chapter presents the empirical results of this dissertation. 
 
                                                 
111
 See http://www.indo.com/cgi-bin/dist/. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS OF THE MODEL: EVALUATING THE PRESENCE OF A GLOBAL 
CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION SCHEME 
 
This chapter begins with a brief description of the sample used in the study. Next 
we discuss the estimation results for Equation 100 using the weight matrixes 1W , 2W , 
3W , and 4W .  
 
Sample Description and Estimation Assumptions 
 
 
Sample Description 
Given the restrictions imposed by the available data and the methodology we use, 
the number of countries in the sample is 53, with the time period covering 19 years from 
1984 through 2002; thus, the number of observations for the sample is 1007. It is 
important to note that the number of countries in the sample is greater than the time 
period since there is not enough data available for years before 1984, and most notably, 
because we need a large sample of countries to evaluate the possibility of world-wide tax 
competition, the main interest of this dissertation.  
The sample of countries is conformed by: (1) Seventeen countries from America: 
Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Venezuela; (2) Twelve countries from Asia and Oceania: Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand; (3) Eighteen countries from Europe and Central Asia: Austria, 
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Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and 
Turkey; and (4) Six countries from the Middle East and Africa: Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, and Israel.  
The measurement units of the variables in the dataset can be described as follows: 
(1) the average effective tax rates, the serially lagged differences at openness to trade, the 
lagged government expenditure, and the shifts at the lagged exchange rate will be 
measured as follows: if an AETR is set at 35%, this will be represented as 0.35 in the 
sample; (2) the serially lagged difference at wages will be measured as US dollars per 
year; (3) the serially lagged difference at technology skills will be measured as 
telephones mainlines per 1,000 people; and (4) the lagged difference at FDI inflows will 
be represented as million of US dollars per year.    
 
Estimating Assumptions 
The econometric model is estimated using four approaches: (1) fixed individual 
and time effects jointly; (2) fixed individual effects only; (3) fixed time effects only; and 
(4) no fixed effects: simple panel data. The main results are presented at Tables 3, 4, 5, 
and 6. Each table contains five columns; the first contains the explanatory variables, 
while the results are presented in the other four. The first column of results presents the 
estimation of Equation 100 from Chapter 5, allowing for fixed individual and time effects 
jointly ( 0≠iµ , 0≠tη ):112 
 
                                                 
112
 Recall from Chapter 5 that µ represents fixed individual effects, and η  the fixed time effects. 
  
 
147 
                                     ittitititi XW εβταηµφτ +++++= −− 1,1,,                            (109) 
 
The second column assumes fixed individual effects only, that is 0=tη  while 
0≠iµ , and implies the estimation of: 
 
                                         ittitiiti XW εβταµφτ ++++= −− 1,1,,                               (110) 
 
The third column presents the estimation under the fixed time period effects 
method, that is 0=iµ  while 0≠tη , thus the model can be represented by: 
 
                                         ittititti XW εβταηφτ ++++= −− 1,1,,                                 (111) 
 
Finally, the fourth column of results assumes no fixed effects, that is 0=iµ  and 
0=tη , and refers to the estimation of the following equation: 
 
                                             ittititi XW εβταφτ +++= −− 1,1,,                                  (112) 
 
In the four cases, we follow Arellano (1987) approach to present robust serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity standard errors estimates, and Baltagi, Song, Jung, and 
Koh (2003) to present three Lagrange Multiplier tests: one for serial correlation ( ρLM ) , 
one for spatial correlation ( λLM ), and one for serial and spatial correlation in the error 
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terms ( λρ +LM ) .113 Additionally, several tests were carried out in order to evaluate the 
suitability of each method for each weight matrix through a number of F tests. These 
simple Chow tests evaluate the differences between the residual sums of squares (RSS) of 
each method above, making them compete against each other. The F tests are fully 
developed in Appendix C. Furthermore; we carried out the Hausman test under each of 
the four weight matrixes in order to corroborate the use of the fixed effects approach 
instead of the random effects model. This test is fully developed in Appendix E and 
shows that the fixed effects estimation approach is preferable to the random effects under 
each of the four weight matrixes.   
The following four sections refer to the estimation of the equations above for the 
four weight matrixes discussed in Chapter 5: 1W , 2W , 3W  and 4W , and presents the most 
appropriate estimation method for each weight matrix. Consequently, after the most 
appropriate methods are selected, we make a comparison of the four estimation results 
from the weight matrixes.  
 
Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 1W  
 
 
The assumed weights for this study reflect the influence of each competing 
country tax rate on the own country tax rate. In this section, weight matrix 1W  sets the 
possibility of evaluating the presence of corporate AETR competition by providing the 
same weight to each competing country’s corporate AETR. By not differentiating among 
weights across countries, the empirical estimation under 1W  makes it possible to examine 
                                                 
113
 See Appendix C for a further description.  
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whether countries compete against each other without restricting their behavior to a 
particular geographical region or the economic position of those countries.  
Table 3 below presents the results based on the estimation of the equations above 
under 1W  (equal weights). It shows, also, the values for the LM tests and F tests 
developed in Appendix C.  
Regarding the most appropriate estimation method under weight matrix 1W , first 
it is necessary to define each of the Chow tests presented at the results. Hence, 1F  test is 
repeated in each column of Table 3 and it tests the hypothesis of whether all coefficients 
to be estimated are zero ( 0:0 ===== ηφµβαH ). On the other hand, 2F  measures 
different issues for each column. For the first column, 2F  tests whether fixed individual 
and time period effects are zero ( 0:0 == tiH ηµ ) (it tests RSS from Equation 109 
against RSS from Equation 112); for the second column, it tests whether fixed individual 
effects are zero ( 0:0 =iH µ ); and for the third column, it tests whether fixed time effects 
are zero ( 0:0 =tH η ). However, there are two additional F tests that only apply to the 
fixed individual and time effects jointly estimation method. The first one, 3F  tests for 
individual effects given time effects ( 0:0 =iH µ , given 0≠tη ) (it tests RSS from 
Equation 109 against RSS from Equation 111). The second, 4F  tests for the presence of 
time effects given individual effects ( 0:0 =tH η , given 0≠iµ )(it tests RSS from 
Equation 109 against RSS from Equation 110).   
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Table 3 
Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 1W . 
 
No Fixed 
Individual and Time Individual Time Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
w τ i,t-1 (+) 0.7638344 0.7508322 1.0128148 0.6363172
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001)
L i,t-1 (-) 1.3071E-06 1.1967E-06 2.3648E-06 2.4548E-06
(0.13600) (0.17126) (0.30602) (0.27235)
op i,t-1 (+) -0.0531589 -0.0497860 -0.1063855 -0.1064499
(0.28558) (0.31282) (0.00008) (0.00003)
γ i,t-1 (+) 0.0001900 0.0002197 -0.0002074 -0.0002065
(0.29885) (0.21563) (0.19890) (0.20532)
fd i,t-1 (+) -1.1380E-06 -1.0904E-06 -1.3511E-06 -1.4528E-06
(0.01707) (0.01943) (0.07961) (0.05763)
ER i,t-1 (-) 2.6619E-05 7.6403E-06 1.1248E-04 1.3328E-05
(0.09090) (0.70977) (0.24367) (0.58724)
GE i,t-1 (+) 0.2611465 0.2647555 -0.2617789 -0.2254035
(0.30619) (0.34265) (0.50733) (0.54247)
Constant -- -- -- 0.1540253
-- -- -- (0.01627)
R 2 within 0.22782 0.14065 0.25128 0.19467
RSS 11.64889 11.34608 32.12227 31.26192
F 1 45.68036 25.83195 54.87173 34.49888
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
F 2  22.34489 31.96683 -0.50528 --
(0.00000) (0.00000) (1.00000) --
F 3 31.39913 -- -- --
(0.00000) -- -- --
F 4      -1.34160 -- -- --
(1.00000) -- -- --
LM λ     0.36158 0.51570 1.82737 1.61636
(0.54763) (0.47268) (0.17644) (0.20360)
Fixed Effects
Variables
(Expected Signs)
Explanatory
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values obtained using Arellano’s (1987) robust serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
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The results of the 1F  tests imply that the null hypothesis for the four cases 
(columns) was rejected. That is, for the four estimation methods, the coefficients were 
found to be statistically different from zero when tested together.  
Regarding column 1 of the results, 2F  shows that the null hypothesis of 
0== ti ηµ  is rejected indicating that the fixed individual and time effects are non zero 
when tested together. Test 3F  also rejects the null hypothesis that all individual fixed 
effects are zero given time effects. Nonetheless, 4F  does not reject the null hypothesis 
that all time fixed effects are statistically equal to zero given individual effects.  
With respect to the fixed individual effects only estimation method, column 2 of 
the results, 2F  indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected making all the fixed 
individual effects non zero. In contrast, 2F  from the fixed time effects estimation 
method, column 3, implies that the null hypothesis was not rejected, making all time 
period effects statistically not different from zero.  
Note that the 2F  test from column 3 implies that the no fixed effects estimation 
method is preferred to the time period fixed effects method. Additionally, 2F  from 
column 2 implies that the fixed individual and time period effects estimation method is 
preferred to the no fixed effects approach. Thus, it remains to evaluate two of the 
approaches, joint fixed individual and time period effects and only fixed individual 
effects. In order to choose between these two, the decisive criteria will be the lowest RSS. 
Consequently, the lowest RSS corresponds to the fixed individual effects only estimation 
method, with a value of 11.34608, while the fixed individual and time effects together 
approach presents a RSS of 11.64889. Observe also that the highest RSS corresponds to 
  
 
152 
the fixed time effects only estimation method with a value of 32.12227. Thus, the most 
appropriate estimation method under 1W  corresponds to the fixed individual effects 
only.114   
Concerning the results of the model under weight matrix 1W , column 2 shows that 
the lagged weighted corporate AETR, 1, −tiWτ , has a positive, expected and statistically 
significant effect over an FDI host country corporate AETR, ti,τ .  
Intuitively, a decrease of 10 percentage points (0.10) on last year’s weighted 
average corporate AETR of competing countries provokes a negative effect on a given 
FDI host country corporate AETR at nearly 7.508 percentage points (0.075083217).115  
This result would seem to indicate that the corporate AETR of a country depends 
significantly on other countries last year’s corporate AETR, when every country is 
weighted in a similar way. Again note that for this result it does not matter the 
geographical location of the country; if Argentina is located in America, China in Asia or 
Nigeria in Africa, they reflect some level of interaction among them regarding the 
corporate AETR decision.  
Looking back to Chapter 5, the empirical estimation under weight matrix 1W  
makes it possible to answer question 1 of the referred chapter. Does the optimal corporate 
tax rate of a country depend significantly on the corporate tax rates of other countries? 
The answer appears to be yes. According to these results, the optimal corporate tax rate 
of a country depends significantly, positively and robustly on the previous period 
                                                 
114
 As an exercise without implications to this study, Appendix F shows estimations for each of the four 
weight matrixes under the individual fixed effects approach using two and three time period lags instead of 
one. 
115
 The sample shows a change in 1, −tiWτ of nearly -10 percentage points (-0.10) in Mexico from 1986 to 
1987 using 1W . 
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corporate tax rates of other countries. This argument show some light regarding the 
“reasonable” tax competition behavior of the countries from the sample.  
The lagged difference wage estimated coefficient, 1, −tiL , which measures the 
deviation of the own wages from the weighted wages of competing countries, shows a 
small, non-statistically significant and non-expected positive effect over the FDI host 
country corporate AETR, ti,τ . Hence, do countries compensate by offering lower AETRs 
if their wages are higher than those of its competitors? According to the obtained 
coefficient when assuming similar weight to each country (under weight matrix 1W ), the 
answer is no. The obtained effect was neither expected nor statistically different from 
zero; moreover, the magnitude of the effect depends on the fact that the shift on 1, −tiL  
would be large. 
The serially lagged openness to trade differences, 1, −tiop , presents a non-
significant at a 95% level and non-expected effect over the corporate AETR. As regards 
to question 5 from Chapter 5, neither the similarity nor the disparity of trade policies 
between countries affects significantly the optimal corporate AETR decision of a country. 
The result from the lagged technology skill differences 1, −tiγ  shows that the 
expected theoretical effect is met; however, it was not statistically significant at a 95 
percent level. Hence, to answer question 7 of Chapter 5, countries do not compensate by 
offering lower AETRs if their technological skills are lower than those of their 
competitors.  
Alternatively, regarding the 1, −tifd  variable, the result indicates a statistically 
significant effect over the setting of the corporate AETRs. According to the theory, 
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countries that have a lower FDI inflow than the similarly weighted average of their 
competitors will push for a decrease in their corporate AETR in order to provide an 
incentive to attract FDI. Nonetheless, the obtained effect did not match the expectation. 
Additionally, it must be noted that an increase in last year’s FDI inflows difference 
variable of nearly 1 billion US dollars will encourage a decrease of  0.001090445 points 
at the setting of the current corporate AETR.116 Consequently, the size of the effect seems 
very small at first sight. However, taking into account that differences in FDI inflows 
could reach values higher than one billion US dollars, the size effect for 1, −tifd turns out 
to be not that insignificant in magnitude. Hence to answer question six, according to the 
estimation results for 1, −tifd , despite of being significant, countries do not reduce their 
corporate AETR in order to attract a higher amount of FDI inflows depending on its 
position of FDI attraction relative to other countries.  
Similarly to the majority of the previous results, the serially lagged government 
expenditure coefficient is not statistically significant at a 95 percent level. The obtained 
effect matches the expected sign and it is the second in size behind the weighted 
corporate AETR.  
The estimated coefficient for the lagged percent changes at the exchange rate, 
1, −tiER ,  was also not significant at a 95 percent level, and it resulted particularly small in 
magnitude given its measurement units. Regarding the expected effect, an increase at 
1, −tiER  represents an appreciation of the national currency against the US dollar, hence 
US dollars are worth less and the costs of maintaining an export oriented firm increases 
                                                 
116
 Data from the sample under 1W  shows an increase in 1, −tifd  in Argentina from 1995 to 1996 of nearly 1 
billion US dollars. On the other hand, under  1W  the average increase of 1, −tifd  from the sample is 3.64 
billion US dollars, while the average decrease is 2.36 billion US dollars.  
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relatively; as a consequence, the country’s government could compensate the raise in 
costs by providing a lower corporate AETR; that is, an incentive for the firm to stay. This 
argument exemplifies the negative expected sign for the parameter, but the sign of the 
coefficient obtained is actually the opposite of what we expected.   
As explained above, we followed Arellano (1987) in order to present serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors estimates since serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity are assumed of an unknown form. Consequently, we 
end up just analyzing the LM test for spatial error correlation, since we can correct for 
serial correlation in the errors by using Arellano’s approach. Thus, the LM test for spatial 
correlation in the error terms ( λLM ) does not rejects the null hypothesis that 0=λ , that 
is, it is demonstrated that the spatial correlation in the error coefficient is statistically not 
different from zero. Hence, there are no spatial dependence in the error terms.117 
Additionally, since the fixed individual effects turned out to be significant when 
tested jointly, it implies that there are several deterministic factors inherent to each 
country different to the ones tested in this section that could explain some part of the 
corporate AETR. 
Summing up, since it turned out that countries react with an effect of 0.75083217 
to each others corporate AETR decisions when assuming the same weight, it results 
important to evaluate if the effect changes signs and significance or if it increases or 
decreases in size when providing a different weight to each country based on different 
assumptions.  
 
                                                 
117
 See Chapter 5 and Appendix C for further description.   
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Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 2W  
 
 
Global or world-wide tax competition was described as uncooperative tax policy 
reactions between governments of different countries of the world not necessarily near 
each other geographically, but in similar economic conditions and with the purpose to 
influence the allocation of FDI. The central hypothesis of this study is that countries with 
similar economic conditions may face greater tax competition than countries within the 
same geographical area. As described in Chapter 5 previously, matrix 2W  assigns the 
weights based on the economic conditions of each country; thus, by using 2W  at the 
estimation we will be able to evaluate the presence of a global tax competition 
framework.  
Table 4 presents the results based on the estimation of the Equations 109, 110, 
111, and 112 above under 2W . Furthermore, it presents the values for each of the LM 
tests and F tests detailed in Appendix C.  
Again, it is necessary to evaluate which estimation method is the most appropriate 
under weight matrix 2W . The 1F  tests results for the four cases (columns) indicate that 
the null hypothesis – that all coefficients are equal to zero when tested jointly – is 
rejected. 
Regarding the fixed individual and time effects jointly estimation (column 1), the 
2F  test shows that the null hypothesis of fixed individual and time effects equal to zero 
must be rejected. Similarly, 3F  test result, from the same estimation method, rejects the 
null hypothesis that all individual fixed effects are zero given the time fixed effects. On 
  
 
157 
the contrary, 4F  result does not reject the null hypothesis that all time fixed effects are 
zero given individual effects.  
Table 4 
Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 2W  
 
No Fixed 
Individual and Time Individual Time Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
w τ i,t-1 (+) 0.7499148 0.7341452 1.0439724 0.7341181
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00002)
L i,t-1 (-) 1.5762E-06 1.4611E-06 2.4955E-06 2.6091E-06
(0.08352) (0.10722) (0.29460) (0.25391)
op i,t-1 (+) -0.0575175 -0.0531708 -0.1052313 -0.1055033
(0.24125) (0.27481) (0.00007) (0.00001)
γ i,t-1 (+) 0.0002525 0.0002728 -0.0001545 -0.0001702
(0.22912) (0.18186) (0.42234) (0.37737)
fd i,t-1 (+) -1.1511E-06 -1.1064E-06 -1.4169E-06 -1.5447E-06
(0.01454) (0.01673) (0.06262) (0.04328)
ER i,t-1 (-) 2.2649E-05 4.8765E-06 1.1284E-04 1.1174E-05
(0.14275) (0.81649) (0.26478) (0.65258)
GE i,t-1 (+) 0.2258508 0.2366965 -0.3123613 -0.2944339
(0.37486) (0.39693) (0.43855) (0.44115)
Constant -- -- -- 0.1342073
-- -- -- (0.04680)
R 2 within 0.22901 0.14190 0.25507 0.19594
RSS 11.63093 11.32952 31.95935 31.21281
F 1 45.98989 26.10047 55.98490 34.77770
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
F 2  22.34383 31.96125 -0.44068 --
(0.00000) (0.00000) (1.00000) --
F 3 31.22494 -- -- --
(0.00000) -- -- --
F 4      -1.33750 -- -- --
(1.00000) -- -- --
LM λ     0.19861 0.30047 1.40118 2.03485
(0.65585) (0.58359) (0.23653) (0.15373)
Fixed Effects
Variables
(Expected Signs)
Explanatory
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values obtained using Arellano’s (1987) robust serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
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Similarly to Table 3, 2F  tests from the fixed individual effects only estimation 
method, column 2, indicates that the null hypothesis (that all the individual fixed effects 
are zero) is rejected. On the other hand, the result from the 2F  test  of the time period 
fixed effects estimation method, column 3, shows that the null hypothesis (that all time 
period effects are zero) can not be rejected.  
The above results for the F tests imply the following: (1) that the no fixed effects 
(simple panel data) estimation method (column 4) is preferred to the time fixed effects 
only estimation method (column 3), since 2F result from column 3 implies that the time 
fixed effects are significantly no different from zero; and (2) that both, individual and 
time fixed effects jointly (column 1) and individual fixed effects estimation methods 
(column2) are preferred to the no fixed effects estimation, since the 2F results from 
column 1 and 2 suggest that the individual and time fixed effects jointly and the 
individual fixed effects are significantly different from zero.118 Thus, we are left with two 
options for the most appropriate estimation method under weight matrix 2W , column 1 
fixed individual and time effects jointly or column 2, fixed individual effects only. In 
order to make this decision, it is necessary to observe the RSS results from Table 4, 
which shows that the lowest value for the residual sum of squares comes from the fixed 
individual effects only estimation method. Therefore, the most appropriate estimation 
method under 2W  is the individual fixed effects estimation method.
119
 
                                                 
118
 Appendix E refers to the Hausman specification test and it shows that the fixed effects approach is 
preferable to the random effects model since the latter presents inconsistent estimates. See Baltagi (2003).  
119
 See Appendix F for estimations under the individual fixed effects approach using two and three time 
period lags as an exercise. 
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Regarding the results under weight matrix 2W , column 2 shows that the serially 
lagged weighted corporate AETR 1, −tiWτ  affects in an expected, positive and significant 
form the present corporate, ti,τ . An increase of 1 percentage point (0.01 points) on last 
year’s weighted corporate AETR of competing countries leads to a rise on a given FDI 
host country corporate AETR of nearly 0.73415 percentage points (0.0073414524).120 
According to this result, countries react today to yesterday’s each others corporate AETR 
decisions when they are in similar economic conditions.  
By using weight matrix 2W  it is possible to answer one of the main questions in 
Chapter 5. Does the significance of global corporate tax competition depend on the fact 
that the economic distance of a country with its competitors is similar? Similarly, to 
question 1, the answer appears to be yes. The result obtained from the parameter α , 
indicates that the countries optimal corporate tax rate of a country depends significantly, 
positively and robustly on the corporate tax rates of other countries that have a similar 
economic condition.  
Regarding the variable denoting the serially lagged difference wage, 1, −tiL ,  the 
obtained coefficient from column 2 above indicates a not statistically significant effect 
over the corporate AETR. Also, note that the expected sign was not met. Hence, do 
countries compensate by offering lower AETRs if their wages are higher than those of its 
competitors? Similarly to the estimation under 1W , the answer is no. The obtained effect 
was statistically not different from zero, and did not match the theoretically expected 
sign. 
                                                 
120
 Data from Venezuela shows a 1 percentage point increase from 1995 to 1996. Under the estimations 
using 2W , the average increase of the sample is 0.01 points, or 1 percentage point.  
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The serially lagged openness to trade differences estimated coefficient, 1, −tiop , 
shows a non significant at a 95 percent level and non expected effect over the corporate 
AETR. Looking back to question 5 of Chapter 5; neither the similarity nor the disparity 
of trade policies between countries affect significantly the optimal corporate AETR 
decision of a country when the empirical estimation assumes high weights to countries 
that have similar economic conditions. 
The result from the serially lagged technology skill differences shows that the 
expected theoretical effect is met; nonetheless it was not statistically different from zero. 
Thus, according to question 7 of Chapter 5, the results from this estimation indicate that 
countries do not compensate significantly by offering lower AETRs if their technological 
skills are lower than those of their competitors.  
For the serially lagged foreign direct investment differences variable, 1, −tifd , the 
estimated parameter shows a statistically significant but not expected effect. The latter 
implies that countries that have a lower FDI inflow than the weighted average of their 
competitors last year, tend to decrease their corporate AETR in order to attract FDI. 
Consequently, the setting of a country’s optimal corporate AETR depends significantly 
on its position of FDI attraction relative to other countries. Nevertheless, in answer to 
question 6 from Chapter 5, countries do not decrease their corporate AETR in order to 
attract a higher amount of FDI inflows in relation to their own FDI inflows differences 
against their competing countries. 
The lagged government expenditure coefficient was not significant at a 95 percent 
level, but it matched the expected sign. Similarly, the serially lagged percent change at 
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the exchange rate coefficient was not statistically different from zero and the theoretically 
expected sign was not obtained.  
Again, the LM test for spatial correlation in the error terms ( λLM ) shows that he 
null hypothesis ( 0:0 =λH ) can not be rejected, this indicates that the spatial correlation 
in the error coefficient is statistically not different from zero. There is no spatial error 
dependence and we are facing spatial interaction.121 
Similar to the previous section, since the fixed individual effects resulted 
significantly different from zero when tested jointly; as a consequence, there are several 
factors natural to each country (not taken into account in this section) that could explain 
some part of the behavior of the corporate AETR. 
Concluding, countries corporate AETRs decisions react positively, significantly 
and robustly to other countries last year’s corporate AETRs when they are competing  in 
regards to economic position or area. 
 
Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 3W  
 
 
Matrix 3W  evaluates whether countries that face similar transportation costs to the 
FDI home country show a higher level of global corporate tax competition. For this 
reason, weight matrix 3W  is constructed providing higher weights when host countries 
have similar geographical distances from the FDI home country.122 
 
 
                                                 
121
 See Chapter 5 and Appendix C for further description.   
122
 The computation of this weight matrix is fully described in Chapter 5. 
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Table 5 
Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 3W  
 
No Fixed 
Individual and Time Individual Time Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
w τ i,t-1 (+) 0.5663070 0.4582160 0.7185726 0.5165254
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001)
L i,t-1 (-) 2.8020E-06 2.5383E-06 2.8493E-06 2.7078E-06
(0.00125) (0.00355) (0.24199) (0.26228)
op i,t-1 (+) -0.0617623 -0.0617646 -0.0975845 -0.0998978
(0.20466) (0.20692) (0.00001) (0.00000)
γ i,t-1 (+) 0.0002186 0.0002420 -0.0001730 -0.0001626
(0.22068) (0.18475) (0.21358) (0.23885)
fd i,t-1 (+) -8.9758E-07 -8.7453E-07 -9.5760E-07 -1.2225E-06
(0.03152) (0.04151) (0.22091) (0.10322)
ER i,t-1 (-) 1.6076E-06 -1.1462E-05 7.2841E-05 1.7585E-06
(0.91919) (0.61681) (0.38405) (0.95057)
GE i,t-1 (+) 0.2678937 0.2565451 -0.2617015 -0.2708811
(0.35600) (0.43388) (0.36162) (0.31301)
Constant -- -- -- 0.2046791
-- -- -- (0.00104)
R 2 within 0.19652 0.11345 0.24415 0.19640
RSS 12.12108 11.70512 32.42785 31.19494
F 1 37.86909 20.19826 52.81396 34.87938
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
F 2  20.88407 30.32346 -0.71726 --
(0.00000) (0.00000) (1.00000) --
F 3 29.93036 -- -- --
(0.00000) -- -- --
F 4      -1.77114 -- -- --
(1.00000) -- -- --
LM λ     1.18176 0.00019 15.38701 3.96442
(0.27700) (0.98892) (0.00009) (0.04647)
Fixed Effects
Variables
(Expected Signs)
Explanatory
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values obtained using Arellano’s (1987) robust serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
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The results from the empirical estimation of Equations 109, 110, 111, and 112 
under 3W  are presented in Table 5 above. Moreover, it shows the values for each of the 
LM tests and F tests detailed in Appendix C.  
As in the two previous subsections, it would be required to analyze which 
estimation method is the most suitable for weight matrix 3W . The 1F  tests results for the 
four cases were rejected, which indicate that all coefficients are significantly different 
from zero when tested jointly.   
As regards of the fixed individual and time effects jointly estimation (column 1), 
the null hypothesis of fixed individual and time effects significant equal to zero was 
rejected ( 2F  test  ). In the same way, 3F  test result, from the same estimation method, 
rejects the null hypothesis that all individual fixed effects are zero given the time fixed 
effects. In contrast, 4F  shows that the null hypothesis that all time fixed effects are zero 
given individual effects can not be rejected.  
The 2F  test from column 2, the fixed individual effects only estimation method, 
shows that the null hypothesis was rejected, hence, all the individual fixed effects are 
significant different from zero.  
Alternatively, column 3 2F  test  result shows that the null hypothesis that all time 
period effects are not different from zero can not be rejected.  
A deeper analysis show that the lowest RSS indicator comes from the fixed 
individual effects only estimation method. Consequently, taking into account the F tests 
results and the RSS from the four estimation methods presented at Table 5, the most 
appropriate estimation method under weight matrix 3W , is again the fixed individual 
effects only approach, column 2. 
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The coefficient for the serially lagged weighted corporate AETR effect, 1, −tiWτ , 
matches theoretically the expectation and it is significant different from zero. Intuitively, 
a decrease of 10 percentage points (0.10 points) on last year’s weighted corporate AETR 
of competing countries encourages a reduction on any given FDI host country (from the 
sample) corporate AETR of nearly 4.582 percentage points (0.045821595 points).123 
Hence, does the level of corporate global or world-wide tax competition depends 
significantly on the transportation costs (proxied by the geographical distance) between 
the host country and the investors’ home country?  The answer appears to be yes; 
countries react today significantly to yesterday’s each others corporate AETR decisions 
depending upon the transportation costs between the host country and the investors’ 
home countries.  
The serially lagged difference wage estimated coefficient, 1, −tiL ,  from column 2 
above shows a statistically significant effect over the corporate AETR. Intuitively, it 
would be expected that an increase at the lagged difference at wages (which implies that 
at country’s wages could be increasing in comparison to its competitors weighted wages) 
would encourage a reduction in any given country corporate AETR in order to 
compensate for the loss of competitiveness attributed to the differences at wage variable. 
Nonetheless, the obtained effect was not the expected, and the magnitude of it depends 
considerably on the amount of the change of the serially lagged difference at wage 
                                                 
123
 The sample shows a decrease of 10 percentage points in Argentina from 1987 to 1988, in Turkey from 
1988 to 1989, and in Costa Rica from 1984 to 1985, among others.  
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variable. For example, the sample average increase is 2,536 US dollars; this would cause 
an increase in the AETR of nearly 0.64 percentage points (0.00643858 points).124 
Therefore, do countries compensate by offering lower AETRs if their wages are 
higher than those of its competitors? Once more the answer is no, but for different 
reasons. Despite of being significant at a 95 percent level, the theoretically expected 
effect was not met.  
The result for the serially lagged openness to trade differences, 1, −tiop , shows that 
the effect was not statistically different from zero, and its sign does not match the 
expected. Hence, on the topic of question 5 of Chapter 5, the similarity of trade policies 
between countries does not affect significantly the optimal corporate AETR decision of a 
country.  
The serially lagged technology skill differences coefficient was not significant at 
a 95 percent level, but it matched the theoretical expected effect. Therefore, regarding 
question 7 of Chapter 5, countries do not significantly compensate by offering lower 
AETRs if their technological skills are lower than those of their competitors.  
In relation to the 1, −tifd coefficient, the obtained result was statistically different 
from zero; however it did not achieve the expected sign. Therefore, despite that the 1, −tifd  
coefficient resulted significant at 95 percent level, countries do not decrease their 
corporate AETR in order to attract FDI inflows depending on its position of FDI 
attraction relative to other countries. 
Regarding the serially lagged government expenditure coefficient, the results 
show that the expected sign was met; nonetheless it was not significant at a 95 percent 
                                                 
124
 On the other hand, the sample average decrease of the serially lagged difference at wage variable is 
2,370.6 US dollars. 
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level. Similarly to the estimation under weight matrixes 1W  and 2W , the magnitude of the 
effect was the second behind the estimated parameters of the serially lagged weighted 
corporate AETR.  
Additionally, the serially lagged percent change at the exchange rate coefficient 
was not statistically different from zero (at a 95 percent level). Even so, the theoretically 
expected sign was achieved. Thus, similarly to the two previous estimations for 
1, −tiER using different weight matrixes, the obtained effect was extremely small in 
magnitude.  
About the LM test for spatial correlation in the error terms ( λLM ), the obtained 
result indicates that the null hypothesis can not be rejected. The spatial correlation in the 
error coefficient is significantly equal to zero. Thus, there is no spatial dependence in the 
error terms. 125 
Note that since the fixed individual effects resulted statistically significant when 
tested together, there are several deterministic factors from each country not examined in 
this section that could explain the corporate AETR behavior. 
Summing up, countries corporate AETRs decisions depend significantly in other 
countries last year’s corporate AETRs when they have similar geographical distances 
between them and the FDI home countries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125
 See Chapter 5 and Appendix C for further description.   
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Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 4W  
 
 
The empirical estimation under weight matrix 4W  test whether geographical 
neighboring countries face greater tax competition than those located far away from each 
other. This matrix serves to answer if global corporate tax competition depends 
significantly on the geographical distance among the host countries; i.e., question four 
from Chapter 5.126 
Similarly to the three previous sections, it is necessary to get the most appropriate 
empirical estimation method under weight 4W . According to the estimations’ results 
from the fixed individual and time effects, fixed individual effects, time period effects 
and no fixed effects illustrated in Table 6 below; the 1F  tests from the four methods show 
a rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficients were statistically not different from 
zero when tested together. In column 1 of Table 6, the 2F  statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis that fixed individual and time effects were significantly equal to zero 
( 0== ti ηµ ). In the same way,  the 3F  test rejects that all individual fixed effects are 
zero given time effects ( 0=iµ , 0≠tη ). On the contrary, 4F  does not reject the null 
hypothesis that all time fixed effects are zero when given the individual effects.  
With respect to the fixed individual effects only estimation method, the 2F  test 
result implies that the null hypothesis was rejected. Thus, the fixed individual effects are 
significant different from zero. Quite the reverse occurs for the 2F  test from the fixed 
time effects estimation method, column 3, where its result show that all time period 
effects are significantly equal to zero.  
                                                 
126
 For a further description of how to compute this weight matrix see Chapter 5. 
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Table 6 
Estimation Results using Weight Matrix 4W  
 
No Fixed 
Individual and Time Individual Time Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
w τ i,t-1 (+) 0.6835585 0.6216420 0.7742964 0.5477322
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00064)
L i,t-1 (-) 1.8529E-06 1.6562E-06 1.6019E-06 1.4610E-06
(0.05646) (0.08325) (0.44416) (0.46422)
op i,t-1 (+) -0.0377291 -0.0374149 -0.1183671 -0.1185545
(0.38076) (0.39408) (0.00000) (0.00000)
γ i,t-1 (+) 0.0002730 0.0002750 -0.0000954 -0.0001038
(0.12607) (0.12404) (0.47412) (0.41489)
fd i,t-1 (+) -9.6939E-07 -9.7184E-07 -1.1581E-06 -1.3538E-06
(0.03903) (0.03858) (0.17891) (0.10477)
ER i,t-1 (-) 8.9367E-06 -7.4192E-06 8.4045E-05 -6.7628E-06
(0.54716) (0.73030) (0.33339) (0.81392)
GE i,t-1 (+) 0.2306899 0.2390679 -0.4914919 -0.3774506
(0.37827) (0.41233) (0.08474) (0.14491)
Constant -- -- -- 0.2092107
-- -- -- (0.00133)
R 2 within 0.21774 0.13255 0.25058 0.20162
RSS 11.80091 11.45298 32.15228 30.99212
F 1 43.09719 24.11763 54.66790 36.04163
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
F 2  21.58262 31.06944 -0.68073 --
(0.00000) (0.00000) (1.00000) --
F 3 30.80990 -- -- --
(0.00000) -- -- --
F 4      -1.52168 -- -- --
(1.00000) -- -- --
LM λ     0.48010 0.44814 13.95895 5.62633
(0.48838) (0.50322) (0.00019) (0.01769)
Fixed Effects
Variables
(Expected Signs)
Explanatory
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values obtained using Arellano’s (1987) robust serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
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The above tests help us to chose the most appropriate estimation method under 
weight matrix 4W . Note that the 2F  test from column 3 implies that the no fixed effects 
estimation method is preferred to the time period fixed effects method. Furthermore, 2F  
from column 2 implies that the fixed individual and time period effects estimation 
method is preferred to the no fixed effects approach. Finally, it remains to evaluate two 
methods, fixed individual and time period effects jointly approach and the fixed 
individual effects. Similarly to the three previous sections, the decisive argument will be 
the lowest RSS in order to choose between these estimation methods. Hence, the most 
appropriate estimation method under weight matrix 4W  is again the fixed individual 
effects only, column 2 from Table 6.    
According to the results below, an increase of 10 percentage points (0.10 points) 
on last year’s weighted corporate AETR of competing countries provokes a positive 
effect on any given FDI host country corporate AETR (of the sample) at nearly 6.2164 
percentage points (0.06216420).127 Hence, the competing countries weighted serially 
lagged corporate AETR, 1, −tiWτ , has a positive, expected, robust and significant effect 
over any given FDI host country corporate AETR, ti,τ . This result indicates that countries 
react to each others serially lagged and weighted corporate AETR decisions when they 
are located in a geographically neighboring condition.  
Hence, does the significance of global corporate tax competition depend on the 
geographical distance among the host countries? Similarly to the previous results under 
each weight matrix, the answer appears to be yes. The estimations show that countries 
                                                 
127
 In the sample, from 1985 to 1986 Egypt shows an increase of nearly 10 percentage points on last year’s 
weighted corporate AETR of competing countries. 
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change their corporate AETR decisions depending on last year’s neighbors’ tax decisions. 
This finding supports other studies from the tax competition literature.128  
The difference at wage coefficient result, which measures the deviation of the 
own country wages from the weighted wages of competing countries, shows a non-
expected positive effect over the FDI host country corporate AETR, ti,τ . The parameter 
resulted not significant at a 95 percent level but significant at a 90 percent level. The 
sample average increase of last year’s difference at wage variable is 2,630.8 US dollars; 
this would encourage a rise at the current corporate AETR setting at about 0.004357245 
points, or 0.4357245 percentage points.  
Again, it is important to answer question 8 from Chapter 5. Do countries 
compensate by offering lower AETRs if their wages are higher than those of its 
competitors? Similarly to the previous three estimations, the answer is no. The obtained 
effect was not the expected from the theory. Countries appear to significantly increase the 
corporate AETR at an evidence of a higher own wage in comparison to its competitors. 
The serially lagged openness to trade differences, 1, −tiop , result which serves to 
answer question 5 of Chapter 5,  shows a non-significant and non-expected effect over 
the corporate AETR. Consequently, the serially lagged similarity of trade policies 
between countries does not affect the setting of a corporate AETR. 
The coefficient from the technology skill differences, 1, −tiγ , implies that the 
expected theoretical effect is met, however it is not significant at a 95 percent level. Thus, 
countries do not compensate by offering lower AETRs if their technological skills are 
                                                 
128
 See Chapter 2 for further detail. 
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lower than those of their competitors at a 95 percent confidence level; this answers 
question seven of Chapter 5.  
The serially lagged foreign direct investment inflow differences variable, 1, −tifd , 
result indicates a significant, negative (non expected) effect over the corporate AETRs. 
Intuitively, this outcome implies that an increase at the difference between any given 
country FDI inflow against the weighted average of their competitors will encourage a 
decrease in its corporate AETR in order to attract FDI. The theory indicates that if 
01, <−tifd  country i FDI inflows will be smaller than the weighted FDI inflows of its 
competing countries j, and regarding its effects over the AETR it might oblige a decrease 
in the corporate AETR of country i at time t since the policymakers and politicians will 
react with a one period lag. Therefore, despite of being considerable in magnitude at an 
increase of 1 billion dollars at the FDI inflows, the theoretical effect was not met and 
countries do not appear to offer an incentive in terms of a lower corporate AETR (when 
taking into account their FDI inflows difference against its competitors) in order to attract 
an additional amount of FDI inflow.  
Regarding the serially lagged government expenditure variable, the coefficient 
result was not significant at a 95 percent level, however it matches the expected sign and 
the size of the effect is considerable. Similarly, the serially lagged percent change at the 
exchange rate coefficient was not significant at a 95 percent level and the size of the 
effect was relatively small. However, opposite to the two previous estimations under 
weight matrixes 1W  and 2W , and similarly to the estimation under 3W ,  the effect 
matched the theoretically expected sign.  
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The LM test for spatial correlation in the error terms ( λLM ) from column 2 shows 
that the null hypothesis ( 0:0 =λH ) can not be rejected. Hence, the spatial correlation in 
the error coefficient is significantly not different from zero and there is no spatial error 
dependence. 129 
In addition, since the fixed individual effects turned out to be significantly 
different from zero, there are several deterministic factors inherent to every country of the 
sample that could explain (in part) the corporate AETR setting. Concluding, it results 
important to note that according to the literature on corporate tax competition, countries 
react to each others tax rates depending upon their geographical position. The finding 
from this estimation corroborates those results.  
  
Comparison of the Estimation Results 
 
 
This section shows a comparison among the fixed individual effects estimation 
methods previously presented under each of the four weight matrixes. Recall from 
previous sections that this method was selected given its good performance under each of 
the four weight matrixes. Table 7 presents the comparison. 
As it can be noted below, the results from the serially lagged difference wage 
variable indicate that the expected effect was not met for none of the four approaches. 
Furthermore, neither the estimation under 1W , nor the estimation under 2W  presented 
significant results at least at a 90 percent level. Quite the opposite occurs with the 
                                                 
129
 See Chapter 5 and Appendix C for further description.   
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estimation under 3W  and 4W , where both coefficients resulted significant at a 95 and 90 
percent levels, respectively.  
Table 7 
Comparison among the Estimation Results 
 
W 1 W 2 W 3 W 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
w τ i,t-1 (+) 0.7508322 0.7341452 0.4582160 0.6216420
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
L i,t-1 (-) 1.1967E-06 1.4611E-06 2.5383E-06 1.6562E-06
(0.17126) (0.10722) (0.00355) (0.08325)
op i,t-1 (+) -0.0497860 -0.0531708 -0.0617646 -0.0374149
(0.31282) (0.27481) (0.20692) (0.39408)
γ i,t-1 (+) 0.0002197 0.0002728 0.0002420 0.0002750
(0.21563) (0.18186) (0.18475) (0.12404)
fd i,t-1 (+) -1.0904E-06 -1.1064E-06 -8.7453E-07 -9.7184E-07
(0.01943) (0.01673) (0.04151) (0.03858)
ER i,t-1 (-) 7.6403E-06 4.8765E-06 -1.1462E-05 -7.4192E-06
(0.70977) (0.81649) (0.61681) (0.73030)
GE i,t-1 (+) 0.2647555 0.2366965 0.2565451 0.2390679
(0.34265) (0.39693) (0.43388) (0.41233)
R 2 within 0.14065 0.14190 0.11345 0.13255
RSS 11.34608 11.32952 11.70512 11.45298
Variables
(Expected Signs)
Explanatory Fixed Individual Effects
 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values obtained using Arellano’s (1987) robust serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
 
Concerning the magnitude of the effect, at first sight it could be assumed as not 
robust given that at a change of 1 US dollar in last year’s difference at wages will induce 
to a change at the current corporate AETR of 0.0000025383089 points from the 
parameter of the estimation under 3W . However, a change in the difference at wages 
variable could be of nearly 1,000 US dollars or 10,000 US dollars, causing a change at 
the corporate AETR of 0.0025383089 points (0.25383089 percentage points) or  
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0.025383089 points (2.5383089 percentage points), respectively.130 So, in this sense, the 
magnitude of the effect could be not that insignificant at the setting of a corporate AETR. 
In fact, observe that the highest parameter effect comes from the estimation 
corresponding to countries that have similar transportation costs, 3W . 
These findings indicate that countries do not significantly internalize, in the 
decision making of their corporate AETR, the serially lagged difference of their wage 
against the weighted average of the competing countries when these are assumed to 
compete against each other without regarding any position ( 1W ), and when countries are 
assumed to compete against those which have similar economic conditions ( 2W ).  
Nonetheless, countries show some level of internalization of the serially lagged 
difference at wages variable when they assume a tax competition regarding the 
geographical neighboring condition ( 4W ) and similarity in transportation costs ( 3W ); but 
again, the size of such internalization depends on the amount of the change in the serially 
lagged difference wage variable.  
An explanation for these findings could be that countries, regionally competing in 
corporate average effective taxes and those competing at a similar transportation costs 
scheme, when facing a decrease at the serially lagged difference at wages variable, they 
could try to obtain an additional advantage to attract foreign direct investment inflows by 
reducing their current corporate AETRs. This argument, despite of being contrary to the 
theoretical expected effect, has a considerable degree of economic logic. Nonetheless, 
when an increase at the lagged difference at wages variable is present governments’ 
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 In the sample under 3W , Belgium showed an increase in 1, −tiL of 1,058 US dollars from 1992 to 1993, 
while Austria presented an increase of nearly 10,000 US dollars from 1993 to 1994. 
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policy makers encourage a rise at the current corporate AETR, and the reasoning behind 
that behavior is not comprehensible.  
Consequently, the magnitude, and signs of the effects from the weighting schemes 
3W  and 4W  estimations, and why only these schemes are significant and not also 1W  and 
2W ,  remain a puzzle.  
About the serially lagged openness to trade differences variable, the results show 
that none of the parameters from the four approaches were significant at least at an 80 
percent level, and moreover, they did not meet the expected sign. Thus, significantly, 
countries do not take into account their difference in openness to trade to the weighted 
average of other countries in the decision making of their tax package regarding the 
corporate AETR for none of the four tax competition weights’ assumptions. 
Regarding the serially lagged technological skills variable, once more the 
obtained coefficients under each weight matrix were not statistically different from zero. 
However, the expected sign was met in the four cases.131 As a result from the four 
examined cases, contrary to the theory, the serially lagged technological skill differences 
variables are not taken into account in a significant way in the setting of the corporate 
AETRs. 
                                                 
131
 It is important to note that at least at an 87 percent level the highest effect over the corporate AETRs 
comes from the estimation under 4W , that is, the weight matrix regarding the geographically neighboring 
condition weighting approach, while the lowest effect comes from the equally weighted scheme. On the 
other hand, the next effect in size refers to 2W , the weight matrix regarding to the similar economical 
position or world-wide tax competition weighting approach. The obtained magnitudes tend to be not that 
unimportant if we assume that the technology skills difference variable is measured as telephone mainlines 
per 1,000 people, so a maximum change at the 1, −tiγ  could be of nearly 70 mainlines, encouraging a change 
at the current corporate AETR at an 87 percent level of confidence of almost 0.0192482 points, or 1.92482 
percentage points, under the 4W  estimation approach. The maximum change at the technology skills 
difference is assumed at 70 mainlines per 1,000 people since that amount corresponds to the greater change 
at the variable sample.   
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With regard to the foreign direct investment inflows differences variables, despite 
of being significant at a 95 percent level in the four estimations, the results did not meet 
the expected sign. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effects was moderate if we assume 
a high change at 1, −tifd . For example, at a decrease of last year’s FDI inflows differences 
variable of nearly 1 billion US dollars (which is common in the sample) will encourage 
an increase at the current corporate AETR of 0.001090445, 0.001106372, 0.000874525, 
and 0.000971841 points for the estimations under 1W , 2W , 3W , and 4W , respectively.
132
 It 
is obvious that the greater effect comes from the estimation under the similar economic 
conditions weighting approach, 2W , while the smallest regards the similar transportation 
costs weighting scheme, 3W .  
Despite of the significance and size of the effects, these findings contradict the 
theory that if a country recognizes a last period’s smaller FDI inflow in comparison to its 
competitors, it will push for a decrease in the corporate AETR as an incentive for the 
export oriented firms to locate in that country. Hence, in a strict position, countries do not 
tend to reduce their corporate AETR in order to attract a higher amount of FDI inflows 
depending on their position of foreign direct investment attraction relative to other 
countries.  
A logical economic explanation for these findings could be that countries (under 
the four weighting schemes) when facing an increase in 1, −tifd  could try to obtain an 
additional advantage to attract more FDI inflows in comparison to their competing 
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 For example, a change of last year’s FDI inflows differences variable of nearly 1 billion US dollars 
appears in the sample in: (1) under 1W  Argentina (1991-1992), Brazil (1988-1989), and Hong Kong (1998-
1999); (2) under 2W  Chile  (1990-1991) and Greece (1995-1996); (3) under 3W   India (1995-1996), and 
Israel (2000-2001); and (4) under 4W  Ireland (1997-1998), and Ecuador (1997-1998), among others.  
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countries by reducing their current corporate AETRs. But again, opposing the theory and 
any logical economic explanation, when a decrease at the lagged difference at FDI 
inflows variable is present, governments’ policy makers encourage a rise at the current 
corporate AETR, and the reasoning behind that behavior is not comprehended.  
As a result, the significance, signs, and magnitudes of the effects from the 
estimations for the four weighting schemes 1W , 2W , 3W , and 4W  is a puzzle.  
Now, when comparing the serially lagged percent change at the exchange rate 
variables from the four weighting scheme cases, all the parameters resulted not 
statistically significant even at a 50 percent confidence level. Two parameters results 
matched the theoretically expected sign: (1) the estimation under 3W , the similar 
transportation costs weighting scheme; and (2) the estimation under 4W , the 
geographically neighboring condition approach. Bear in mind from Chapter 5 that an 
increase in 1, −tiER is defined as an appreciation of the national currency against the US 
dollar, which in turn could induce to a decrease at the current corporate AETR setting as 
an incentive, that is, the theory establishes a negative expected effect. Thus, the estimated 
coefficients signs for these two weighting schemes were negative in accordance with the 
theory.   
Contrary to the above, the parameters regarding the equally weighted approach 
( 1W ) and the similar economic condition weighting scheme ( 2W ) did not meet the 
theoretical expected signs. Furthermore, the size of the effects for the four cases was 
relatively small in order to influence considerably the setting of the corporate AETRs. So, 
the lagged percent change at the exchange rate does not significantly affect the setting of 
the current AETRs for neither of the estimations regarding the four weighting methods.  
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Evaluating the serially lagged government expenditure variables, although the 
expected signs were met and the size of these were considerable in magnitude, none of 
the four estimations presented statistically significant results. There are several possible 
explanations behind the lack of response of the corporate AETR to a raise in last year’s 
government expenditure. First, an increase in 1, −tiGE   could respond to higher 
government revenues in period 1−t , or before. Second, governments could increase 
other taxes such as personal, consumption, property, etc. in period 1−t , t , both, or 
further ahead, in order to compensate for the raise in government expenditure. Third, 
governments could have paid for the raise in 1, −tiGE  by increasing the level of 
indebtedness; this of course, would be translated later into rising government revenue for 
debt payments, but the change in the government revenues does not necessarily has come 
from increasing the corporate AETR.  Hence, serially lagged government expenditure 
does not significantly affect the setting of the current corporate AETRs.  
Turning now to the center point of the study, the four coefficients of the serially 
lagged weighted corporate AETRs, 1, −tiWτ , resulted significant at a very high confidence 
level (99 percent). They matched the expected positive sign which implies that a decrease 
at last year’s weighted corporate AETR from the competitors would encourage a decrease 
at the own country corporate AETR. Additionally, the effects were considerable in size in 
order to be taken into account at the setting of the current corporate AETR. The highest 
effect corresponds to the same weights scheme 1W  with a value of 0.75083217; the 
second in size refers to the similar economic condition or global tax competition scheme 
2W  with 0.73414524; the third regards the geographically neighboring condition 
approach 4W with 0.62164201; and the lowest in size effect corresponds to the similar 
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transportation costs weighting method 3W  with 0.45821595. It is important to observe 
that the difference between the highest effect and the second in size is just 0.0166869 
points, while the difference between the second and third in size is much larger, with 
nearly 0.1125032 points. Obviously, the difference between the  1, −tiWτ  parameters from 
4W  and 3W  is larger than the two before, at about 0.1634261 points. 
As a result of the numbers above, countries facing similar costs of transportation 
tend to show some level of corporate tax rate competition since they react significantly to 
each others last period’s weighted corporate AETRs by changing their decision of the 
current corporate AETR.133 The parameter obtained from the estimation under 3W  shows 
that countries could be competing against each other since the export oriented firms from 
the FDI home countries could find themselves indifferent of where to locate given that 
they face similar transportation costs. Hence, FDI host countries internalize that fact and 
try to modify that indifference by changing their corporate AETRs. As a consequence, a 
corporate tax competition scheme appears to be present among those countries. 
On the other hand, the empirical literature on tax competition consulted for this 
study suggests that countries tend to engage in regional corporate tax competition in 
order to attract FDI inflows.134 In this sense, the significant, positive and robust obtained 
coefficient from the estimation under 4W  (which implies high weights to geographically 
neighboring located countries) confirms those empirical findings. Thus, countries located 
as geographical neighbors face some level of corporate tax competition between them. 
The intuition regards that export oriented firms are indifferent on where to locate if their 
                                                 
133
 Recall that transportation costs weighting scheme are proxied by the geographical distance of the FDI 
host countries to the FDI home countries. See Chapter 5 for further detail. 
134
 See Chapter 3. 
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target location is a given region. As a consequence, countries are sensitive to this 
indifference and are inclined to provide an incentive in terms of a lower corporate AETR.    
The central point of this study regards examining the possibility that a global or 
world-wide corporate tax competition among countries can be present. As explained 
previously at the study, no literature was found that empirically tested corporate tax 
competition between countries with an economic condition alike. The empirical 
estimations under weight matrix 2W  imply providing high weights to countries that have 
a similar economic position. Hence, as it can be observed in Table 7, the significance, 
positive effect, and magnitude of the estimated 1, −tiWτ   coefficient under 2W  represents 
an indication that countries appear to face some degree of corporate tax competition 
among those that have similar economic conditions.  
The explanation behind this finding regards that export oriented firms search for 
the most profitable after tax location for their investments taking into account the whole 
package of costs, such as labor costs, capital costs, and transportation costs, but also the 
optimal level of labor and capital, as well as taxes, among other deterministic factors. The 
most profitable location does not require to be in the neighboring country of where the 
firm is already located, and in fact it could be in a completely different continent if the 
costs determine so. Countries, on the other hand, seek to attract FDI inflows by 
increasing their relative competitiveness; this is determined by infrastructure, wages, 
transportation costs, openness to trade, taxes, skills, technology, and availability of labor, 
among other factors. For example, a country in Asia could be offering higher after tax 
profits to an export oriented firm already located in America and induce that firm to 
relocate. Certainly, the country in Asia would be more attractive than that in America for 
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the relocation to occur. Recall that there are factors such as wages that depend on labor 
market conditions rather than on governments’ policymakers’ decisions, and others such 
as infrastructure, skills and technology that can not be changed in a short period of time 
(they are fixed at the short run). The latter leaves as viable options to decrease the 
countries’ corporate tax rate or to increase the rate of allowance. Hence, the higher 
attractiveness could come from lower corporate average effective tax rates. Therefore, 
according to the estimation results, countries in different geographical areas (not 
geographical neighbors) appear to compete to attract FDI by changing their corporate 
AETRs taking as a reference their similar economic conditions competitors corporate 
AETRs. Countries internalize in their decision making that export oriented firms search 
for a given level of conditions that could maximize their after tax profits, which in the 
short run can be translated into similar economic conditions. In this sense, is in this form 
that a global or world-wide tax competition structure could take place.  
In addition, note that the level of influence (the higher effect) is greater for the 
global tax competition framework than that regarding the regional tax competition, and 
that concerning similar transportation costs. When countries take into account their 
economic position and that of their competitors, corporate tax competition becomes 
stronger than when countries take into account the regional position or the similarity in 
transportation costs of their competitors.  
Turning now to the estimation obtained from the same weights scheme 1W , the 
serially lagged weighted corporate AETR coefficient confirms the presence of corporate 
tax competition among all countries from the sample. Additionally, observe that the 
parameter  1, −tiWτ  has a greater influence on the setting of the current corporate AETR 
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than the other three parameters from the different weightings schemes. This finding could 
imply that countries tend to react to each others decisions about the corporate tax rates 
assuming several factors, such as: the similar transportation costs, the geographically 
neighboring condition, and the similar economical condition, among others. In other 
words, the same weights approach (estimation under 1W ) could group and synthesize 
several distinctive factors from each of the 3 weighting schemes that could explain the 
highest value of this effect.  
 
Summary 
 
 
This chapter starts with a brief description of the sample a several determinant 
assumptions used at this study; subsequently the estimation results were presented. The 
empirical evaluation regarded four estimation methods for each of the four weight 
matrixes: (1) fixed individual and time effects jointly, Equation 109; (2) fixed individual 
effects only, Equation 110; (3) fixed time effects only, Equation 111; and (4) no fixed 
effects: panel data, Equation 112.  
After testing the properties and fit of each of the 16 estimated equations (four 
methods under four weight matrixes), the most appropriate estimation method given its 
results was the fixed individual effects only approach. In this context, the results can be 
summarized as follows: 
First, countries do not compensate by offering lower AETRs if their wages are 
higher than those of their competitors. Governments’ policymakers do not significantly 
internalize, in the decision making of their corporate AETR, the serially lagged difference 
of the own country wage against the weighted average of its competing countries when 
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these are assumed to compete against each other without regarding any position ( 1W ), 
and when countries are assumed to compete against those which have similar economic 
conditions ( 2W ).  Countries show some degree of internalization of the serially lagged 
difference at wages variable when they assume a tax competition regarding the 
geographical neighboring condition ( 4W ) and similarity in transportation costs ( 3W ); but 
again, the size of such internalization depends on the change in the difference between 
wages.   
Second, countries do not take into account their difference in openness to trade to 
the weighted average of other countries in the decision making of their tax package 
regarding the corporate AETR for none of the four tax competition weights’ assumptions. 
Third, resulting from the four examined cases, contrary to the theory, the serially 
lagged technological skill differences variables are not taken into account in a statistically 
significant way in the setting of the corporate AETRs. 
Fourth, countries do not tend to reduce their corporate AETR rate in order to 
attract a higher amount of FDI inflows depending on their position of foreign direct 
investment attraction relative to other countries.  
Fifth, the current corporate AETR does not depend significantly on the serially 
lagged percent change at the exchange rate.  
Sixth, serially lagged government expenditure does not significantly affect the 
setting of the current corporate AETRs.  
Seventh, the four coefficients of the serially lagged weighted corporate AETRs, 
1, −tiWτ , resulted significant at a very high confidence level; they matched the expected 
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positive sign and the effects were considerable in size in order to be taken into account at 
the setting of the current corporate AETR. 
Eighth, countries facing similar costs of transportation tend to show some level of 
corporate tax rate competition since they react significantly to each others last period’s 
weighted corporate AETRs by changing their decision of the current corporate AETR.  
Ninth, countries located at the same region or area (geographical neighbors) 
appear to face some level of corporate tax competition between them confirming the 
findings from the empirical literature on tax competition consulted for this study.  
Tenth, the significance, positive effect, and magnitude of the estimated 1, −tiWτ   
coefficient under 2W  represents an indication that countries appear to face some degree 
of corporate tax competition among those that have similar economic conditions. Thus, 
global or world-wide tax competition in corporate AETRs for export oriented firms could 
be present.  
Eleventh, the serially lagged weighted corporate AETR coefficient obtained from 
the estimation under 1W  confirms the presence of corporate tax competition among all 
countries from the sample.  
Twelfth, the greatest influence on the setting of the current corporate AETR 
comes from the same weights approach. The latter could imply that countries tend to 
react to each others corporate tax rate settings assuming different factors: similarity in 
transportation costs, a geographical neighboring condition, and a similar economic 
condition. The same weights approach could be synthesizing several distinctive factors 
from each of the 3 weighting schemes that could be explaining the highest value of the 
estimated effect.  
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 Finally, it results important to note that the level of competition is greater for the 
global tax competition framework than the one regarding the regional tax competition, 
and that concerning similar transportation costs. Corporate tax competition becomes 
stronger when governments consider their economic position and that of their 
competitors, than when they take into account the similarity in transportation costs and 
regional position of their competitors. 
Additionally, since the fixed individual effects were significant, there are several 
factors from each country, not examined in this section, which could help explain the 
corporate AETR behavior. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The principal objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the presence of a global 
or world-wide corporate tax competition scheme among countries. Global or world-wide 
corporate tax competition was defined as uncooperative tax policy reactions between 
governments of different countries of the world not necessarily near each other 
geographically, but in similar economic conditions and with the purpose to influence the 
allocation of a mobile tax base; in this case export oriented foreign direct investment. In a 
simple form, global tax competition is thought as a tax competition among different 
countries of the world without providing a significant importance to the geographical 
location of them, but considering substantially their economic position. 
Recall that export oriented firms’ purpose is to find and use particular and specific 
resources at a lower real cost in foreign countries, and then export the output produced to 
the home country or third countries. On the other hand, market oriented investments aim 
to set up enterprises in a particular country to supply goods and services to the local 
market. Work by Reuber (1973), Guisinger (1985), and Coyne (1994), indicate that 
export oriented firms operate in highly competitive markets with very slim margins, and 
that these firms are often highly mobile, and more likely to compare taxes across 
alternative locations. Hence, taxes are an important part of export oriented firms’ cost 
structure, and these companies can easily move to take advantage of more favorable tax 
regimes. In this case, tax incentives can compensate for resource obstacles making the 
country more attractive to investors, and consequently more competitive.  
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The theoretical model was developed following Devereux, Lockwood, and 
Redoano (2002) framework, but their framework was expanded to allow for a third 
country, workers, two types of entrepreneurs and capital, geographical distance between 
countries, transportation costs, labor skills, and technology skills. The theoretical model 
intents to make understandable the forces that generate competition between countries’ 
corporate tax policies. The aim of the model regards finding optimal corporate tax rates 
that will serve as governments’ reaction functions. Commonly, geographically separated 
countries are thought as non-reactionary since distance puts a barrier between their 
responses. Nonetheless, the theoretical model provides an insight into the fact that 
governments, when competing for export oriented FDI, take into account the 
geographical distance of their competing countries to the investors’ home country, as 
well as the income distance or economic condition between each other, at the time of 
deciding their optimal statutory corporate tax rate.  
However, the statutory corporate tax rates were discarded since their computation 
do not take into account the existence of tax holidays, depreciation schedules, inflation 
adjustments, inventory allowance systems, availability of credits for investment, and 
deductibility of categories of business expenses. So, we searched within the literature for 
the most appropriate measure for an effective corporate tax rate. Two methods were 
analyzed: the marginal effective tax rate and the average effective tax rate. The 
computation of the first presented several important difficulties since it required detailed 
sectoral information on tax provisions, deductions, exemptions, special depreciation 
structures, and other variables of economic influence, which could have diverse 
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definitions in each country. So, the corporate average effective tax rate measure was 
selected given its properties and suitability to our work. 
The empirical model was developed following Revelli (2000), Brueckner and 
Saavedra (2001), Hayashi and Boadway (2001), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002), 
Cavlovic and Jackson (2003), and Brueckner (2003) methodologies. It represents a 
derivation from the spatial econometric model which was denoted as a pure space-
recursive model in Anselin (1999) and as a lagged spatial dependence model in Lopez 
and Chasco (2004).   
Four weight matrixes were constructed in order to evaluate the influence the 
competing countries’ corporate AETRs on the own country AETR. Weight matrix 1W  
assumed equal weights to every country. Matrix 2W  internalized the definition of global 
corporate tax competition and assigned high weights to countries with similar economic 
conditions. Weight matrix 3W  assumed that countries could face some degree of tax 
competition among those that have similar transportation costs to the FDI home 
countries. Finally, matrix 4W  assigns high weights to those countries residing at 
geographically neighboring conditions, attempting to recreate the current literature on 
regional corporate tax competition. 
The sample covered 53 countries from different areas of the world for a time 
period of 19 years, from 1984 to 2002.  
The empirical evaluation regarded four estimation methods for each of the four 
weight matrixes: fixed individual and time effects jointly, fixed individual effects only, 
fixed time effects only, and no fixed effects (simple panel data). After evaluating each of 
  
 
189 
the 16 equation results, the fixed individual effects only approach was the most 
appropriate estimation method for the four weight matrixes. 
The results in Chapter 6 show that when governments are assumed to compete 
against each other without regarding any position ( 1W ), and against those which have 
similar economic conditions ( 2W ), countries of the sample do not consider, in the 
decision making of their corporate AETR, the serially lagged difference of their wage 
against the weighted average of the competing countries. In contrast, countries show a 
significant degree of internalization of the 1, −tiL  variable in the optimal corporate AETR, 
when a tax competition scheme regarding the geographical neighboring condition ( 4W ) 
and similarity in transportation costs ( 3W ) are assumed. However, the size of such 
internalization depends on the amount of the change in 1, −tiL . Despite that the coefficients 
from the estimations from the geographical neighboring condition and similarity in 
transportation costs were statistically significant; the expected sign were not met for none 
of the four cases.  
 A possible explanation for the results above could be that at the presence of a 
decrease at the serially lagged difference at wage variable, when we assume a tax 
competition under a similar transportation costs scheme and that regarding the 
geographical neighboring condition, governments could try to take an additional 
advantage to attract FDI inflows by decreasing their current corporate AETRs. Despite of 
opposing the expected theoretical effect, this argument has a considerable degree of 
economic logic. Nonetheless, when an increase at the lagged difference at wages variable 
is present, governments’ policy makers encourage an increase at the current corporate 
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AETR, and the reasoning behind that behavior can not be explained in a economic 
comprehensible form.  
Consequently, it remains a puzzle why the estimation from the weighting schemes 
3W  and 4W  were statistically significant and not also 1W  and 2W .  
As a conclusion, countries do not compensate by offering lower AETRs if their 
wages are higher than those of their competitors when the weighting assumptions regard 
similar economic conditions, similar transportation costs, geographically neighboring 
conditions and the same weights to every country.  
Second, countries do not take into account in the decision making of the corporate 
AETR the serially lagged difference in openness to trade. The obtained coefficients from 
the equally weighted, the similar economic condition weighted, the similar transportation 
costs weighted, and the geographically neighboring condition weighted were not 
statistically significant, did not meet the theoretical expected effect and their magnitude 
was not robust. 
Third, resulting from the four examined cases, despite of matching the theoretical 
expected sign, the serially lagged technological skill differences variables are not taken 
into account in a statistically significant way in the setting of the current corporate 
AETRs. This fact contradicts the theory which indicates that countries tend to offer some 
compensation in order to attract FDI inflows when their technological skills are smaller 
than those of their competitors.  
Fourth, despite of the significance and size of the serially lagged difference at FDI 
inflows effects, the theory regarding this variable’s effect is contradicted. If a country 
recognizes that in the last period received a smaller inflow of FDI in comparison to its 
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competitors, it will push for a reduction in its corporate AETR in order to provide an 
incentive for the export oriented firms to come and locate in that country or not move 
from it. Consequently, countries appear to not decrease their corporate AETR rate as an 
incentive in order to attract a higher amount of FDI inflows depending on their position 
of foreign direct investment attraction relative to other countries.  
A explanation for these findings could be that, at an increase in 1, −tifd , countries 
could try to attract more FDI inflows in comparison to their competing countries by 
reducing their current corporate AETRs. But again, when a decrease at the lagged 
difference at FDI inflows variable is present, governments’ policy makers encourage a 
rise at the current corporate AETR opposing the theory and any logical economic 
explanation. As a result, the significance, signs, and magnitudes of the effects from the 
estimations for the four weighting schemes 1W , 2W , 3W , and 4W  are also a puzzle. 
Fifth, by making a comparison at the 1, −tiER  estimated parameters from the four 
weighting scheme cases, the following conclusions arise: (1) all the coefficients resulted 
not statistically different from zero; (2) the parameters obtained from the estimations 
under the similar transportation costs weighting scheme ( 3W ) and the geographically 
neighboring condition approach ( 4W ) matched the theoretically expected sign; and (3) the 
parameters regarding the equally weighted approach ( 1W ) and the similar economic 
condition weighting scheme ( 2W ) did not meet the expectations from the theory. Hence, 
the lagged percent change at the exchange rate does not affect significantly the setting of 
the current AETRs for neither of the estimations regarding the four weighting methods.  
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Sixth, although the expected signs were met for the serially lagged government 
expenditure coefficient under each weight matrix, the estimated parameters turned out 
statistically not different from zero. Hence, serially lagged government expenditure does 
not significantly affect the setting of the current corporate AETRs.  
Seventh, the four coefficients of the serially lagged weighted corporate AETRs, 
1, −tiWτ , resulted significant at a very high confidence level; they matched the expected 
positive sign, and the effects were considerable in size in order to be taken into account at 
the setting of the current corporate AETR. 
Eighth, countries facing similar costs of transportation appear to show corporate 
tax rate competition since they react in a significant form to each others last period’s 
weighted corporate AETRs by changing their current corporate AETR setting.  
Ninth, countries located at the same region or area face some level of corporate 
tax competition between them confirming the findings from the empirical literature on 
tax competition consulted for this study.  
Tenth, since the 1, −tiWτ   estimated coefficient under 2W  was statistically 
significant, matched the expected sign and its magnitude was robust, countries tend to 
face a significant degree of corporate tax competition among those that have similar 
economic conditions. As a consequence, countries of the sample show a global or world-
wide tax competition in corporate AETRs behavior for export oriented firms.  
Eleventh, the serially lagged weighted corporate AETR coefficient obtained from 
the estimation under 1W  confirms a corporate tax competition behavior among all 
countries from the sample.  
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Different conclusions arise when taking into account the above findings. One of 
them considers that the level of competition is greater for the global tax competition 
framework than that regarding the regional tax competition, and that concerning similar 
transportation costs. When countries take into account their economic position and that of 
their competitors, corporate tax competition becomes stronger than when countries take 
into account the regional position or the similarity in transportation costs of their 
competitors. 
Another conclusion regards that countries from the sample behave in a tax 
competitive way not only in geographical neighboring terms as the current corporate tax 
competition literature suggest, but also in a global or world-wide approach assuming 
similar economic conditions, and when internalizing the fact that their competitors have 
similar transportation costs. For example, the greatest influence on the setting of the 
current corporate AETR comes from the same weights approach; this suggests that 
countries tend to react to each others decisions about the corporate tax rates assuming 
several factors, such as: similarity in transportation costs, geographically neighboring 
condition, and similar economic condition, among others. The same weights approach 
could synthesize several distinctive factors from each of the other 3 weighting schemes 
that could explain the highest value of this effect.  
Additionally, it needs to be established that there are several facts that have to be 
taken into account when analyzing the corporate tax competition for export oriented FDI 
inflows. For example, regarding wages and labor, there are countries with particularly 
difficult labor agreements which may influence the allocation of firms. Furthermore, 
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there are several institutional factors including corruption of the government and stability 
of policies which could influence corporate tax competition.  
Further work regards evaluating if there exists a form or a distinctive point to 
discriminate among which type of countries compete in terms of corporate AETRs 
depending on the geographical neighboring condition, which type on the economic 
condition, and which taking into account the similarity in transportation costs. For 
example, it could be interesting to evaluate if countries behave in a leader-follower way, 
and how to identify the characteristics of each type of country.  
Moreover, it would be interesting to evaluate if countries show some degree of tax 
compensation (cross subsidy in taxes), i.e., if average effective corporate tax rates are 
driven down in order to attract FDI inflows or maintain the firms’ already residing in the 
country, governments policymakers could compensate a possible fall in total tax revenues 
by increasing other taxes, such as personal income taxes or consumption taxes, among 
others. That is, countries could charge a higher corporate tax rate to the immobile tax 
base, and a lower corporate tax rate to the mobile tax base in order to compensate for a 
possible fall at the total tax revenues.  
A different research could embark on finding the optimal time lag that countries 
take to react to other countries corporate tax rates policies. Perhaps, the reaction period 
would depend on the economic or geographical position of them. Additional studies 
could be based on dividing the dataset in two time periods. For example, as in García-
Herrero and Santabárbara (2004) the sample of data could be divided from 1984 to 1994 
and from 1995 to 2002 and after that analyze if factors which were considered not 
significant for the whole sample period could change their status.  
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Regarding policy implications, this work could help to recognize that some 
governments have internalized that their competitors do not need to be only their 
geographical neighbor countries, but also all of those that have similar economic 
conditions which are being seek by export oriented firms. Thus, it is imperative that 
countries policymakers, especially in developing countries, identify that a proactive fiscal 
policy, with observance on fiscal, financial and trade policies of regionally neighboring 
and similar economic conditions countries, could be transformed into an increase in 
competitiveness that could raise FDI attraction and thus increase employment. Also, it 
must be mentioned that governments should not depend only on their fiscal policy in 
order to attract export oriented FDI. Countries’ governments, especially developing 
countries, should put attention on policies regarding technology developing and 
infrastructure investment projects, but most importantly, they have to provide confidence 
to foreign firms by building a reliable state of law. 
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Table A1 
Hypothesis and Questions 
 
Hypothesis: 
There is a presence of a significant level of global 
corporate tax competition among countries. 
Matrix 
1W and 2W  
 
Questions: 
 
1. Does the optimal corporate tax rate of a country 
depend significantly on the corporate tax rates of other 
countries? 
2. Does the significance of global corporate tax 
competition depend on the fact that the “economic” 
distance of a country with its competitors is similar?  
3. Does the level of corporate global or world-wide tax 
competition depends significantly on the 
transportation costs (proxied by the geographical 
distance) between the host country and the investors’ 
home countries?  
4. Does the significance of global corporate tax 
competition depend on the geographical distance 
among the host countries?  
5. Can the similarity or disparity of trade policies 
between countries affect significantly the setting of a 
country’s optimal corporate tax rate?  
6. Do countries tend to reduce their corporate tax rate in 
order to increase the amount of foreign direct 
investment inflows depending on their position of 
foreign direct investment attraction relative to other 
countries?  
7. Do countries compensate by offering lower AETRs if 
their technological skills are lower than those of their 
competitors?  
8. Finally, do countries compensate by offering lower 
AETRs if their wages are higher than those of their 
competitors? 
 
 
 
 
1W
 
 
 
2W
 
 
 
 
3W
 
 
 
 
 
4W
 
 






−=
−−−
___
1,1,1, tjtiti opoop
 
 
 






−=
−−−
___
1,1,1, tjtiti fffd
 
 
 





 Ω−Ω=
−−−
_____
1,1,1, tititiγ
 
 






−=
−−−
_____
1,1,1, tititi LSLL
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Figure A1 
Labor Market Conditions 
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Workers and Wages 
 
 
According to Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) wages for the home producing firm 
are determined by: 
                                              )('),,( ciciiicici kFkkFw −= ϕγ                                            (B1) 
Proof:  
Define a production function of the form: 
                              
c
i
c
iic
iii L
KKLKF
2
),,,(
2δϕγϕγ −=     where 0,, >iii δϕγ                    (B2) 
where:  
                                                              
c
i
c
ii
L L
KF
2
'
2δ
=                                                      (B3) 
In per-capita terms: 
                                                  
2
2
),,( ciiii kkkF
δϕγϕγ −=                                             (B4) 
where ciiiik kF δϕγ −='  and ikF δ−='' . 
For the home producing firms ciL wF =' , thus: 
                                                       
2
2
2
22
c
i
i
c
i
c
iic
i k
L
K
w
δδ
==                                                (B5) 
While using Equation B1, then: 
                                     ( )





−−−=
c
iiii
c
i
c
i
ic
iii
c
i kkkkw δϕγ
δϕγ 2
2
                                   (B6) 
Thus, wages for the home producing entrepreneurs are given by: 
                                                               
2
2
c
i
ic
i kw
δ
=                                                      (B7) 
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Alternatively, wages for the export oriented firm are determined by:  
                                           ( )( ))('),,(1 bibiiibiibi kFkkFw −−= ϕγθ                                  (B8) 
Proof:  
For the exporting firms:  
                                          L
b
iL FdF
dh
wF '' +=  ⇒   ( ) biL wF =− '1 θ                                (B9) 
                                                           ( ) 2
2
1 bii
b
i kw
δθ−=                                              (B10) 
While by the formula ( )( ))('),,(1 iiiiiii kFkkFw −−= ϕγθ  for exporting firms: 
                                  ( ) ( )





−−−−=
b
iiii
b
i
b
i
ib
iiii
b
i kkkkw δϕγ
δϕγθ 2
2
1                          (B11) 
Hence, wages for the export oriented firms’ workers are given by: 
                                                           ( ) 2
2
1 biii
b
i kw
δθ−=                                             (B12) 
Now, from the home producing firm wage, Equation B1, let’s define: 
                                    





−−=
i
i
ii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
dt
dkkFk
dt
dkkF
dt
dkkF
dt
dw )('')(')('                        (B13) 
                                                        0)('' <





−=
i
i
ii
i
i
dt
dkkFk
dt
dw
                                (B14) 
since both 
i
i
dt
dk
 and )('' ikF  are negative.   0<
i
i
dt
dk
 and )('' ikF < 0. 
While for the export oriented entrepreneurs: 
                                              
( ) 0)(''1 <





−−=
i
c
ic
i
c
ii
i
b
i
dt
dkkFk
dt
dw θ                              (B15) 
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Now, using Equation B7 and substituting ci
c
i
c
i LKk /=  the number of workers for 
the home producing entrepreneurs is determined by:  
                                                            
c
ic
i
ic
i K
w
L
2/1
2 






=
δ
                                             (B16) 
While using Equation B12, the number of workers for the export oriented 
entrepreneurs can be expressed as: 
                                                        
( ) bib
i
i
i
b
i K
w
L
2/1
2
1 





−=
δθ                                       (B17) 
 
Now, it is also possible to assume a different production function. Suppose that: 
                                                  ( ) ( )βα ϕγϕγ ciicii LKLKF =),,,(                                   (B18) 
where 1=+ βα  which implies constant returns to scale.  
Now, in per-capita terms: 
                                                     ( )αβαϕγϕγ ciii kkF =),,(                                          (B19) 
where ( ) 0' 1 >= −αβαϕαγ ciiik kF  and ( ) ( ) 01'' 2 <−= −αβαϕαγα ciiik kF . 
Hence, from Equation B1, wages for the home producing firms’ workers are: 
                                            ( ) ( ) 1−−= αβααβα ϕαγϕγ ciiiciciiici kkkw                                (B20) 
                                         ( ) ( )αβααβα ϕβγϕγα ciiiciiici kkw =−= )1(                              (B21) 
 
On the other hand, using Equation B8, wages for export oriented firms’ workers 
are expressed as: 
                                                    ( ) ( )αβαϕβγθ biiibi kw −= 1                                          (B22) 
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Thus, the number of workers for both types of entrepreneurs is determined by:  
                                                       
c
ic
i
iic
i K
w
L
αβα βϕγ
1






=                                               (B23) 
                                                   
( ) b
ib
i
iib
i K
w
L
αβα βϕγθ
1
1





 −
=                                          (B24) 
 
Home Producing Entrepreneurs 
 
 
The after tax profits of home producing firms located in country i can be 
expressed as: 
                      ( )iciiiiciiiciiicici wrkakFtwrkkF −−−−−=Π ),,(),,( ϕγϕγ                  (B25) 
or 
                                  ( )( ) ( ) ciiiiiiciici rkatwkFt −−−−=Π 1),,(1 ϕγ                              (B26) 
                               
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 




−
−
−−−=Π ci
i
ii
iii
c
ii
c
i rkt
at
wkFt
1
1),,(1 ϕγ                    (B27) 
Define: 
                                                    
( )
( ) ii
ii
i mt
at
z +=
−
−
= 1
1
1
                                          (B28) 
where  
                                                         ( )21
1
1
1
1
1
t
a
dt
dz
−
−
=                                                   (B29) 
where  0
1
1 >
dt
dz
 if a < 1 and 0
1
1 <
dt
dz
 if a > 1. While:                                        
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                                                            ( ) 01
1
1
1 <
−
−
=
it
t
da
dz
                                          (B30) 
And 
                                                                  1
1
1
=
dm
dz
                                                      (B31) 
 
Continuing, 
                                          ( ) ( )[ ]ciiiiiciici rkzwkFt −−−=Π ),,(1 ϕγ                              (B32) 
 
Define: 
                                                 ( )[ ]ciiiiicii rkzwkF −−=Γ ),,( ϕγ                                   (B33) 
Thus: 
                                                            ( ) iici t Γ−=Π 1                                                    (B34) 
Home producing entrepreneurs search to maximize after tax profit, Equation B32. 
                                      ( ) ( ) 01),,('1 =−−−=Π ratkFt
dk
d
iiii
c
ii
i
c
i ϕγ                           (B35) 
                                                 
( )
( ) rzrt
atkF i
i
ii
ii
c
i =
−
−
=
1
1),,(' ϕγ                                 (B36) 
Assuming a production function as in Equation B4, hence: 
                                                             rzk i
c
iiii =−δϕγ                                              (B37) 
Thus, the optimal home producing firm’s capital per-capita is determined by: 
                                                             
i
iiic
i
rzk δ
ϕγ −
=                                                 (B38) 
where:  
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                                                                0>=
i
i
i
c
i
d
dk
δ
ϕ
γ
                                               (B39) 
                                                               0>=
i
i
i
c
i
d
dk
δ
γ
ϕ
                                                 (B40) 
                                                             0<−=
i
i
c
i z
dr
dk
δ                                                 (B41) 
                                                         0<−==
ii
c
i
i
c
i r
dm
dk
dz
dk
δ                                           (B42) 
 
Export Oriented Entrepreneurs 
 
 
In addition, the after tax profits of the export oriented firms located in country i 
can be expressed as:  
               ( )iibiiiibiiiibiiibibi hwrkakFthwrkkF −−−−−−−=Π ),,(),,( ϕγϕγ           (B43) 
                            ( )( ) ( ) biiiiiiibiibi rkathwkFt −−−−−=Π 1),,(1 ϕγ                            (B44) 
                          
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 




−
−
−−−−=Π bi
i
ii
iiii
b
ii
b
i rkt
athwkFt
1
1),,(1 ϕγ                           (B45) 
                                    ( )( )[ ]biiiiiibiibi rkzhwkFt −−−−=Π ),,(1 ϕγ                            (B46) 
Let’s define:  
                                      ( )biiiiiibii rkzhwkF −−−=Ψ ),,( ϕγ                                        (B47) 
 
Thus, export oriented entrepreneurs after tax profit is given by: 
                                                       ( ) iibi t Ψ−=Π 1                                                        (B48) 
Export oriented entrepreneurs search to maximize after tax profit. Consequently: 
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( ) ( ) 01),,('),,('1 =−−





−−=
Π
ratkF
dF
dhkFt
dk
d
iiiii
i
iiii
i
i ϕγϕγ             (B49) 
                                    ( )( ) ( ) 01),,('11 =−−−− ratkFt iiiiiii ϕγθ                                  (B50) 
                                        
( ) ( )( ) rt
atkF
i
ii
iiii
−
−
=−
1
1),,('1 ϕγθ                                          (B51) 
Now, assume a production function as in Equation B4 and with the same 
properties, hence: 
                          
( )
2
),,(
2b
iib
iii
b
i
kkkF δϕγϕγ −=    where 0,, >iii δϕγ                         (B52) 
                                                     
b
iiii
b
i kkF δϕγϕγ −=),,('                                        (B53) 
And: 
                                                    ( )( ) rzk ibiiiii =−− δϕγθ1                                         (B54) 
 
Thus, the optimal export oriented capital per-capita in terms of the international 
cost of capital ends:  
                                                      ( )ii
i
i
iib
i
rzk
θδδ
ϕγ
−
−=
1
                                            (B55) 
 
Now, in order to obtain the export oriented capital of country 1 in function 
country’s 2 variables, let’s establish: 
  
                             ( ) ( ) ),,('11),,('11 2222
2
1111
1
ϕγθϕγθ bb kF
z
kF
z
−=−                            (B56) 
and using Equation B53 above, then: 
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( )
( )
( )
( )21
12
1122
21
12
1122 1
1
1
1
θ
θϕγϕγ
θ
θδδ
−
−
−=
−
−
−
z
z
z
zkk bb                              (B57) 
Hence, using equation bb kkK 213 += , the optimal export oriented entrepreneurs’ 
capital per-capita in terms of country’s 2 variables can be expressed as: 
                                          
( )
( )
( )
( )




−
−
+
−
−
+−
=
21
12
12
21
12
112232
1
1
1
1
1
θ
θδδ
θ
θϕγϕγδ
z
z
z
zK
k b                                       (B58) 
or 
                           
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]121212
121121222132
1 11
111
θδθδ
θϕγθϕγθδ
−+−
−+−−−
=
zz
zzzKk b                          (B59) 
where  
                                                ( )
( )
0
1
1
21
12
12
2
3
1 >






−
−
+
=
θ
θδδ
δ
z
zKd
dk b
                                     (B60) 
                                                 ( )
( )
0
1
1
21
12
12
2
2
1 <






−
−
+
−
=
θ
θδδ
ϕ
γ
z
zd
dk b
                                     (B61) 
                                                 ( )
( )
0
1
1
21
12
12
2
2
1 <






−
−
+
−
=
θ
θδδ
γ
ϕ
z
zd
dk b
                                     (B62) 
                                                  
( )
( )
( )
( )
0
1
1
1
1
21
12
12
21
12
1
1
1 >






−
−
+
−
−
=
θ
θδδ
θ
θϕ
γ
z
z
z
z
d
dk b
                                    (B63) 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
0
1
1
1
1
21
12
12
21
12
1
1
1 >






−
−
+
−
−
=
θ
θδδ
θ
θγ
ϕ
z
z
z
z
d
dk b
                                    (B64) 
By assuming that: 
                                                  0321211122 >−+ Kδδδϕγδϕγ                                     (B65) 
Then:  
                           
( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] 011
11
2
121212
321221112211
2
1 >
−+−
−+−−
=
θδθδ
δδϕγδϕγδθθ
zz
Kz
dz
dk b
                      (B66) 
                        
( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] 01111 2121212
211122312
212
1
1 <
−+−
−−
−−=
θδθδ
δϕγδϕγδδθθ
zz
K
z
dz
dk b
                   (B67) 
                         
( )( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] 011
11
2
121212
1121223212221
1
1 <
−+−
−−−−
=
θδθδ
ϕγδδϕγδδθθ
θ zz
Kzz
d
dk b
                    (B68) 
                               
( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] 011
1
2
121212
321112221121
2
1 >
−+−
−+−
=
θδθδ
δδϕγδϕγδθ
θ zz
Kzz
d
dk b
                         (B69) 
 
Condition of Investment 
 
 
Let’s define the condition regarding the number of entrepreneurs investing in 
country 1.  
                                                        ( ) ( )( )( )( )22
11
1
11
Ψ−
Ψ−
=Ω+
t
t
                                           (B70) 
where:  
                                  
( )
( )
( )
( ) 01
1
1
1
?
1
1
1
1
1
1
22
1
22
1
11
<
Ψ
Ψ−
−
+
Ψ−
Ψ−
=
Ω
=
Ω+
−++
dt
dz
dz
dk
dk
d
t
t
tdt
d
dt
d b
b           (B71) 
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assuming ( )
( )
( ) 1
1
1
1
1
1
21
1
21
1
1
1
1 dt
dz
dz
dk
dk
d
t
t
t
b
b
Ψ
Ψ−
−
>
Ψ−
Ψ
 in the case that 0
1
1 <
dt
dz
. Hence: 
                                         
( ) ( )
( ) 01
11
1
1
1
1
1
1
21
1
11
>
Ψ
Ψ−
−
=
Ω
=
Ω+
−−++
da
dz
dz
dk
dk
d
t
t
da
d
da
d b
b                       (B72) 
                                  
( )
( )
( )
( ) 01
1
1
1
)1(
22
11
22
1
1
1
11
<
Ψ−
−−
=
Ψ−





 Ψ
−
=
Ω
=
Ω+
t
trk
t
dz
d
t
dz
d
dz
d b
                   (B73) 
where 
                       ( )[ ] 01),,(' <−=−−−=Ψ bibi
i
b
i
iiii
b
i
i
i rkrk
dz
dk
rzkF
dz
d θϕγ                         (B74) 
                                                 0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 <−=
Ψ
=
Ψ
dt
dz
rk
dt
dz
dz
d
dt
d
                                   (B75) 
 
Government Budget Constraint 
 
 
Country’s 1 government finance the provision of the public good 1g through the 
corporate statutory tax rate 1t  and the allowance rate 1a . Hence, if the governments’ 
revenues are used completely to finance gi then:   
 
           ( )( ) ( )ccbb rkawkFtrkahwkFtg 1111111111111111 ),,(),,(1 −−+−−−Ω+= ϕγϕγ       (B76) 
 
                        
( )( )
( )cccc
bbbb
rkarkzrkzwkFt
rkarkzrkzhwkFtg
11111111111
1111111111111
),,(
),,(1
−+−−+
−+−−−Ω+=
ϕγ
ϕγ
                (B77) 
 
                            ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )cb rktaztrktaztg 1111111111111 1 −+Γ+−+ΨΩ+=                    (B78) 
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and since ( ) ( )11111 −=− ztaz  
Then: 
                                  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]cb rkztrkztg 111111111 111 −+Γ+−+ΨΩ+=                    (B79) 
 
Observe that:  
                             ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
1
1
1
1
11111
11
1 11
dt
dz
dz
dg
rkzt
dt
d
dt
dg b +Γ+ΨΩ++−+ΨΩ=                 (B80) 
 
Government Maximization Problem 
 
 
Country’s 1 government searches to:  
                
11 ,zt
Max ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 11111111 1114)( Ψ−Ω++Γ−+Ω+++= ttgvrkwSWF c              (B81) 
                 Subject to:     ( ) ( )( )( )( )22
11
1
11
Ψ−
Ψ−
=Ω+
t
t
                                                            (B82) 
Consequently, the first order conditions can be expressed as:  
                
( ) [ ] 04)(
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
=
Ω
Ω
+Ω+++++=
dt
d
d
dSWF
dt
gdv
dt
dy
dt
dy
dt
rkwd
dt
dSWF bcc
          (B83) 
                
( ) [ ] 04)(
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
=
Ω
Ω
+Ω+++++=
dz
d
d
dSWF
dz
gdv
dz
dy
dz
dy
dz
rkwd
dz
dSWF bcc
          (B84) 
Hence, by assuming 10 *1 << t  and 11 =z , then: 
                                                                 1
1
1 Γ−=
td
dy c
                 (B85) 
                                                 ( ) ( ) 1
1
11
1
1 11 ΨΩ−+ΨΩ+−=
dt
d
t
td
dyb
                          (B86) 
  
 
211 
                                              ( )[ ] ( ) 1111
11
1 1 Γ+ΨΩ++ΨΩ= t
dt
d
dt
dg
                 (B87) 
                                                          
( )
( )( )22
1
1 Ψ−
Ψ−
=
Ω
tdt
d
                 (B88) 
                                                        ( ) ( )
1
111 dt
d
t
Ω
−−=Ω+      (B89) 
and substituting into Equation B83: 
 
                       
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ] 041
11
1
1
1111
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
11
1
1
=
Ω
Ω
+Ω+





Γ+ΨΩ++ΨΩ+
ΨΩ−+ΨΩ+−++=
dt
d
d
dSWF
t
dt
d
dt
d
t
dt
dy
dt
rkwd
dt
dSWF cc
     (B90) 
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( ) ( ) [ ] 041
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1
1
1
1
1
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
=
Ω






Ω
+Ω+












Ω
Γ
+Ω
ΨΩ+
+Ψ+






Ψ−+Ω
ΨΩ+
−Ω+Ω
+
=
dt
d
d
dSWF
dt
d
dt
dt
t
dt
d
dt
d
dt
dy
dt
d
dt
rkwd
dt
dSWF
cc
     (B91) 
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

Ω
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
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








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Ψ




 Ω
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+Ψ+
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





+Ψ−+Ω
Ψ




 Ω
−−
−
Ω
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Ω
+
=
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d
dSWF
dt
d
dt
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dt
d
dt
d
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t
t
dt
d
dt
d
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d
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d
rkwd
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dSWF
c
cc
     (B92) 
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Thus:   
                
( ) ( )
( ) [ ]
0
41
12
111
1111
11
111
11
1
1
=
Ω












Ω
+Ω+





Ω
−Ψ−−Ψ+
Ψ−+
Ω
+
Ω
+
=
=
dt
d
d
dSWF
d
dy
tt
t
d
dy
d
rkwd
dt
dSWF
c
cc
z φ
           (B93) 
Now, repeating the same procedure to Equation B84, using: 
                                                   ( ) ( )11
1
1
1
1
1 11 trk
dz
d
t
dz
dy cc
−−=
Γ
−=                                  (B94) 
                                             ( ) ( )( )
1
1
11
1
1
1
1 111
dz
d
t
dz
d
t
dz
dyb ΨΩ+−+ΨΩ−=                          (B95) 
                                         ( )[ ] bbbb rkrk
dz
dk
rzkF
dz
d
11
1
1
11
1
1 )('1 −=−−−=Ψ θ                       (B96) 
                                             
( )
( )( )
( )
( )( ) 01
1
1
1
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11
1
1
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1
1
<
Ψ−
−−
=
Ψ
Ψ−
−
=
Ω
t
trk
dz
d
t
t
dz
d b
                      (B97) 
                      
( )[ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( )


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
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
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dz
dk
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dz
dk
rzrkzt
dz
d
dz
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c
c
b
b
b
        (B98) 
and 
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Consequently, from Equation B94, since 0
1
≠
Ω
dt
d
 then:   
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In addition, from Equation B104 and since 0
1
≠
Ω
dz
d
 at 11 =z , then: 
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Hence, the value of 1z  that maximizes the social welfare function is 1
*
1 =z . Thus, 
1*1 =z  ; 1
*
1 =a  ; 0
*
1 =m  ; 10
*
1 << t  ; and *1*1 t=λ . 
 
Optimal Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 
 
 
Hence from:  
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Hence with Equation B88: 
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Using the general formula for a quadratic equation: 
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Therefore, the optimal statutory corporate tax rate is: 
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Where by numerical evaluation, and 10 *1 << t  the *1t  is given by: 
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where the slope of the reaction function is determined by:  
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First part: 
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Reaction Function of the AETR 
 
 
Redefine Ω+1  in terms of b1λ : 
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Then, 
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Similarly, redefine government revenue to: 
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Also, export oriented entrepreneurs after tax income ends: 
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where  
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Alternatively, home producing entrepreneur’s after tax income ends: 
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The first order condition ends: 
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So, by solving for b1λ and since: 
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Hence,  
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          (B143) 
The optimal AETR for export oriented entrepreneurs can be expressed as: 
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Effects on the Reaction Functions 
 
 
From the optimal statutory corporate tax rate the following conclusions can be 
extracted: 
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Also, by assuming 25.0=φ and that 1Γ is high, then: 
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Average Effective Tax Rates 
 
 
Since i
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i τλλ == . Then: 
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APPENDIX C 
 
EMPIRICAL MODEL: SPECIFICATIONS AND TESTS 
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Lagrange Multiplier Tests 
 
 
Following Baltagi (2003), assuming fixed individual and time effects and that 
itit y=τ , the econometric model can be represented as:  
 
                                            itititit uXWyy +++= −− βαφ 11         Ni ,........2,1=                (C1) 
                 Tt ,........2,1=  
                                                       ittiitu εηµ ++=                                                   (C2) 
 
Additionally, similarly to Baltagi, Song, Jung, and Koh (2003) the disturbances 
can be defined as: 
 
where 
                                                      ititNTit vW += ελε                                                       (C3) 
                                                        ititit evv +=
−1ρ                                                         (C4) 
 
Note that NTW is a NT x NT weight matrix, where TNT IWW ⊗= , where W is a N 
x N weight matrix. Also, ite ~IIN ),0( 2eσ  , itv ~N ))1/(,0( 22 ρσ −e . 
  In order to obtain the within estimator it is necessary to define: 
 
                                                       
....
~ yyyyy tiitit +−−=                                                  (C5) 
                                                   
..'1..'11
~ yyyyy tiitit +−−= −−−                                             (C6) 
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..'1..'11
~ XXXXX tiitit +−−= −−−                                          (C7) 
                                                      
....
~ εεεεε +−−= tiitit                                                (C8) 
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~ vvvvv tiitit +−−=                                               (C9) 
                                                   
..'1..'11
~ vvvvv tiitit +−−= −−−                                            (C10) 
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~ eeeee tiitit +−−=                                             (C11) 
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1
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= =
=
N
i
T
t
ityNT
y
1
..
1
and ∑
−
=
−
=
1
1
1.'
1 T
t
iti yT
y . 
Therefore: 
                                     ittiititit XWyy εηµβαφ +++++= −− 11                                   (C13) 
                                            
..'.'. iiiii XyWy εµβαφ ++++=                                        (C14) 
                                         ttttt XyWy .1.1.. εηβαφ ++++= −−                                        (C15) 
                                              
....'..'..
εβαφ +++= XyWy                                               (C16) 
Using the above equations to obtain the within estimator: 
                    
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
......'1..'1
..1..'1.... '
εεεεβ
αφφφφ
+−−++−−+
+−−++−−=+−−
−−
−−
tiittiit
tiittiit
XXXX
yyyyWyyyy
           (C17) 
Hence, 
                                                   itititit XyWy εβα ~~~~ 11 ++= −−                                               (C18) 
Also, note from Equations C3 and C8 that:  
                                        
( ) ( )
....
1
~ vvvvWI tiitNTNTit +−−−=
−λε                                   (C19) 
Hence:  
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( ) itNTNTit vWI ~~ 1−−= λε                                            (C20) 
 
and from Equations C4, C10 and C11:  
                          ( ) ( )
......'1..'1....
~ eeeevvvvvvvvv tiittiittiitit +−−++−−=+−−= −−ρ     (C21) 
                                                             itit evv
~~~
1 += −ρ                                                   (C22) 
Also, ite~ ~IIN ),0( 2eσ  , itv~ ~N ))1/(~,0( 22 ρσ −e and KTN
vv
e
−−−
= )1)(1(
~
'
~
~
2σ  where K 
represents the number of independent variables at the estimation. 
Hence, from Equation C20 and since TNT IWW ⊗=  and TNNT III ⊗=  (where 
NI  and TI  are identity matrices of order N and T, respectively):  
                                                     
( ) TitNit IvWI ⊗−= − ~~ 1λε                                        (C23) 
Denote  ( )WIB N λ−= , hence: 
                                                             TIvB ⊗=
−
~~
1ε                                                 (C24) 
And the variance covariance matrix is:  
                                            ρσ VBBVBB e ⊗=⊗=Ω
−− 121 )'(~)'(                                (C25) 
Define:  
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Testing for 0:0 == ρλeH , Equation C6 at eH0   reduces to: 
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 and G is a bidiagonal matrix 
obtained from derivation of 1V  with respect to ρ . 
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The above using the fact that ( ) 111 )'('')'()'( −−− +=
∂
∂ BBWBBWBBBB λ  according 
to Anselin (1988, p. 164).  
The LM statistic is given by: 
                                                          θθθ DJDLM
~
'
~
'
~ 1−
=                                               (C35) 
where  
                                                         ( )( )θθθ ~/~ ∂∂= LD                                                 (C36) 
and θ  represents the variable in question. The general formula that is commonly used to 
obtain θD
~
:  
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Where uˆ represents the OLS residuals from the within estimation and 
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2σ . 
Thus, from Equation C30: 
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Using Equation C37: 
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Similarly, from Equation C31: 
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Using the following matrix differentiation formula given in Harville (1977): 
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Thus, the LM tests for 0:0 =ρeH  and 0:0 =λeH  are given by:  
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Which are asymptotically distributed as 21χ . 
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Thus, the joint test for 0:0 == ρλeH  can be expressed as: 
                                                         λρλρ LMLMLM +=                                          (C66) 
which is asymptotically distributed as 22χ . 
Note that 
KTN
uu
e
−−−
= )1)(1(
ˆ'ˆ
~
2σ  comes from the within estimator assuming 
fixed individual and time effects. The LM tests derived above can also be used with no 
fixed affects, with individual fixed effects and with time fixed effects, depending on the 
notation of 2eσ  and the residuals. For example:  
 
Table C1 
Different 2eσ  for each Estimation Method 
 
Estimation  Method 
 
Variance 
A) No fixed affects 
NT
ee
e
'2
=σ   where e are the OLS residuals. 
B) Individual fixed 
effects only KTN
uu
e
−−
= )1(
'
~
2
))
σ  where u) are the residuals from within 
estimator model with fixed individual effects.  
C) Time fixed effects 
only KNT
uu
e
−−
= )1(
'
~
2
((
σ  where u( are the residuals from within 
estimator model with fixed time effects. 
D) Individual and time 
fixed effects KTN
uu
e
−−−
= )1)(1(
ˆ'ˆ
~
2σ  where uˆ  represent the OLS 
residuals from the within estimator. 
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Tests for Time and Individual Effects: The F tests 
 
 
According to Baltagi (2003), fixed time and individual effects can be tested as 
follows:  
a)  An F test for jointly testing individual and time effects. Denoting the µ ’s as the 
individual fixed effects, and the η ’s as the time fixed effects, the null hypothesis 
is given by: 
0.....: 110 === −NH µµ    and 0..... 11 === −tηη  
which will be tested by:  
                                  
( ) ( )
( )( )( )KTNURSS
TNURSSRRSSF
−−−
−+−
=
11/
2/
                                 (C67) 
where RRSS refers to the restricted residual sum of squares of the pooled 
regression, εε '=URSS . On the other hand, the URSS is defined as the 
unrestricted residual sum of squares that of using Equation C18, εε ~'~=URSS . 
This test is distributed as: KTNTNF −−−−+ )1)(1(),2( . 
b)  A second test is carried out as to check for the existence of individual effects 
given the time effects. So, the null hypothesis is represented as: 
0.....: 110 === −NH µµ    and 0≠tη  for t=1,……, T-1. 
The same F test from Equation C67 applies, and URSS is still the within residual 
sum of squares from Equation C18, however RRSS is the residuals sum of squares 
of the time series only, that is, of the regression based upon 
( ) ( )tittittit xxyy ... εεβ −+−=− .  This test is distributed as: KTNNF −−−− )1)(1(),1( . 
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c) Finally, a third F test validates the existence of time effects given the individual 
effects, hence the null hypothesis is given by: 
0.....: 110 === −tH ηη      and 0≠iµ    for i=1,……, N-1. 
Again, the F test of Equation C67 applies, however the RRSS is given by  
( ) ( )
... iitiitiit xxyy εεβ −+−=− ,  while the URSS  is obtained from Equation 
C18. This test is distributed as: KTNTF −−−− )1)(1(),1( .  
 
Arellano’s Robust Standard Error Estimators 
 
 
Following Arellano (1987), it is possible to compute robust standard errors for 
within-groups estimators when having heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of 
arbitrary form.  Assuming that the within-groups estimators are given by: 
                                                         ( ) yXXXWG ~'~'~'~ˆ =β                                               (C68) 
and since ( )NXXXX ~,........,~,~'~ 21= , then the robust variance covariance matrix of βˆ  can 
be represented by: 
                                      ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
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~~
'
~~
'
~~
'
~ −
=
−






= ∑ ii
N
i
iiiiii XXXXXXAVM εεβ                   (C69) 
where in both cases, Equations C68 and C69, the X~ include all the independent variables, 
that is, it includes the 1~ −ity  and 1
~
−itX  (right hand side of Equation C18). 
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Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 1W  
 
 
Table D1 
Individual and Time Fixed Effects using 1W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7638344 0.05084 15.02376 0.00000 0.06551 11.65902 0.00000
L i,t-1 1.3071E-06 6.8446E-07 1.90960 0.05649 8.7596E-07 1.49214 0.13600
op i,t-1 -0.0531589 0.03209 -1.65631 0.09800 0.04975 -1.06848 0.28558
γ i,t-1 0.0001900 0.00012 1.64607 0.10009 1.8279E-04 1.03949 0.29885
fd i,t-1 -1.1380E-06 3.8485E-07 -2.95692 0.00319 4.7625E-07 -2.38945 0.01707
ER i,t-1 2.6619E-05 6.0229E-05 0.44197 0.65861 1.5729E-05 1.69243 0.09090
GE i,t-1 0.2611465 0.17377 1.50282 0.13323 0.25507 1.02381 0.30619
ρ 0.47037144 0.03254824 14.45152 0.00000
R 2 within 0.22782 Variance 0.01254
R 2  adjusted 0.16381 RSS 11.64889
R 2 ordinary 0.69992
0.87427 480.37852
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual and time effects
F1 45.68036 F2  22.34489
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
3) F-test for individual given time effects 4) F-test for time given individual effects
F3 31.39913 F4      -1.34160
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       176.22143 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     0.36158 P-value 0.54763
LM ρ+λ     176.58302 P-value 0.00000
Breusch-
Pagan
Durbin-
Watson
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Table D2 
Individual Fixed Effects using 1W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7508322 0.06889 10.89970 0.00000 0.12387 6.06141 0.00000
L i,t-1 1.1967E-06 6.6949E-07 1.78745 0.07418 8.7400E-07 1.36921 0.17126
op i,t-1 -0.0497860 0.03137 -1.58694 0.11286 0.04930 -1.00987 0.31282
γ i,t-1 0.0002197 0.00011 1.94691 0.05184 1.7729E-04 1.23907 0.21563
fd i,t-1 -1.0904E-06 3.7622E-07 -2.89839 0.00384 4.6575E-07 -2.34125 0.01943
ER i,t-1 7.6403E-06 5.9524E-05 0.12836 0.89789 2.0523E-05 0.37228 0.70977
GE i,t-1 0.2647555 0.17182 1.54085 0.12369 0.27886 0.94942 0.34265
ρ 0.4591521 0.02776 16.54221 0.00000
R 2 within 0.14065 Variance 0.01198
R 2  adjusted 0.08711 RSS 11.34608
R 2 ordinary 0.70772
0.88520 501.73848
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 25.83195 F2 31.96683
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       175.25500 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     0.51570 P-value 0.47268
LM ρ+λ     175.77070 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Table D3 
Time Fixed Effects using 1W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 1.0128148 0.08171 12.39530 0.00000 0.17577 5.76213 0.00000
L i,t-1 2.3648E-06 5.9503E-07 3.97428 0.00008 2.3091E-06 1.02414 0.30602
op i,t-1 -0.1063855 0.01045 -10.17749 0.00000 0.02689 -3.95703 0.00008
γ i,t-1 -0.0002074 0.00005 -4.33705 0.00002 1.6131E-04 -1.28555 0.19890
fd i,t-1 -1.3511E-06 5.1214E-07 -2.63808 0.00847 7.6995E-07 -1.75477 0.07961
ER i,t-1 1.1248E-04 9.4697E-05 1.18775 0.23522 9.6418E-05 1.16656 0.24367
GE i,t-1 -0.2617789 0.11976 -2.18586 0.02906 0.39469 -0.66325 0.50733
ρ 0.7983248 0.03223 24.76927 0.00000
R 2 within 0.25128 Variance 0.03274
R 2  adjusted 0.23220 RSS 32.12227
R 2 ordinary 0.17251
0.18139 625.07589
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed time effects
F1 54.87173 F2 -0.50528
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       588.69121 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     1.82737 P-value 0.17644
LM ρ+λ     590.51858 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Table D4 
No Fixed Effects using 1W  (Simple Panel Data Estimation) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
Constant 0.1540253 0.04194 3.67291 0.00025 0.06399 2.40687 0.01627
w τ i,t-1 0.6363172 0.11009 5.77974 0.00000 0.14514 4.38411 0.00001
L i,t-1 2.4548E-06 5.8044E-07 4.22930 0.00003 2.2352E-06 1.09828 0.27235
op i,t-1 -0.1064499 0.01012 -10.51515 0.00000 0.02524 -4.21775 0.00003
γ i,t-1 -0.0002065 0.00005 -4.42861 0.00001 1.6291E-04 -1.26738 0.20532
fd i,t-1 -1.4528E-06 5.0066E-07 -2.90171 0.00379 7.6434E-07 -1.90067 0.05763
ER i,t-1 1.3328E-05 9.3791E-05 0.14210 0.88703 2.4544E-05 0.54301 0.58724
GE i,t-1 -0.2254035 0.11776 -1.91401 0.05590 0.36995 -0.60929 0.54247
ρ 0.7974026 0.01851 43.07635 0.00000
R 2 within 0.19467 Variance 0.03129
R 2  adjusted 0.18903 RSS 31.26192
R 2 ordinary 0.19467
0.18969 612.24840
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero
F1 34.49888
P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       609.33492 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     1.61636 P-value 0.20360
LM ρ+λ     610.95128 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 2W  
 
 
Table D5 
Individual and Time Fixed Effects using 2W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7499148 0.05064 14.80953 0.00000 0.06639 11.29518 0.00000
L i,t-1 1.5762E-06 7.0165E-07 2.24635 0.02492 9.0976E-07 1.73249 0.08352
op i,t-1 -0.0575175 0.03198 -1.79841 0.07244 0.04905 -1.17263 0.24125
γ i,t-1 0.0002525 0.00013 2.00975 0.04475 2.0980E-04 1.20342 0.22912
fd i,t-1 -1.1511E-06 3.9001E-07 -2.95147 0.00324 4.7017E-07 -2.44828 0.01454
ER i,t-1 2.2649E-05 6.0179E-05 0.37636 0.70673 1.5440E-05 1.46688 0.14275
GE i,t-1 0.2258508 0.17467 1.29303 0.19632 0.25438 0.88783 0.37486
ρ 0.46938905 0.03255049 14.42034 0.00000
R 2 within 0.22901 Variance 0.01252
R 2  adjusted 0.16510 RSS 11.63093
R 2 ordinary 0.70038
0.87784 483.73877
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual and time effects
F1 45.98989 F2  22.34383
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
3) F-test for individual given time effects 4) F-test for time given individual effects
F3 31.22494 F4      -1.33750
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       175.43775 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     0.19861 P-value 0.65585
LM ρ+λ     175.63636 P-value 0.00000
Breusch-
Pagan
Durbin-
Watson
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Table D6 
Individual Fixed Effects using 2W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7341452 0.06854 10.71132 0.00000 0.12400 5.92049 0.00000
L i,t-1 1.4611E-06 6.8646E-07 2.12844 0.03356 9.0620E-07 1.61234 0.10722
op i,t-1 -0.0531708 0.03127 -1.70050 0.08936 0.04866 -1.09268 0.27481
γ i,t-1 0.0002728 0.00012 2.22107 0.02658 2.0416E-04 1.33604 0.18186
fd i,t-1 -1.1064E-06 3.8129E-07 -2.90166 0.00380 4.6161E-07 -2.39677 0.01673
ER i,t-1 4.8765E-06 5.9477E-05 0.08199 0.93467 2.1008E-05 0.23212 0.81649
GE i,t-1 0.2366965 0.17263 1.37116 0.17065 0.27929 0.84751 0.39693
ρ 0.4582452 0.02778 16.49714 0.00000
R 2 within 0.14190 Variance 0.01196
R 2  adjusted 0.08844 RSS 11.32952
R 2 ordinary 0.70814
0.88896 505.73898
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 26.10047 F2 31.96125
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       174.45313 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     0.30047 P-value 0.58359
LM ρ+λ     174.75360 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Table D7 
Time Fixed Effects using 2W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 1.0439724 0.07968 13.10186 0.00000 0.17893 5.83457 0.00000
L i,t-1 2.4955E-06 5.9677E-07 4.18166 0.00003 2.3797E-06 1.04865 0.29460
op i,t-1 -0.1052313 0.01035 -10.16456 0.00000 0.02627 -4.00509 0.00007
γ i,t-1 -0.0001545 0.00005 -2.88603 0.00399 1.9246E-04 -0.80271 0.42234
fd i,t-1 -1.4169E-06 5.1803E-07 -2.73510 0.00635 7.6013E-07 -1.86397 0.06262
ER i,t-1 1.1284E-04 9.4519E-05 1.19379 0.23285 1.0113E-04 1.11580 0.26478
GE i,t-1 -0.3123613 0.11778 -2.65213 0.00813 0.40306 -0.77497 0.43855
ρ 0.7963903 0.03225 24.69701 0.00000
R 2 within 0.25507 Variance 0.03258
R 2  adjusted 0.23609 RSS 31.95935
R 2 ordinary 0.17671
0.17433 647.83225
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed time effects
F1 55.98490 F2 -0.44068
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       584.68097 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     1.40118 P-value 0.23653
LM ρ+λ     586.08215 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Table D8 
No Fixed Effects using 2W  (Simple Panel Data Estimation) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
Constant 0.1342073 0.04122 3.25592 0.00117 0.06742 1.99061 0.04680
w τ i,t-1 0.7341181 0.10737 6.83730 0.00000 0.17274 4.24986 0.00002
L i,t-1 2.6091E-06 5.8295E-07 4.47560 0.00001 2.2855E-06 1.14157 0.25391
op i,t-1 -0.1055033 0.01007 -10.47733 0.00000 0.02410 -4.37834 0.00001
γ i,t-1 -0.0001702 0.00005 -3.26469 0.00113 1.9273E-04 -0.88315 0.37737
fd i,t-1 -1.5447E-06 5.0735E-07 -3.04471 0.00239 7.6335E-07 -2.02362 0.04328
ER i,t-1 1.1174E-05 9.3726E-05 0.11922 0.90512 2.4815E-05 0.45032 0.65258
GE i,t-1 -0.2944339 0.11595 -2.53928 0.01126 0.38211 -0.77056 0.44115
ρ 0.7960888 0.01859 42.82195 0.00000
R 2 within 0.19594 Variance 0.03124
R 2  adjusted 0.19031 RSS 31.21281
R 2 ordinary 0.19594
0.18670 618.45292
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero
F1 34.777699
P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       606.17156 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     2.03485 P-value 0.15373
LM ρ+λ     608.20642 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 3W  
 
 
Table D9 
Individual and Time Fixed Effects using 3W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.5663070 0.04346 13.03097 0.00000 0.05168 10.95765 0.00000
L i,t-1 2.8020E-06 7.1924E-07 3.89582 0.00010 8.6570E-07 3.23674 0.00125
op i,t-1 -0.0617623 0.03165 -1.95156 0.05129 0.04866 -1.26928 0.20466
γ i,t-1 0.0002186 0.00012 1.76429 0.07801 1.7837E-04 1.22554 0.22068
fd i,t-1 -8.9758E-07 3.9214E-07 -2.28893 0.02231 4.1675E-07 -2.15376 0.03152
ER i,t-1 1.6076E-06 6.1396E-05 0.02618 0.97912 1.5841E-05 0.10148 0.91919
GE i,t-1 0.2678937 0.17690 1.51442 0.13026 0.29009 0.92347 0.35600
ρ 0.46936100 0.03246113 14.45917 0.00000
R 2 within 0.19652 Variance 0.01305
R 2  adjusted 0.12992 RSS 12.12108
R 2 ordinary 0.68775
0.90062 467.73000
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual and time effects
F1 37.86909 F2  20.88407
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
3) F-test for individual given time effects 4) F-test for time given individual effects
F3 29.93036 F4      -1.77114
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       177.35634 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     1.18176 P-value 0.27700
LM ρ+λ     178.53810 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Table D10 
Individual Fixed Effects using 3W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.4582160 0.05215 8.78595 0.00000 0.06939 6.60396 0.00000
L i,t-1 2.5383E-06 7.0222E-07 3.61468 0.00032 8.6838E-07 2.92305 0.00355
op i,t-1 -0.0617646 0.03083 -2.00344 0.04541 0.04891 -1.26294 0.20692
γ i,t-1 0.0002420 0.00012 2.00473 0.04528 1.8230E-04 1.32723 0.18475
fd i,t-1 -8.7453E-07 3.8229E-07 -2.28758 0.02238 4.2844E-07 -2.04120 0.04151
ER i,t-1 -1.1462E-05 6.0427E-05 -0.18968 0.84960 2.2899E-05 -0.50054 0.61681
GE i,t-1 0.2565451 0.17437 1.47129 0.14154 0.32768 0.78290 0.43388
ρ 0.4634507 0.02766 16.75486 0.00000
R 2 within 0.11345 Variance 0.01236
R 2  adjusted 0.05822 RSS 11.70512
R 2 ordinary 0.69847
0.88632 484.38169
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 20.19826 F2 30.32346
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       180.04927 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     0.00019 P-value 0.98892
LM ρ+λ     180.04946 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Table D11 
Time Fixed Effects using 3W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7185726 0.05346 13.44199 0.00000 0.11365 6.32247 0.00000
L i,t-1 2.8493E-06 6.4690E-07 4.40451 0.00001 2.4337E-06 1.17074 0.24199
op i,t-1 -0.0975845 0.00985 -9.90322 0.00000 0.02157 -4.52513 0.00001
γ i,t-1 -0.0001730 0.00005 -3.60982 0.00032 1.3900E-04 -1.24459 0.21358
fd i,t-1 -9.5760E-07 5.2579E-07 -1.82126 0.06887 7.8178E-07 -1.22489 0.22091
ER i,t-1 7.2841E-05 9.5031E-05 0.76650 0.44357 8.3643E-05 0.87085 0.38405
GE i,t-1 -0.2617015 0.10391 -2.51851 0.01194 0.28673 -0.91271 0.36162
ρ 0.7908752 0.03226 24.51403 0.00000
R 2 within 0.24415 Variance 0.03306
R 2  adjusted 0.22489 RSS 32.42785
R 2 ordinary 0.16464
0.20058 616.31107
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed time effects
F1 52.81396 F2 -0.71726
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       575.48855 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     15.38701 P-value 0.00009
LM ρ+λ     590.87556 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
247 
Table D12 
No Fixed Effects using 3W  (Simple Panel Data Estimation) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
Constant 0.2046791 0.02806 7.29467 0.00000 0.06221 3.29033 0.00104
w τ i,t-1 0.5165254 0.06054 8.53201 0.00000 0.11716 4.40868 0.00001
L i,t-1 2.7078E-06 6.2848E-07 4.30850 0.00002 2.4141E-06 1.12165 0.26228
op i,t-1 -0.0998978 0.00951 -10.50407 0.00000 0.02120 -4.71204 0.00000
γ i,t-1 -0.0001626 0.00005 -3.48074 0.00052 1.3798E-04 -1.17857 0.23885
fd i,t-1 -1.2225E-06 5.1316E-07 -2.38232 0.01739 7.4958E-07 -1.63093 0.10322
ER i,t-1 1.7585E-06 9.3536E-05 0.01880 0.98500 2.8363E-05 0.06200 0.95057
GE i,t-1 -0.2708811 0.10193 -2.65759 0.00800 0.26835 -1.00944 0.31301
ρ 0.7918509 0.01885 42.00687 0.00000
R 2 within 0.19640 Variance 0.03123
R 2  adjusted 0.19077 RSS 31.19494
R 2 ordinary 0.19640
0.19593 620.96751
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero
F1 34.87938
P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       598.68931 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     3.96442 P-value 0.04647
LM ρ+λ     602.65373 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 4W  
 
 
Table D13 
Individual and Time Fixed Effects using 4W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.6835585 0.04712 14.50680 0.00000 0.06629 10.31223 0.00000
L i,t-1 1.8529E-06 7.3171E-07 2.53235 0.01149 9.7019E-07 1.90988 0.05646
op i,t-1 -0.0377291 0.03163 -1.19273 0.23328 0.04303 -0.87691 0.38076
γ i,t-1 0.0002730 0.00012 2.32545 0.02026 1.7828E-04 1.53116 0.12607
fd i,t-1 -9.6939E-07 3.9843E-07 -2.43306 0.01516 4.6904E-07 -2.06676 0.03903
ER i,t-1 8.9367E-06 6.0735E-05 0.14714 0.88305 1.4839E-05 0.60224 0.54716
GE i,t-1 0.2306899 0.17359 1.32894 0.18419 0.26170 0.88152 0.37827
ρ 0.47095908 0.03250772 14.48761 0.00000
R 2 0.21774 Variance 0.01270
R 2  adjusted 0.15290 RSS 11.80091
R 2 ordinary 0.69600
0.88647 470.84793
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual and time effects
F1 43.09719 F2  21.58262
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
3) F-test for individual given time effects 4) F-test for time given individual effects
F3 30.80990 F4      -1.52168
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       177.54465 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     0.48010 P-value 0.48838
LM ρ+λ     178.02475 P-value 0.00000
Breusch-
Pagan
Durbin-
Watson
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Table D14 
Individual Fixed Effects using 4W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.6216420 0.05938 10.46886 0.00000 0.10548 5.89319 0.00000
L i,t-1 1.6562E-06 7.1445E-07 2.31819 0.02065 9.5517E-07 1.73395 0.08325
op i,t-1 -0.0374149 0.03086 -1.21223 0.22573 0.04388 -0.85263 0.39408
γ i,t-1 0.0002750 0.00011 2.40104 0.01654 1.7862E-04 1.53941 0.12404
fd i,t-1 -9.7184E-07 3.8886E-07 -2.49923 0.01261 4.6914E-07 -2.07154 0.03858
ER i,t-1 -7.4192E-06 5.9937E-05 -0.12378 0.90151 2.1516E-05 -0.34483 0.73030
GE i,t-1 0.2390679 0.17133 1.39538 0.16323 0.29149 0.82017 0.41233
ρ 0.4609265 0.02767 16.66052 0.00000
R 2 0.13255 Variance 0.01209
R 2  adjusted 0.07851 RSS 11.45298
R 2 ordinary 0.70496
0.89273 501.94259
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 24.11763 F2 31.06944
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       177.32602 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     0.44814 P-value 0.50322
LM ρ+λ     177.77417 P-value 0.00000
Breusch-
Pagan
Durbin-
Watson
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Table D15 
Time Fixed Effects using 4W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7742964 0.06073 12.75020 0.00000 0.15269 5.07102 0.00000
L i,t-1 1.6019E-06 5.9897E-07 2.67446 0.00761 2.0927E-06 0.76549 0.44416
op i,t-1 -0.1183671 0.01012 -11.69319 0.00000 0.02161 -5.47768 0.00000
γ i,t-1 -0.0000954 0.00005 -1.83660 0.06657 1.3317E-04 -0.71607 0.47412
fd i,t-1 -1.1581E-06 5.2441E-07 -2.20839 0.02745 8.6099E-07 -1.34509 0.17891
ER i,t-1 8.4045E-05 9.5001E-05 0.88467 0.37655 8.6843E-05 0.96778 0.33339
GE i,t-1 -0.4914919 0.10747 -4.57315 0.00001 0.28483 -1.72559 0.08474
ρ 0.8002518 0.03229 24.78505 0.00000
R 2 0.25058 Variance 0.03278
R 2  adjusted 0.23148 RSS 32.15228
R 2 ordinary 0.17174
0.18993 615.42699
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed time effects
F1 54.66790 F2 -0.68073
P-value 0.00000 P-value 1.00000
LM ρ       587.35385 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     13.95895 P-value 0.000187
LM ρ+λ     601.31280 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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Table D16 
No Fixed Effects using 4W  (Simple Panel Data Estimation) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
Constant 0.2092107 0.02733 7.65496 0.00000 0.06498 3.21939 0.00133
w τ i,t-1 0.5477322 0.07147 7.66372 0.00000 0.15990 3.42543 0.00064
L i,t-1 0.0000015 5.8317E-07 2.50532 0.01239 1.9954E-06 0.73220 0.46422
op i,t-1 -0.1185545 9.7742E-03 -12.12928 0.00000 0.02075 -5.71397 0.00000
γ i,t-1 -1.0379E-04 5.0248E-05 -2.06567 0.03912 1.2725E-04 -0.81566 0.41489
fd i,t-1 -1.3538E-06 5.1042E-07 -2.65241 0.00812 8.3383E-07 -1.62363 0.10477
ER i,t-1 -6.7628E-06 9.3592E-05 -0.07226 0.94241 2.8726E-05 -0.23543 0.81392
GE i,t-1 -0.3774506 0.10480 -3.60153 0.00033 0.25873 -1.45888 0.14491
ρ 0.7973530 0.01860 42.85797 0.00000
R 2 within 0.20162 Variance 0.03102
R 2  adjusted 0.19603 RSS 30.99212
R 2 ordinary 0.20162
0.18718 593.47834
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero
F1 36.04163
P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       603.90894 P-value 0.00000
LM λ     5.62633 P-value 0.01769
LM ρ+λ     609.53527 P-value 0.00000
Durbin-
Watson
Breusch-
Pagan
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The “Hausman specification test” regards the estimation of 2 models: (1) the fixed 
effects model, consistent under the null and alternative hypotheses (where 
( ) 0/0 == itit XuEH ); and (2) the random effects model, consistent under the null 
hypothesis but inconsistent under the alternative (where ( ) 0/ ≠= itita XuEH ). Once 
these models have been estimated, we compare the parameters obtained under each 
approach and if they are statistically different, we can conclude that the model 
inconsistent under aH should not be used.  
To statistically compare the coefficients estimated, Baltagi (2003) defines the 
Hausman specification test as follows: 
 
                                                             qqVarqm ˆ)ˆ(ˆ 1−′=                                                (E1) 
 
where )(ˆˆˆ GLSREFEq ββ −= ; )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( )(GLSREFE VarVarqVar ββ −= and m is distributed as 2kχ .  
If m shows that the coefficients estimated by the random effects ( )(GLSREβ ) are the 
same as the ones estimated through fixed effects ( FEβ )  (by obtaining a not statistically 
significant P-value, Prob > 2χ larger than 0.05), then we should use random effects. To 
the contrary, if we obtain a statistically significant P-value (Prob > 2χ smaller than 0.05), 
then we should use fixed effects. 
For the four weight matrixes, we estimate the coefficients through the random 
effects generalized least squares (GLS) approach and compare them in the Hausman test 
with the previously obtained individual fixed effects from Appendix D.  
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Hausman Test Estimations under Weight Matrix 1W  
 
 
Table E1 
Fixed Effects: Individual (Within Regression) under 1W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7508322 0.06889 10.89970 0.00000 0.6156462 0.88602
L i,t-1 1.1967E-06 6.6949E-07 1.78745 0.07418 -1.1700E-07 2.51E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0497860 0.03137 -1.58694 0.11286 -0.1113533 0.01178
γ i,t-1 0.0002197 0.00011 1.94691 0.05184 -1.7600E-06 4.41E-04
fd i,t-1 -1.0904E-06 3.7622E-07 -2.89839 0.00384 -1.8300E-06 -3.52E-07
ER i,t-1 7.6403E-06 5.9524E-05 0.12836 0.89789 -1.0920E-04 1.25E-04
GE i,t-1 0.2647555 0.17182 1.54085 0.12369 -0.0724454 0.60196
cons 0.0359748 0.03370 1.07000 0.28600 -0.0301668 0.10212
R 2 0.14065
[95% Confidence Interval]
 
Source: Appendix D, own estimations.  
 
 
Table E2 
Random Effects GLS Regression under 1W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.6363172 0.11009 5.78000 0.00000 0.4205361 0.85210
L i,t-1 2.4500E-06 5.8000E-07 4.23000 0.00000 1.3200E-06 3.59E-06
op i,t-1 -0.1064499 0.01012 -10.52000 0.00000 -0.1262915 -0.08661
γ i,t-1 -0.0002065 0.00005 -4.43000 0.00000 -2.9780E-04 -1.15E-04
fd i,t-1 -1.4500E-06 5.0100E-07 -2.90000 0.00400 -2.4300E-06 -4.71E-07
ER i,t-1 1.3300E-05 9.3800E-05 0.14000 0.88700 -1.7050E-04 1.97E-04
GE i,t-1 -0.2254035 0.11776 -1.91000 0.05600 -0.4562185 0.00541
cons 0.1540253 0.04194 3.67000 0.00000 0.0718332 0.23622
R 2 0.10890 Wald chi2 241.49
Prob > chi2 0.00000
[95% Confidence Interval]
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Table E3 
Hausman Test under 1W  
 
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects Difference
β FE β RE(GLS) β FE - β RE(GLS)
w τ i,t-1 0.7508322 0.6363172 0.11452
L i,t-1 1.2000E-06 2.4500E-06 -1.26E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0497860 -0.1064499 0.05666
γ i,t-1 0.0002197 -0.0002065 0.00043
fd i,t-1 -1.0900E-06 -1.4500E-06 3.62E-07
ER i,t-1 7.6400E-06 1.3300E-05 -5.69E-06
GE i,t-1 0.2647555 -0.22540350 0.49016
-
3.34E-07
0.02969
Standard Error
(diag(V( β FE )-V( β RE ))) 1/2
1.03E-04
0.12512
-
-
 
Hence, using Equation E1 we obtain: 
34.32ˆ =m  
Prob > 2χ = 0.0000 
Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic, and we should use the fixed effects estimator.  
 
Hausman Test Estimations under Weight Matrix 2W  
 
 
Table E4 
Fixed Effects: Individual (Within Regression) under 2W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7341452 0.06854 10.71132 0.00000 0.599639 0.86865
L i,t-1 1.4611E-06 6.8646E-07 2.12844 0.03356 1.1400E-07 2.810E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0531708 0.03127 -1.70050 0.08936 -0.1145329 0.00819
γ i,t-1 0.0002728 0.00012 2.22107 0.02658 3.1800E-05 5.14E-04
fd i,t-1 -1.1064E-06 3.8129E-07 -2.90166 0.00380 -1.8500E-06 -3.58E-07
ER i,t-1 4.8765E-06 5.9477E-05 0.08199 0.93467 -1.1180E-04 1.22E-04
GE i,t-1 0.2366965 0.17263 1.37116 0.17065 -0.1020758 0.57547
cons 0.0536104 0.03377 1.59000 0.11300 -0.0126618 0.11988
R 2 0.14190
[95% Confidence Interval]
 
Source: Appendix D.  
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Table E5 
Random Effects GLS Regression under 2W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.7512447 0.06841 10.98000 0.00000 0.6171698 0.88532
L i,t-1 1.4600E-06 6.6000E-07 2.22000 0.02700 1.6800E-07 2.76E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0784134 0.02402 -3.26000 0.00100 -0.1254992 -0.03133
γ i,t-1 0.0000531 0.00010 0.55000 0.57900 -1.3470E-04 2.41E-04
fd i,t-1 -1.0100E-06 3.7700E-07 -2.67000 0.00800 -1.7500E-06 -2.67E-07
ER i,t-1 4.5800E-06 5.9600E-05 0.08000 0.93900 -1.1220E-04 1.21E-04
GE i,t-1 0.1168666 0.16159 0.72000 0.47000 -0.1998514 0.43358
cons 0.0646072 0.03863 1.67000 0.09400 -0.0110998 0.14031
R 2 0.13730 Wald chi2 158.25
Prob > chi2 0.00000
[95% Confidence Interval]
 
 
 
Table E6 
Hausman Test under 2W  
 
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects Difference
β FE β RE(GLS) β FE - β RE(GLS)
w τ i,t-1 0.7341452 0.7512447 -0.01710
L i,t-1 1.4600E-06 1.4600E-06 -7.64E-10
op i,t-1 -0.0531708 -0.0784134 0.02524
γ i,t-1 0.0002728 0.0000531 2.20E-04
fd i,t-1 -1.1100E-06 -1.0100E-06 -9.92E-08
ER i,t-1 4.8800E-06 4.5800E-06 2.94E-07
GE i,t-1 0.2366966 0.11686660 0.11983
7.68E-05
0.06072
-
5.45E-08
4.26E-03
1.89E-07
0.02001
Standard Error
(diag(V( β FE )-V( β RE ))) 1/2
 
 
With Equation E1 we obtain: 
51.11ˆ =m  
Prob > 2χ = 0.0214 
We should use the fixed effects estimator since we reject the null hypothesis that 
the difference in coefficients is not systematic. 
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Hausman Test Estimations under Weight Matrix 3W  
 
 
Table E7 
Fixed Effects: Individual (Within Regression) under 3W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.4582160 0.05215 8.78595 0.00000 0.35588 0.56058
L i,t-1 2.5383E-06 7.0222E-07 3.61468 0.00032 1.1600E-06 3.92E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0617646 0.03083 -2.00344 0.04541 -0.12228 -0.00128
γ i,t-1 0.0002420 0.00012 2.00473 0.04528 5.1200E-06 4.79E-04
fd i,t-1 -8.7453E-07 3.8229E-07 -2.28758 0.02238 -1.6200E-06 -1.24E-07
ER i,t-1 -1.1462E-05 6.0427E-05 -0.18968 0.84960 -1.3000E-04 1.07E-04
GE i,t-1 0.2565451 0.17437 1.47129 0.14154 -0.08565 0.59873
cons 0.1419756 0.03069 4.63000 0.00000 0.08175 0.20220
R 2 0.11345325
[95% Confidence Interval]
 
Source: Appendix D.  
 
 
Table E8 
Random Effects GLS Regression under 3W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.4675695 0.05135 9.11000 0.00000 0.36692 0.56822
L i,t-1 2.5700E-06 6.7800E-07 3.79000 0.00000 1.2400E-06 3.90E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0820616 0.02308 -3.56000 0.00000 -0.12729 -0.03683
γ i,t-1 0.0000373 0.00009 0.40000 0.69300 -1.4770E-04 2.22E-04
fd i,t-1 -8.1900E-07 3.8000E-07 -2.15000 0.03100 -1.5600E-06 -7.41E-08
ER i,t-1 -1.2600E-05 6.0500E-05 -0.21000 0.83600 -1.3120E-04 1.06E-04
GE i,t-1 0.1298552 0.15967 0.81000 0.41600 -0.18309 0.44280
cons 0.1583008 0.03548 4.46000 0.00000 0.08876 0.22784
R 2 0.10910 Wald chi2 124.75
Prob > chi2 0.00000
[95% Confidence Interval]
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Table E9 
Hausman Test under 3W  
 
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects Difference
β FE β RE(GLS) β FE - β RE(GLS)
w τ i,t-1 0.4582281 0.4675695 -0.00934
L i,t-1 2.5400E-06 2.5700E-06 -3.18E-08
op i,t-1 -0.0617818 -0.0820616 0.02028
γ i,t-1 0.0002420 0.0000373 2.05E-04
fd i,t-1 -8.7500E-07 -8.1900E-07 -5.56E-08
ER i,t-1 -1.1500E-05 -1.2600E-05 1.10E-06
GE i,t-1 0.2565363 0.12985520 0.12668
9.11E-03
1.82E-07
0.02044
Standard Error
(diag(V( β FE )-V( β RE ))) 1/2
7.52E-05
0.07007
-
4.15E-08
 
 
Thus, with Equation E1 we obtain: 
14.11ˆ =m  
Prob > 2χ = 0.0250 
We reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. 
As a consequence, we should use the fixed effects estimator.  
 
Hausman Test Estimations under Weight Matrix 4W  
 
 
Table E10 
Fixed Effects: Individual (Within Regression) under 4W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.6216420 0.05938 10.46886 0.00000 0.50513 0.73819
L i,t-1 1.6562E-06 7.1445E-07 2.31819 0.02065 2.5400E-07 3.06E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0374149 0.03086 -1.21223 0.22573 -0.09806 0.02308
γ i,t-1 0.0002750 0.00011 2.40104 0.01654 5.0200E-05 5.00E-04
fd i,t-1 -9.7184E-07 3.8886E-07 -2.49923 0.01261 -1.7300E-06 -2.09E-07
ER i,t-1 -7.4192E-06 5.9937E-05 -0.12378 0.90151 -1.2500E-04 1.10E-04
GE i,t-1 0.2390679 0.17133 1.39538 0.16323 -0.09718 0.57527
cons 0.0851734 0.03098 2.75000 0.00600 0.02438 0.14596
R 2 0.13255
[95% Confidence Interval]
 
Source: Appendix D. 
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Table E11 
Random Effects GLS Regression under 4W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z P-value
w τ i,t-1 0.6207920 0.05894 10.53000 0.00000 0.50528 0.73630
L i,t-1 1.4600E-06 6.8400E-07 2.13000 0.03300 1.1700E-07 2.80E-06
op i,t-1 -0.0809714 0.02335 -3.47000 0.00100 -0.12674 -0.03520
γ i,t-1 0.0000680 0.00009 0.74000 0.45900 -1.1200E-04 2.48E-04
fd i,t-1 -9.1300E-07 3.8700E-07 -2.36000 0.01800 -1.6700E-06 -1.55E-07
ER i,t-1 -1.1800E-05 6.0100E-05 -0.20000 0.84500 -1.2960E-04 1.06E-04
GE i,t-1 0.0796341 0.15786 0.50000 0.61400 -0.22977 0.38904
cons 0.1108903 0.03566 3.11000 0.00200 0.04101 0.18077
R 2 0.12640 Wald chi2 143.78
Prob > chi2 0.00000
[95% Confidence Interval]
 
 
 
Table E12 
Hausman Test under 4W  
 
Variable Fixed Effects Random Effects Difference
β FE β RE(GLS) β FE - β RE(GLS)
w τ i,t-1 0.6216572 0.6207920 0.00087
L i,t-1 1.6600E-06 1.4600E-06 1.98E-07
op i,t-1 -0.0374912 -0.0809714 0.04348
γ i,t-1 0.0002750 0.0000680 2.07E-04
fd i,t-1 -9.7200E-07 -9.1300E-07 -5.92E-08
ER i,t-1 -7.4200E-06 -1.1800E-05 4.36E-06
GE i,t-1 0.2390448 0.07963410 0.15941
6.84E-05
0.06658
-
4.17E-08
7.25E-03
2.06E-07
0.02018
Standard Error
(diag(V( β FE )-V( β RE ))) 1/2
 
 
Thus, we obtain: 
61.15ˆ =m  
Prob > 2χ = 0.0036 
As a result, we reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic, and we should use the fixed effects estimator.  
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Several regressions were performed as an exercise using different time lags for 
the independent variables. We chose the fixed individual effects model for this analysis 
since in the dissertation it proved to be the most appropriate estimation method. Equation 
110 from Chapter 6 was transformed to include two and three time lags.  
The two period time lag equation for the fixed individual effects model can be 
described as: 
 
                                             ittitiiti XW εβταµφτ ++++= −− 2,2,,                                  (F1) 
 
On the other hand, the three period time lag equation is expressed as: 
 
                                           ittitiiti XW εβταµφτ ++++= −− 3,3,,                                 (F2) 
 
Hence, the following tables present the estimation results for each weight matrix 
for the fixed individual effects approach using Equations F1 and F2. 
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Two Period Time Lag (2PTL): Equation F1 
 
 
Table F1 
2PTL Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 1W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-2 0.6613889 0.06892 9.59684 0.00000 1.2227E-01 5.40907 0.00000
L i,t-2 1.2135E-06 6.8141E-07 1.78084 0.07528 8.5208E-07 1.42414 0.15475
op i,t-2 -0.0521835 0.03269 -1.59622 0.11079 4.8980E-02 -1.06541 0.28698
γ i,t-2 0.0002023 0.00012 1.70091 0.08931 1.8876E-04 1.07178 0.28411
fd i,t-2 -8.3882E-07 3.8481E-07 -2.17986 0.02953 3.8553E-07 -2.17576 0.02983
ER i,t-2 2.2121E-05 5.9798E-05 0.36992 0.71153 7.2188E-06 3.06432 0.00225
GE i,t-2 0.0548599 0.18137 0.30248 0.76236 2.6845E-01 0.20436 0.83812
ρ 0.4419130 0.02850 15.50835 0.00000
R 2 0.11388 Variance 0.01170
R 2  adjusted 0.05540 RSS 10.45965
R 2 ordinary 0.71116
Durbin-Watson 0.92895 Breusch-Pagan 456.62718
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 19.14958 F2 30.77342
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       0.01185 P-value 0.91330
LM λ     1.65176 P-value 0.19872
LM ρ+λ     1.66361 P-value 0.43526
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Table F2 
2PTL Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 2W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-2 0.6496425 0.06842 9.49550 0.00000 1.2281E-01 5.28963 0.00000
L i,t-2 1.4533E-06 6.9864E-07 2.08015 0.03780 9.3362E-07 1.55660 0.11992
op i,t-2 -0.0553291 0.03255 -1.69964 0.08955 4.8082E-02 -1.15072 0.25015
γ i,t-2 0.0002640 0.00013 2.02684 0.04298 2.1669E-04 1.21823 0.22346
fd i,t-2 -8.1251E-07 3.9036E-07 -2.08146 0.03768 3.7734E-07 -2.15328 0.03156
ER i,t-2 2.0423E-05 5.9714E-05 0.34201 0.73242 7.0817E-06 2.88388 0.00402
GE i,t-2 0.0248554 0.18223 0.13640 0.89154 2.6979E-01 0.09213 0.92662
ρ 0.4411082 0.02851 15.46964 0.00000
R 2 0.11630 Variance 0.01167
R 2  adjusted 0.05798 RSS 10.43116
R 2 ordinary 0.71195
Durbin-Watson 0.93336 Breusch-Pagan 458.36440
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 19.60873 F2 30.85143
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       0.01370 P-value 0.90681
LM λ     1.17127 P-value 0.27914
LM ρ+λ     1.18498 P-value 0.55295
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Table F3 
2PTL Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 3W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-2 0.3202299 0.05344 5.99263 0.00000 8.2207E-02 3.89541 0.00011
L i,t-2 1.6091E-06 7.2582E-07 2.21695 0.02688 9.4291E-07 1.70654 0.08825
op i,t-2 -0.0717976 0.03272 -2.19414 0.02848 4.9557E-02 -1.44877 0.14775
γ i,t-2 0.0003045 0.00013 2.37209 0.01790 2.2303E-04 1.36547 0.17245
fd i,t-2 -5.5751E-07 3.9167E-07 -1.42341 0.15497 4.0243E-07 -1.38536 0.16629
ER i,t-2 1.9769E-06 6.1364E-05 0.03222 0.97431 9.6841E-06 0.20413 0.83830
GE i,t-2 0.1190120 0.18642 0.63841 0.52337 3.3887E-01 0.35120 0.72552
ρ 0.4414317 0.02820 15.65431 0.00000
R 2 0.06581 Variance 0.01233
R 2  adjusted 0.00415 RSS 11.02716
R 2 ordinary 0.69549
Durbin-Watson 0.92404 Breusch-Pagan 443.89325
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 10.49574 F2 28.76829
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       0.03275 P-value 0.85639
LM λ     24.67796 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ+λ     24.71071 P-value 0.00000
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Table F4 
2PTL Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 4W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-2 0.5464243 0.06029 9.06385 0.00000 1.0603E-01 5.15349 0.00000
L i,t-2 1.4787E-06 7.3094E-07 2.02301 0.04337 9.7321E-07 1.51942 0.12901
op i,t-2 -0.0428065 0.03199 -1.33798 0.18124 4.6185E-02 -0.92685 0.35425
γ i,t-2 0.0002872 0.00012 2.38497 0.01729 2.0082E-04 1.43024 0.15300
fd i,t-2 -5.2591E-07 3.9994E-07 -1.31495 0.18886 4.1986E-07 -1.25259 0.21068
ER i,t-2 1.2112E-05 6.0266E-05 0.20097 0.84076 9.5260E-06 1.27147 0.20389
GE i,t-2 0.0568459 0.18083 0.31437 0.75332 2.7982E-01 0.20315 0.83906
ρ 0.4433932 0.02841 15.60781 0.00000
R 2 0.10386 Variance 0.01183
R 2  adjusted 0.04472 RSS 10.57795
R 2 ordinary 0.70789
Durbin-Watson 0.93593 Breusch-Pagan 442.41798
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 17.26892 F2 29.72503
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       0.00001 P-value 0.99753
LM λ     3.57737 P-value 0.05857
LM ρ+λ     3.57738 P-value 0.16718
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Three Period Time Lag (3PTL): Equation F2 
 
 
Table F5 
3PTL Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 1W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-3 0.5389827 0.06895 7.81755 0.00000 1.1543E-01 4.66915 0.00000
L i,t-3 3.2693E-07 6.8513E-07 0.47718 0.63336 7.5725E-07 0.43173 0.66605
op i,t-3 -0.0639987 0.03437 -1.86209 0.06294 5.1490E-02 -1.24294 0.21424
γ i,t-3 0.0002880 0.00012 2.31253 0.02099 1.8358E-04 1.56881 0.11707
fd i,t-3 -6.6720E-07 5.9626E-07 -1.11898 0.26347 6.5128E-07 -1.02445 0.30592
ER i,t-3 1.2707E-05 5.8599E-05 0.21685 0.82838 2.0181E-05 0.62966 0.52909
GE i,t-3 -0.3047072 0.18771 -1.62327 0.10491 2.8321E-01 -1.07591 0.28228
ρ 0.4355913 0.02932 14.85797 0.00000
R 2 0.07860 Variance 0.01118
R 2  adjusted 0.01396 RSS 9.40458
R 2 ordinary 0.71803
Durbin-Watson 0.93697 Breusch-Pagan 435.66414
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 11.95650 F2 30.03931
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       3.91298 P-value 0.04791
LM λ     0.11100 P-value 0.73900
LM ρ+λ     4.02399 P-value 0.13372
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Table F6 
3PTL Results for Estimations under weight Matrix 2W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-3 0.5263548 0.06835 7.70035 0.00000 1.1563E-01 4.55188 0.00001
L i,t-3 4.9253E-07 7.0365E-07 0.69996 0.48415 7.7903E-07 0.63223 0.52741
op i,t-3 -0.0660760 0.03424 -1.92980 0.05397 5.1097E-02 -1.29315 0.19632
γ i,t-3 0.0003503 0.00014 2.55253 0.01087 2.0886E-04 1.67736 0.09384
fd i,t-3 -5.9431E-07 6.0264E-07 -0.98617 0.32433 6.6134E-07 -0.89864 0.36910
ER i,t-3 1.1987E-05 5.8573E-05 0.20466 0.83789 2.0715E-05 0.57869 0.56295
GE i,t-3 -0.3332360 0.18904 -1.76276 0.07830 2.8599E-01 -1.16521 0.24426
ρ 0.4351570 0.02935 14.82789 0.00000
R 2 0.08003 Variance 0.01117
R 2  adjusted 0.01549 RSS 9.38994
R 2 ordinary 0.71847
Durbin-Watson 0.94056 Breusch-Pagan 439.38246
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 12.19367 F2 30.13706
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       3.87735 P-value 0.04894
LM λ     0.23033 P-value 0.63128
LM ρ+λ     4.10768 P-value 0.12824
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
268 
Table F7 
3PTL Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 3W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-3 0.2986694 0.05365 5.56722 0.00000 6.5026E-02 4.59310 0.00001
L i,t-3 5.2938E-07 7.2318E-07 0.73202 0.46436 8.0088E-07 0.66099 0.50880
op i,t-3 -0.0749841 0.03414 -2.19635 0.02834 5.0725E-02 -1.47825 0.13972
γ i,t-3 0.0004244 0.00013 3.20018 0.00142 1.9902E-04 2.13251 0.03325
fd i,t-3 -3.9556E-07 6.4030E-07 -0.61776 0.53690 7.3863E-07 -0.53552 0.59243
ER i,t-3 -7.6771E-07 5.9403E-05 -0.01292 0.98969 2.4055E-05 -0.03191 0.97455
GE i,t-3 -0.2661267 0.18995 -1.40102 0.16158 3.1118E-01 -0.85522 0.39267
ρ 0.4430878 0.02909 15.23286 0.00000
R 2 0.05398 Variance 0.01148
R 2  adjusted -0.01238 RSS 9.65581
R 2 ordinary 0.71049
Durbin-Watson 0.92076 Breusch-Pagan 428.01833
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 7.99853 F2 28.97935
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       4.56552 P-value 0.03262
LM λ     3.11946 P-value 0.07736
LM ρ+λ     7.68499 P-value 0.02144
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Table F8 
3PTL Results for Estimations under Weight Matrix 4W  
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Test P-value Robust SE T-Test P-value
w τ i,t-3 0.4135585 0.06074 6.80820 0.00000 1.0254E-01 4.03317 0.00006
L i,t-3 5.8086E-07 7.4221E-07 0.78261 0.43408 9.6429E-07 0.60237 0.54709
op i,t-3 -0.0478215 0.03337 -1.43297 0.15224 4.9002E-02 -0.97591 0.32939
γ i,t-3 0.0003710 0.00013 2.94314 0.00334 1.9650E-04 1.88822 0.05934
fd i,t-3 -6.8344E-08 6.2764E-07 -0.10889 0.91332 8.2126E-07 -0.08322 0.93370
ER i,t-3 1.1115E-05 5.9505E-05 0.18679 0.85187 2.2650E-05 0.49072 0.62375
GE i,t-3 -0.2740829 0.18724 -1.46379 0.14363 2.9502E-01 -0.92904 0.35314
ρ 0.4332824 0.02938 14.74624 0.00000
R 2 0.06402 Variance 0.01136
R 2  adjusted -0.00165 RSS 9.55339
R 2 ordinary 0.71357
Durbin-Watson 0.95445 Breusch-Pagan 433.17379
1) F-test for the all coefficients equal zero 2) F-test for fixed individual effects
F1 9.58689 F2 28.87411
P-value 0.00000 P-value 0.00000
LM ρ       3.82623 P-value 0.05046
LM λ     0.07134 P-value 0.78940
LM ρ+λ     3.89757 P-value 0.14245
 
 
The following presents a comparison among one, two and three period time lags 
regressions under each of the four weight matrixes. 
First, under weight matrix 1W  when comparing Table D2, Table F1, and Table F5 
we found the following: 
1. The estimated coefficients for τw  were statistically different from zero and 
maintained their positive signs in the three cases, while 3,2,1, −−− >> tititi www τττ . 
2. The parameters estimated for L , op ,γ  , and GE turned out statistically not different 
from zero in the three cases. 
3. Results for the one and two period time lag regressions show that fd  coefficients 
were statistically different from zero, maintained their negative signs, and 
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1,2, −− > titi fdfd . The estimated coefficient for the three period time lag equation was 
statistically not different from zero.  
4. The ER estimated coefficient resulted statistically different from zero in the two 
period time lag regression. To the contrary, in the one and three period time lag 
regressions the coefficients were not statistically significant.     
Second, using weight matrix 2W  the comparison of Table D6, Table F2, and 
Table F6 provided the following conclusions: 
1. For the three cases, the τw  coefficients were statistically different from zero, 
maintained their positive signs, and 3,2,1, −−− >> tititi www τττ . 
2. The estimated coefficients for L , op , and GE turned out statistically not different 
from zero in the three cases. 
3. The γ  estimated coefficients resulted statistically not different from zero for the one 
and two period time lag regressions, while different from zero at the 90% level for the 
three period time lag equation. 
4. Results for the one and two period time lag regressions show a statistically different 
from zero fd  coefficient, where 1,2, −− > titi fdfd . The estimated coefficient for the 
three period time lag regression was statistically not significant.  
5. The estimated coefficient for ER  resulted statistically significant in the two period 
time lag regression; nonetheless, its magnitude is relatively small. On the other hand, 
in the one and three period time lag regressions the coefficients were not different 
from zero.    
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Third, comparing Table D10, Table F3, and Table F7 using weight matrix 3W  the 
following conclusion arise: 
1. Again, the τw  estimated coefficients were statistically different from zero for the 
three cases. They maintained a positive sign and the relationship among them show 
that 3,2,1, −−− >> tititi www τττ . 
2. The estimated parameter for L  was statistically different from zero for the one period 
time lag regression. It was also different from zero at the 90% level for the two period 
time lag equation, and not statistically significant for the three period time lag 
regression.  
3. The op , ER, and GE estimated coefficients resulted statistically not different from 
zero in the one, two and three period time lag regressions. 
4. The estimated coefficients for γ  were statistically not different from zero for the one 
and two period time lag regressions, but statistically significant for the three period 
time lag equation. 
5. Results for the two and three period time lag regressions show a statistically not 
different from zero fd  coefficients. To the contrary, the fd  estimated parameter for 
the one period time lag equation was statistically significant.  
Fourth, with weight matrix 4W  the comparison among Table D14, Table F4, and 
Table F8 show that: 
1. For the three cases the τw  estimated coefficients were statistically different from 
zero and 3,2,1, −−− >> tititi www τττ . 
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2. The estimated parameter for L  was statistically different from zero at the 90% level 
for the one period time lag regression. For the cases of the two and three period time 
lag regressions, the L  estimated parameters were not statistically significant.  
3. The estimations for the op , ER, and GE coefficients were statistically not different 
from zero in the one, two and three period time lag regressions. 
4. The γ  estimated parameter was statistically different from zero in the three period 
time lag regression; nevertheless, for the one and two period time lag equations the 
parameters were not statistically significant. 
5. Finally, the fd  estimated parameter for the one period time lag was statistically 
different from zero, while for the two and three period time lag regressions the 
estimated coefficients were not different from zero. 
Hence, from the four cases and three types of regressions, the τw  parameters 
showed to be higher for the one period time lag equation, than for the two and three 
period time lag equations. Parameters such as op  and GE were never statistically 
different from zero, while L , ER, γ , and fd  estimated coefficients changed their 
statistical significance depending on the time lags and weight matrix used in the 
regressions.   
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